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Material Abstract
In western market economies, it is generally accepted that competition is the key
point of achieving social and economic welfare. Therefore, it is necessary to protect
competition and there are, basically, two main approaches to deterring such socially
harmful behaviour: an administrative public enforcement by public agencies and
fine proceedings or a private enforcement through litigations by private parties and
especially damage claims.
But, the work will show that private enforcement of European competition law
is underdeveloped, but still necessary as access to individual justice with reference
to the theoretical analysis by Aristotle and other moral philosophers
Because of the underdevelopment, the work argues in favour of a necessity
to implement a general right of pre-action disclosure and access to files in the
possession of the competition authorities to improve the effectiveness of private
enforcement of European competition law. On the other hand, the given rights
of the European Commission make its fine proceedings an effective information
gathering system and thus an effective way of detecting and proving an infringement
of European competition law, especially Art 101 TFEU. But, the Commission has
to rely on members of cartels to apply for leniency and therefore to disclose a
hidden infringement, i.e. cartel. Furthermore, an efficient leniency programme has
to offer effective protection to its whistle-blowers. However, this protection policy is
in conflict with an effective private enforcement because the private plaintiffs have
to provide evidence of an infringement.
Recently, the European Commission gets the ball rolling again by introducing
its Directive 2014/104/EU that focuses on the effectiveness of private enforcement
of European competition law and especially of civil damage claims. Therefore, it is
highly topical to highlight the theoretical and practical relationship between public
and private enforcement and the main tasks and problems by implementing the
European rules into national law.
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1. Introduction
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversion ends in a conspiracy against the public, or
in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such
meetings, by any law, which either could be executed, or would be consistent
with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same
trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate
such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.1
(Adam Smith)
Competition is key principle of gaining social welfare in western economies.
Nevertheless, as the quote of Adam Smith mentioned, it is a natural behaviour of
market players to maximise their profits. In western market economies, it is generally
accepted that competition is the key point of achieving social and economic welfare.
A working competition results in an optimal allocation of goods and resources as
well as generally lower prices and hence a greater number of goods delivered to more
people.
The first German Vice Chancler and Minister of Economic Affairs after the
Second World War and the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ludwig
Erhard, described the effect of cartels in the following way:
There have never been as many unemployed in German, economic history as
in the period when cartels flourished most strongly. Cartels always have to be
paid for by a lower standard of living.2
Erhard made to the point that cartels as a way of elimination of competition
leads to less innovation and less economic welfare and – for him in connection with
unemployments – to less social welfair. This is linked to the economic functions
of competition: control, coordination, encouragement, protection and selection of a
market economy. Therefore, it is necessary to protect these functions by protecting
competition.
Basically, there are two main approaches to deterring such socially harmful
behaviour: an administrative public enforcement by public agencies and fine
1A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Strahan & Cadell
1776) Book I, Ch 10 at para 82.
2L Erhard, Prosperity through competition (1958) 136-7.
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proceedings or a private enforcement through litigations by private parties and
especially damage claims. Although both approaches of competition law enforcement
are in use in most countries, the emphasis varies between common law and civil
law jurisdictions.3 Whereas common law jurisdictions, such as the United States or
the United Kingdom put the emphasis on private litigation, civil law jurisdictions,
such as German law or other countries of continental Europe strengthen public
enforcement by agencies.4
This distinction is attributed to the two main concepts of economic policy:
Ordoliberlism and the Chicago School. Whereas Ordoliberalism (or Freiburg School)
is the theoretical baseline of the economy especially in Germany, which is based
between social liberalism and neoliberalism and emphasises the need for a state
to ensure that the free market produces results close to its theoretical potential.5
On the other hand, the Chicago School of economics is a neoclassical school of
economic thought that emphasises the self-healing power of the market and have a
large influence on US-American competition law and its focus on private enforcement
by market players.6
Recently, the European Commission gets the ball rolling again by introducing
its Directive 2014/104/EU of 27th December 2014. The Directive focuses on the
effectiveness of private enforcement of European competition law and especially of
civil damage claims. A main problem in the Directive is the relationship between
public and private enforcement and especially the protection of applicants for the
leniency regimes. Until 27th December 2016, the Member States of the European
Union have the task to implement these rules into national law.
Therefore, it is highly topical to highlight the theoretical and practical
relationship between public and private enforcement and the main tasks and
problems by implementing the European rules into national law.
Based upon this, the first question is, if there is an underdevelopment of
private enforcement of European competition law (Section 2.1) and if there is
a need of an effective private enforcement with reference to access to individual
justice (Section 2.3). This is based on the empirical reality of public and private
enforcement in Europe and the theoretical analysis by Aristotle and other moral
philosophers. With reference to the outcome of this basic question, the next task
is to analyse the reasons for this underdevelopment (Section 2.2) and to discuss
3Segal I and Whinston M, ‘Public vs private enforcement of antitrust law: a survey’
(2007) 28 ECLR 306.
4Ibid.
5R Ptak, ‘Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the Ordoliberal Foundations of the Social
Market Economy’ in P Mirowski and D Plehwe (eds), The Road From Mont Pe´lerin: The Making
of The Neoliberal Thought Collective (Harvard University Press 2009) 124-5.
6BE Kaufman, ‘Chicago and the development of twentieth-century labor economics’, in
RB Emmett (ed), The Elgar Companion to the Chicago School of Economics (Edward
Elgar 2010) 133.
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whether the burdon of proof is the weak point of private enforcement (Chapter 3).
Therefore, it is necessary to argue whether follow-on claims and access to files are
the central mechanisms to fine-tune the relationship between public and private
enforcement of competition law. Furthermore, it is factually and legally necessary
to implement rules of getting access to files in the poesession of the defendant as
well as the competition authorities. On the other hand, it is necessary to protect
leniency documents to protect the leniency regimes and the effectiveness of public
enforecement (Chapter 4).
14
2. The necessity of private competition
law enforcement in Europe and the
historical and structural reasons for its
underdevelopment
This chapter begins by focusing on the necessity of private competition law
enforcement in Europe and by highlighting the historical and structural reasons
for its underdevelopment. In the first section, the chapter points out the
underdevelopment of private enforcement on the basis of the analysis of the
Directorate General of Competition on Directive 2014/104/EU and an empirical
analysis about the quantitative and qualitative relationship between public and
private enforcement of European competition law, especially Art 101 TFEU.
The second section of the chapter examines the reasons for this underdevelopment
of private competition law enforcement and focuses on the history of competition
law enforcement in Europe and its structure, starting with the first regulations about
competition law in the ECSC-Treaty 1952 all the way to the Treaty of Lisbon 2009.
This shows the privileged position of public enforcement to punish a breach of the
relevant European competition regulations. A comparative analysis of competition
law enforcement in the US illustrates how the US system compensates for the
lack of specialised agencies (private litigants as ‘private attorney-generals’7).8 This
section concludes that the US conditions and limitations of private actions cannot
be uncritically transcribed into the European context.9
Besides the historical argument, the section analyses the structural reasons for
the underdevelopment. For this purpose, the section first deals with the investigating
possibilities of the competition authorities. Based on the principle of an inquisitorial
system of administrative law enforcement, this section defines the term inquisitorial
system. In doing so, it strengthens the distinction between an inquisitorial system
7Associated Industries of New York State, Inc v Ickes 134 F 2d 694 (2d Cir 1943) at 704 by
Franck J.
8S Bourjade, ‘The role of private litigation in antitrust enforcement’ (2010) 3 GCLR 118.
9CA Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA (OUP 1999) 186;
AP Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition
Law by National Courts (Hart Pub 2008) 10-1.
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in a wider sense as a proceeding conducted by a judge in a public inquisition or
investigation of a crime and an adversarial system where a judge focuses on the
issue of law and procedure and acts as a referee in the contest between the defence
and the prosecutor. This part analyses the distinction between an adversarial and
inquisitorial system and how this relates to the differences between a civil law and a
common law system. Beyond this, the section also analyses the definition of the term
inquisitorial system in a narrower sense as the unity of the investigating and deciding
authority and its roots based on Roman and medieval criminal law. It highlights that
this proceeding is not used in modern criminal law but is the main proceeding in
administrative law and hence in the public enforcement of competition law. The
section goes on to analyse the provisions on dawn raids and interviews by the
Commission and national competition authorities as main investigating mechanisms.
Finally, this section focuses on the importance of whistle-blowers and their
protection through leniency regimes. Related to this, the first section ends by
focusing on the leniency programme of the European Commission as a reason for
the underdevelopment of private enforcement of European competition law. The
section will do this by considering the developments of the leniency regimes of the
German and English competition authorities as well as the European Commission,
its general requirements and its benefits and protection limits. In doing so, the
section will reveal the vulnerability of leniency applicants because an applicant for a
leniency programme has to disclose everything related to the breach of competition
law and is therefore susceptible to civil claims. This is even more so as the fines
protection of the leniency regime generally has no effect on the possibility of civil
damages claims.
In its second part, the chapter focuses on the question of whether private
enforcement is necessary alongside an effective public enforcement regime. With
reference to an analysis of individual and universal justice, the section comes to the
conclusion that there is a necessity for restitution and therefore private enforcement
of European competition law.
2.1 The underdevelopment of private
competition law enforcement in Europe
2.1.1 Perception of underdevelopment of private competition law
enforcement by the European Commission
In its statement on the reasons for the most recent European Directive on Cartel
Damage Claims 2014/104/EU, the European Commission – in particular the
Directorate General for Competition – indicated that there had been considerable
16
underdevelopment of private enforcement of European competition law, especially
by damage claims.10
In the legislative proceedings of the Commission before the proposal of
the Directive, the Directorate General of Competition acknowledged a “total
underdevelopment” of private proceedings for damages based on an infringement of
European competition law.11 With reference to a study by Ashurst LLP which was
commissioned by the Directorate General of Competition, the European Commission
identified the “astonishing diversity” of the legal frameworks of the Member
States related to private cartel damage claims.12 Based upon this, the European
Commission concluded in its White Paper that there was currently a lack of “an
effective legal framework for private actions seeking compensation for the damage
caused to citizens and businesses as a result of infringements of EC competition
law”13 and this was the main obstacle that had prevented the development of private
enforcement. With reference to the case law of the ECJ and its statement that in
the absence of European law, the legal systems of the Member States had to provide
the details of the legal proceedings,14 the European Commission decided to start a
harmonisation process that culminated in Directive 2014/104/EU.
2.1.2 Empirical reality of public and private enforcement
These theoretical arguments of the Commission and especially of the
Directorate-General for Competition can be validated by empirical evidence. On
the one hand, the number of cases shows that private damage claims plays a minor
role in relation to public fine proceedings. On the other hand, the outcomes of the
fine proceedings of the European Commission indicate highly efficient and deterrent
public competition law enforcements.
Related to the decentralised private enforcement regime of European competition
law, the data basis of private damage claims based on an infringement of European
competition law is not comprehensive. However, Germany and England became the
most important forum for damage claims and it is therefore sufficient to analyse both
jurisdictions to get a broad picture of the relationship between public and private
competition law enforcement.
10See Commision, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition
law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union’ COM(2013) 404 final, 2.
11Commision, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper – Annex to the Green Paper Damages actions
for breach of the EC antitrust rules’ SEC(2005) 1732, at para 29; Commission, ‘Green Paper on
Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules’ COM(2005) 672 final, 4.
12See E Clark, M Hughes and D Wirth, ‘Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of
infringement of EC competition rules’ (2004) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/
actionsdamages/economic_clean_en.pdf> accessed 01/03/2016.
13Commision, ‘Commission staff working document accompanying document to the White paper
on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules – Impact assessment’ SEC(2008) 405 final, 5.
14See Commission, ‘Green Paper on Damages Actions’ (n 11) 4.
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On the one hand, there has been no successful damage claim based on an
infringement of European competition law in England.15 On the other hand, in
Germany, 368 private actions were claimed between 2005 and 2007,16 but only
10,87% of these actions were private damage claims.17 Only 17% hereof were based on
European law and 13,3% on an infringement of Art 101 TFEU.18 At the same time,
the chances of winning (or even partially winning) the damage claim was 17,5%.19
Therefore, approximately 1 damage claim out of an infringement of Art 101 TFEU
was successful.
Figure: 1: Private actions in Germany 2005-2007
For the period 2009 to 2010, the German Federal Competition Office (Bundes-
kartellamt) listed 556 private actions,20 and between 2011 and 2012 there
were 311 private actions.21 Transferred to this period, approximately 2 damage
claims out of an infringement of Art 101 TFEU were successful.
On the other hand, the Commission has imposed around 20.4 billion Euros in
113 cases in the last 24 years. Between the years 1990 and 1999, the Commission
came to approximately 2 positive fine decisions per year. Between 2000 and 2004,
the number of cases leaped to 30 cases in 4 years (roughly 7.5 cases per year) and
has remained at that level ever since.
15BJ Rodger, ‘Private Enforcement of Competition Law, the Hidden Story: Competition
Litigation Settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000-2005’ (2008) 29 ECLR 96.
16S Peyer, ‘Myths and Untold Stories – Private Antitrust Enforcement in Germany’ (Working
Paper No. 10-12, Centre for Competition Policy 2010) 27.
17Ibid 48.
18Ibid 57.
19Ibid 54.
20Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes u¨ber seine Ta¨tigkeit in den Jahren 2009/2010 sowie u¨ber die
Lage und Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet [2011] BT-Drs 17/6640, 49.
21Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes u¨ber seine Ta¨tigkeit in den Jahren 2011/2012 sowie u¨ber die
Lage und Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet [2013] BT-Drs 17/13675, 42.
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Figure: 2: Positive fine decisions of the European Commission between 1990 and 2014
Tabelle 1: Number of positive fine decisions of the European Commission between
1990 and 201422
Number of positive
fine decisions of the EC
1990 – 1994 10
1995 – 1999 10
2000 – 2004 30
2005 – 2009 33
2010 7 30
2011 4
2012 5
2013 4
2014 10
At the same time, the amount of fines imposed by the European Commission
correlates with amount of imposed fines but arose with a time difference. Before 2000,
the Commission imposed less than half a million Euros in fines over a four year
period. After an intermediate level of around 3 million fines in 2000-2004, the amount
of fines imposed by the Commission nearly stagnated between 9 and 9.5 million Euros
in a four year period.
22<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf> accessed
01/03/2016.
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Figure: 3: Fines imposed by the European Commission between 1990 and 2014
Tabelle 2: Amount of fines imposed by the European Commission adjusted and
non-adjusted by the European Courts between 1990 and 201423
Fines imposed by
Commission
Fines after adjustment
by CFI/ECJ
Difference
1990 – 1994 539,691,550 e 344,282,550.00 e 195,409,000.00 e
1995 – 1999 292,838,000 e 270,963,500.00 e 21,874,500.00 e
2000 – 2004 3,462,664,100 e 3,157,348,710.00 e 305,315,390.00 e
2005 – 2009 9,414,012,500 e 7,928,868,156.50 e 1,485,144,343.50 e
2010 – 2014 8,930,678,674 e 8,700,344,579.00 e 230,334,095.00 e
On the other hand, this increase in fines is directly related to an increase in fines
in particular cases (Leading Cases). The relevance of these Leading Cases can be
illustrated in relation to the imposed fines of the minor cases per year.
23Ibid.
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Figure: 4: Average fines per year and the distinction between Leading Case and
other cases
Figure 4 shows that the fines of Leading Cases represent approximately 68% of
all fines imposed by the European Commission in a particular year. The proportion
is based on the four Leading Cases between the years 2011 and 2014.
Tabelle 3: Amount of fines imposed by the European Commission between 2011 and
2014 as well as imposed fines in Leading Cases24
2011 2012 2013 2014
Fines (sum of the year) 614,053,000 e 1,875,694,000 e 1,882,975,000 e 1,689,497,000 e
Case AT.39437 – 1,470,515,000 e
TV and computer
monitor tubes
Case AT.39914 – 1,042,749,000 e
Euro Interest Rate
Derivatives (EIRD)
Case COMP/
AT.39861 –
669,719,000 e
Yen Interest Rate
Derivatives (YIRD)25
Case AT.39922 – 953,306,000 e
Automotive bearings
Others 614,053,000 e 405,179,000 e 170,507,000 e 736,191,000 e
24Ibid.
25The Commission imposed fines with an amount of all in all 684,679,000 e in several decisions
of the YIRD case in 2013 and 2015. Recognising that there was only 1 positive fine decision of
the EC in 2015 until the official statistic has been published, and referring to the published amount
of 14,960,000 e in 2015, the Commission imposed 669,719,000 e of the YIRD case in 2013.
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On the other hand, the top 6 cases with the highest imposed fines since 1969 were
between 2008 and 2014. That directly correlates with the amount of the overall fine
increases.
Tabelle 4: Top 6 cases with the highest imposed fines since 196926
Year Leading Case Imposed fines
2008 Case COMP/39.125 – Carglass 1,185,500,000 e
2009 Case COMP/39.401 – E.ON/GDF 640,000,000 e
2010 Case C.39258 – Airfreight 799,445,000 e
2012 Case AT.39437 – TV and computer monitor tubes 1,470,515,000 e
2013 Case AT.39914 – Euro Interest Rate Derivatives (EIRD) 1,042,749,000 e
2014 Case AT.39922 – Automotive bearings 953,306,000 e
Alongside the purely quantitative decrease in decisions and fines, Figure 3 and
Table 2 illustrate the effectiveness of public competition law enforcement by the
European Commission. With reference to the adjustments by the European courts,
the data show that the difference between the fines imposed by the European
Commission and the adjusted fines after the decisions of the European Courts are
less than 10% overall in relation to the amount of fines imposed by the European
Commission. Furthermore, in the last four years only in 2000 was an adjustment by
the European Courts.
Figure: 5: Fines imposed by the European Commission between 2010 and 2014
26<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf> accessed
01/03/2016.
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Tabelle 5: Amount of fines imposed by the European Commission adjusted and
non-adjusted by the European Courts between 2010 and 201427
Fines imposed
by Commission
Fines after adjustment
by CFI/ECJ
Difference
2010 2,853,499,674 e 2,623,165,579 e 230,334,095 e
2011 614,053,000 e 614,053,000 e –
2012 1,875,694,000 e 1,875,694,000 e –
2013 1,882,975,000 e 1,882,975,000 e –
2014 1,689,497,000 e 1,689,497,000 e –
Another indicator confirming the efficiency of public competition law enforcement
by the European Commission is the number of fined undertakings per fine decision
of the Commission. Between 1990 and 2014 the European Commission imposed
fines on 784 undertakings. Related to the number of positive fine decisions, the
Commission imposed fines on average on 6.31 undertakings per positive fine decision.
2.1.3 Conclusion
In summary, it can be said that private enforcement of European competition law
by damage claims based on an infringement of Art 101 TFEU is underdeveloped.
With reference to a purely quantitative analysis, the number of cases of damage
claims is marginal in relation to the number of fine decisions by the Commission
and they are more in relation to the number of imposed undertakings. On the other
hand, the relation between decisions and imposed undertakings and the minimum
adjustments by courts show the high quality of public enforcement as an efficient
enforcement proceeding.
2.2 Historical and structural reasons for
the underdevelopment of private
competition law enforcement
Given that private enforcement of European competition law is underdeveloped, the
question of why this is so arises. The first reason for this underdevelopment could
be historic. Competition law is traditionally ‘public enforced’ in Europe and thus
public enforcement is well established and could develop an efficient structure. On
the other hand, this structure of public enforcement could be the second reason for
weak private enforcement. Strong and efficient public authorities and an effective
leniency regime strengthen public enforcement but weaken private enforcement.
27Ibid.
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2.2.1 History of competition law enforcement in Europe as a story
of public enforcement
The enforcement of competition law in Europe is mainly characterised by the
activities of the European Commission and the national competition authorities.28
Although much of the legal basis of the European provisions about competition law,
especially the regulations in Art 101 and 102 TFEU, are based on the decades-long
experience of market concentration and competition law enforcement of the US,29
the European regulations are – in contrast to the rules in the US30 – shaped around
a strong public enforcement through specialised agencies.31
To understand these different approaches of competition law enforcement, it is
necessary to analyse the historical developments of European competition law. In
contrast to the competition law regulation in the US, which is mainly based on the
Sherman Antitrust Act 1890 and the Clayton Antitrust Act 1914,32 the European
provisions are very young and were established after the Second World War.
The first regulations about competition law in Europe were the provisions in
the Treaty of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) from 1952 (Treaty
of Paris).33 After the experience in market concentration in the coal and steel
industry – the main industrial sector at the time – and its utilisation in the Second
World War, six countries in the middle of Europe wanted to find a way to decentralise
the market as it was mainly dominated by German companies.34 In addition, the
coal and steel production was seen as key to the rapid reconstruction of Europe
28S Bourjade (n 8) 118.
29N Foster, EU Law (4th edn, OUP 2014) 482.
30Associated Industries v Ickes at 704 per Franck J calling private litigants in the US 'private
attorney-generals'.
31C Harding, European Community Investigations and Sanctions, The Supranational Control
of Business Delinquency (Leicester University Press 1993) 116; M Paulweber, ‘The End of
a Success Story? The European Commission's White Paper on the Modernisation of the
European Competition Law; A Comparative Study about the Role of the Notification of
Restrictive Practices within the European Competition and the American Antitrust Law’ (2000)
23 WComp 3, 45; WPJ Wils, ‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in
Europe?’ (2003) 26 WComp 473; D Wolf, ‘European Political Integration, Comparative Law and
Private Enforcement of Competition Law’ in T Einhorn (ed), Spontaneous Order, Organization and
the Law, Roads to a European Civil Society, Liber Amicorum Ernst-Joachim Mestma¨cker (Asser
2003) 421-4; J Fingleton, ‘De-monopolising Ireland’ in C-D Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds),
European competition law annual 2003: What is an abuse of a dominant position? (Hart
Pub 2006) 60-1; W Mo¨schel, ‘Beho¨rdliche oder privatrechtliche Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts?’
[2007] WuW 483; FG Jacobs, ‘Civil Enforcement of EEC Antitrust Law’ in MLR Association (ed),
The art of governance: Festschrift zu Ehren von Eric Stein (Nomos 1987) 230 ff.; AP Komninos,
EC Private Antitrust Enforcement (n 9) 8.
32B Leucht and M Marquis, ‘American Influences on EEC Competition Law: Two Paths,
How Much Dependence?’ in KK Patel and H Schweitzer (eds), The Historical Foundations of
EU Competition Law (OUP 2013).
33C Harding and J Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe (OUP 2010) 94-8.
34DJ Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth-Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus
(OUP 2001) 336.
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and its long-term economic prosperity.35 Therefore, the political leaders of France,
Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg wanted to establish a ‘legal
community’ to regulate and balance the market power across Europe.36
Jean Monnet, a big personality during the initial stage of European integration,
mainly shaped the principles of the ECSC-Treaty and its competition law
provisions.37 His main challenge was to balance German ordoliberalism and the
French state focused approach.38 He delegated the task of drafting such provisions
to Robert Bowie, a professor of antitrust law at Harvard University.39 This is one
of the reasons why European competition law could make use of the US experience
in competition law. Although the draft of the competition law provisions of the
ECSC were commented on and reviewed by the US, the role of the US was not
disclosed as much as possible to prevent the claim that the European project would
be controlled by the US.40
Notably, these were the first supranational competition law regulations providing
significant regulation on cartels.41 The ECSC-Treaty provided a regulatory scheme
for the protection of competition on the European market in Art 65 but through
Arts 58, 61 and 63 it also offered the opportunity to organise cartel-like agreements
through a public authority (the so-called High Authority).42 The public enforcement
of the provisions through the imposition of fines by the High Authority was
complemented by the private nullity of the contracts. The regulations in the
ECSC-Treaty can be seen as the basis of European competition law in two
respects. On the one hand, the Treaty introduced an American-style prohibition
on anti-competitive market behaviour and, on the other hand, it transferred the
power to enforce the law mainly to a supranational authority.43
The Treaty of Rome was signed five years later, and the European Economic
Community (EEC) was established on the 1st January 1958. Even though there
had been no significant activity from the High Authority in terms of enforcing
the competition law provisions of the ECSC, the competition policy was seen as
an integral part of the project of a European Common Market.44 The European
35Ibid 335.
36G Bebr, ‘The European Coal and Steel Community: A Political and Legal Innovation’ (1953)
63 YaleLRev 1.
37DJ Gerber (n 34) 337.
38SM Ramı´rez Pe´rez, ‘The Evolution of the Law on Articles 85 and 86 EEC [Articles 101 and
102 TFEU]’ in KK Patel and H Schweitzer (eds), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition
Law (OUP 2013) 24 ff.
39DJ Gerber (n 34) 338.
40Ibid.
41CD Edwards, Control of Cartels and Monopolies: An International Comparison (Oceana
Pub 1967) ch 15; G Bebr (n 36); DJ Gerber (n 34) 335 ff.
42C Harding and J Joshua (n 33) 95-6; W Friedmann and P Verloren, ‘International Cartels and
Combines’ in W Friedmann (ed), Anti-Trust Laws: A Comparative Symposium (Stevens 1956) 512.
43C Harding and J Joshua (n 33) 96; DJ Gerber (n 34) 335.
44C Harding and J Joshua (n 33) 110.
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Commission – the so-called Guardian of the Treaty – is not only a union-wide
competition authority but also has direct influence on the competition law legislation
of the European Union.45
The competition regulation in the EEC-Treaty itself contained no provisions
about its enforcement. Therefore, in 1962, the first executive order was introduced
by the Commission with Regulation (EEC) 17/62.46 For the first decade of
European competition law enforcement, the power to do so was centralised by
the European Commission.47 Furthermore, Regulation 17/62 established the central
investigation rights of the European Commission. In Art 11 No 1 it regulated the
right of the Commission to obtain all necessary information from governments,
competition authorities and undertakings related to a potential breach of the
European competition law provisions. In Arts 13, 14 and 19, the Regulation
established direct investigation and hearing rights of the Commission, and in Art 15
there is a penalty clause for supplying incorrect information. Additionally, the ECJ
decided in the mid-1970s that Arts 85(1) and 86, the central provisions of European
competition law, had direct effect on the citizens (and undertakings) of the European
Community.48 In this way, the ECJ established a dual enforcement mechanism
because it declared the European provisions applicable by the national courts of
the Member States as well as the European Commission.49
Almost 14 years after the establishment of the EEC, the Treaty of Amsterdam
reorganised the legal structure of the treaty but it did not modify the central
provisions of European competition law. The central innovation of the 1992 single
market program was the introduction of a union-wide merger regulation.50 Even
more influential was the replacement of Regulation 17/62 with Regulation 1/2003
because the new Regulation mainly reordered the competition law enforcement
and extended the dual public enforcement of the European provisions by the
European Commission and the national competition authorities. Additionally,
Regulation 1/2003 specified the rights of the Commission in investigating breaches
of Art 85 ff. EC.51 The administrative proceedings of the actions of the European
45SK Schmidt, ‘European Commission’ in E Jones, A Menon and S Weatherill (eds), The Oxford
Handbook of the European Union (OUP 2012) 342.
46[1962] OJ 13/204.
47J Goyder and A Albors-Llorens, Goyder's EC Competition Law (5th edn, OUP 2009) ch 5;
I Maher, ‘Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: Evolving Formalism’ in G de Burca
and P Craig (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 1999) 597-624; I Maher, ‘Competition Policy’
in E Jones, A Menon and S Weatherill (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the European Union
(OUP 2012) 442.
48Case 127-73 Belgische Radio en Televisie and socie´te´ belge des auteurs, compositeurs
et e´diteurs v SV SABAM and NV Fonior [1974] ECR 313; Case 155-73 Giuseppe Sacchi
[1974] ECR 409.
49C Harding and A Sherlock, European Community Law: Text and Materials (Longman
1995) 410.
50I Maher, ‘Competition Policy’ (n 47) 442.
51MJ Frese, Sanctions in EU Competition Law (Hart Pub 2014) 123-4.
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Commission in competition law are based on Regulation 773/2004. However, since
the mid-1990s European competition policy has been characterised by a hybridity52
of competition law.53 This means that European competition policy has made use
of legal formalism on the one hand and an extensive use of soft law on the other.54
Moreover, the central aim of competition law enforcement has shifted to greater
consumer welfare.55 Moreover, with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 the provisions
shifted from Art 81 ff. EC to Art 101 ff. TFEU but the substantive completion rules
were not changed.56
In summary, it can be said that the Commission has extensive enforcement
powers and is also mainly involved in the legislative setting of European competition
law. With reference to the basis of European competition law in the antitrust
law of the US, the strong position of the European Commission (and the other
national competition authorities) in public enforcement is the key difference to US
competition law which is largely based on private enforcement because it lacks public
enforcement authorities.
2.2.2 Effectiveness of the European leniency programmes as a
reason for a weak private competition law enforcement
Beside the historical argument, an effective leniency regime could be a reason
for a weak private enforcement of European Competition law. After focussing on
the general system of information gathering by the European Commission, this
section highlights the necessity of whistle-blowers for investigations in competition
law and its theoretical framework. Finally, the section analyses leniency regimes
as a protection of whistle-blowers in public enforcement and its protection limits
in private enforcement. In doing so, the section outlines the developments of the
leniency regimes of the German, English and European competition authorities, the
general requirements for a successful leniency application and its benefits for public
enforcement as well as its limits related to private enforcement.
52G de Burca and J Scott, ‘Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’ in G de
Burca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Pub 2006) 1-12.
53I Maher, ‘Regulation and modes of Governance in EC Competition Law: What’s new in
Enforcement?’ (2008) 31 FordhamIntlLJ 1713.
54F Snyder, ‘The Effective of European Law: Institutions, processes, Tools and Techniques’
in T Daintith (ed), Implementing EC Law in the United Kingdom: Structures for Indirect Rule
(Chancery Law Pub 1995) 64.
55DB Audretsch, W Baumol and AE Burke, ‘Competition Policy in Dynamic Markets’ (2001)
19 IntJIndOrgan 613; DJ Gerber (n 34) 233 ff.; I Maher, ‘Competition Policy’ (n 47) 446.
56N Dunleavy, Competition Law: A Practitioner's Guide (Bloomsbury Professional 2010) 61.
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2.2.2.1 Information gathering of the competition authorities
2.2.2.1.1 Inquisitorial system of public competition law enforcement
With reference to the organisation of the courts and the applicable procedure rules,
public enforcement through administrative authorities can best be described as
an inquisitorial system.57 This characterisation is often used as opposed to the
adversarial system of private enforcement.
However, the characteristics of the inquisitorial system of public competition
law enforcement must not be limited to the narrow definition of a ‘procedural
inquisitorial system’. On the contrary, the institutionalisation of public competition
law enforcement itself can be described as an ‘institutional inquisitorial system’.
On the one hand, a procedural inquisitorial system is shaped by a proceeding
conducted by a judge in a public inquisition or investigation of a crime in contrast to
an adversarial system where judges focus on the issue of the law and procedure and
act as a referee in the contest between the defence and the prosecutor.58 Based on
the Roman Corpus Iuris Civilis of emperor Justinian I, the procedural principle of
an investigation by an official institution enables the state to reveal a crime through
its own initiative. A claimant, as found in an adversarial system, or a denouncer,
as found in the old tribunal court system, is not necessary. The official institution
investigating the crime does not need to be the court or a part of the court.59
The public enforcement of European competition law by the European
Commission fulfils the indicators of a procedural inquisitorial system. The
Commission is authorised to request information from governments, authorities
and undertakings and can investigate firms.60 In doing so, the Commission has to
consider incriminating as well as exonerating evidence.61
On the other hand, the analysis of an institutional inquisitorial system focuses
on the organisation of the investigating and deciding institutions. An institutional
inquisitorial system can be defined as a combination of the investigating and deciding
authority. Even if the first connotation of an institutional inquisitorial system
suggests the religious medieval Inquisition, the roots are actually in Roman and
early Germanic law. Although Roman law was based on a procedural inquisitorial
system, the litigation itself was shaped by private claims and organised in the manner
of a civil litigation with private plaintiffs and defendants.
However, the first introduction of a full institutional inquisitorial system was
the implementation in the canon law by Pope Innocent III in 1215. Because of the
57AP Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement (n 9) 225-6.
58TL Kubicek, Adversarial Justice: America's Court System on Trial (Algora Pub 2006) 48.
59The organisation of the institutions is more a question of the Institutional Inquisitorial System.
60C Harding and A Sherlock (n 49) 139; D Edward and R Lane, European Union Law (Edward
Elgar 2014) at para 13.89.
61N Dunleavy (n 56) 472.
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morally doubtful success in the prosecution of heretics and other branches of canon
law, secular courts adopted the system. In the Holy Roman Empire, the institutional
inquisitorial system was implemented in the criminal court system by the Constitutio
Criminalis Bambergensis (1507) and the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina (1532).
The key points of the medieval inquisitorial system were the unity of prosecutor
and judge as well as the unity of investigation and main proceedings and therefore
the repeal of every procedural separation of powers.62 The accused had no right to
be heard in the court and its participation in the proceeding was restricted by the
arbitrariness of the court.63
Even though in modern times the institutional inquisitorial system has been
replaced by a system of power separation between a (public) prosecutor and judge,64
the institutional inquisitorial system is still the leading system of administrative fine
proceedings and, therefore, of the public enforcement of the European Commission
and the competition authorities of the Member States.65 However, in contrast to the
historical inquisitorial system, the accused has a right of defence and no torture is
used to force confessions.66
2.2.2.1.2 Regulation of Commission’s investigating power
As mentioned above, the European Commission has the power to investigate
breaches of Art 101 or 102 TFEU. The central regulation about the investigation
rights is Regulation (EC) 1/2003.67 The most important actions68 of the Commission
are regulated in Art 18 (right to request information), Art 19 (right to take
statements) and Art 20 (right to investigate, i.e. to dawn raids). In addition to
the formal investigation powers, the Commission can gather information through
complaints (Art 7) Art 9 and 10 proceedings, information exchange with national
competition authorities (Art 12) as well as in administrative proceedings according
to Art 27. It is also possible for the Commission to gather information unofficially.69
62M Vallerani, Medieval Public Justice (SR Blanshei tr, CUoA Press 2012) 241-6.
63Ibid 231.
64Firstly replaced in Electorate of Saxony in 1770 and finally in the entire Holy Roman Empire
by the introduction of the code d’instruction criminelle of the French code of criminal procedure
by Napole´on Bonaparte in 1808.
65Case T-7/89 SA Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission of the European Communities
[1992] 4 CMLR 84 (CFI) at 100-1 by AG Vesterdorf.
66See in detail G Miersch, ‘Vorbemerkung Art. 17’ in E Grabitz and M Hilf (eds), Das Recht
der Europa¨ischen Union (40th edn, CH Beck 2009) at paras 17-29.
67Recitals 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003.
68N Dunleavy (n 56) 473.
69G-K de Bronett, ‘VO 1/2003, Vor Art. 17’ in H Schro¨ter et al (eds), Europa¨isches
Wettbewerbsrecht (2nd edn, Nomos 2014) at para 2.
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The central aim is to empower itself to gather the necessary information70 and
evidence71 about a possible breach of Art 101 or 102 TFEU.
In practice, the most important vehicle that the Commission has to gather
information is the requests for information under Art 18 Regulation (EG) 1/2003.72
The reason for the preference for using the information request in contrast to,
for example, formal interviews of Art 19, is the possibility of sanctioning for
incorrect or insufficient information.73 They are also less time-consuming than the
investigation procedures of Art 20 or 21.74 With reference to Art 337 TFEU and
Art 18 Regulation (EG) 1/2003, the Commission is entitled to require ‘all necessary
information’ from an undertaking from a set time period.75 If there is no response or
the undertaking delivers the wrong information, the Commission can impose fines
of up to one per cent of the annual turnover (Art 23) or daily penalty payments of
up to five per cent of the daily turnover (Art 24). However, the non-response of an
undertaking cannot be used as evidence of a breach of Art 101 or 102 TFEU.76
The second most important investigation vehicles of the Commission are
inspections or dawn raids. With reference to Art 20 of Regulation (EG) 1/2003,
the Commission has the right to conduct ‘all necessary inspections’ of undertakings.
In doing so, the officials of the Commission and other authorised accompanying
persons (e.g. officials of national competition authorities assisting the Commission)
can enter the premises of the undertaking and examine their books and business
records, take copies and seal premises, books and records, and interview staff about
facts or documents.77 However, the Commission does not have the right to force
entry onto the premises of an undertaking unless the assisting national competition
authority has applied for a national search warrant.78 The national courts are obliged
to obtain such a search warrant (Arts 20(7) and 21(3)).79
70National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European Communities
[1980] ECR 2033 at para 21; Case 374-87 Orkem v Commission of the European Communities
[1989] ECR 3283 at para 21; Case C-67/91 Direccio´n General de Defensa de la Competencia
v Asociacio´n Espan˜ola de Banca Privada and others [1992] ECR I-4785 at para 18.
71G Miersch (n 66), vor Art. 17’ at para 2.
72L Ortiz Blanco, EU Competition Procedure (3rd edn, OUP 2013) at para 7.21; S Hirsbrunner,
‘VO 1/2003, Art. 18 ’ in R Bechtold, W Bosch and I Brinker (eds), EU-Kartellrecht (3rd edn,
CH Beck 2014) at para 1; S Barthelmeß and L-P Rudolf, ‘VO 1/2003, Art. 18’ in U Loewenheim,
KM Meessen and A Riesenkampff (eds), Kartellrecht (2nd edn, CH Beck 2009) at para 3.
73J Burrichter and TT Hennig, ‘VO 1/2003 Art. 18. Auskunftsverlangen’ in U Immenga
and E-J Mestma¨cker (eds), EU-Wettbewerbsrecht, vol 1 (5th edn, CH Beck 2012) at para 6; no
sanctioning in Art 19 proceedings (interviews), N Dunleavy (n 56) 474.
74S Barthelmeß and L-P Rudolf (n 72) at para 1; J Burrichter and TT Hennig (n 73) at para 7.
75See as well recital 23 of Regulation (EG) 1/2003.
76Case T-305, 306, 307, 313, 316, 318, 325, 328, 329, 335/94 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV,
et al v Commission of the European Communities [1999] ECR II-931 at para 489.
77See eg Art 4(2) and (3) of Regulation (EG) 773/2004.
78N Dunleavy (n 56) 475.
79Joined cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG v Commission of the European Communities
[1989] ECR 2859; Case C-94/00 Roquette Fre`res SA v Directeur ge´ne´ral de la concurrence, de
la consommation et de la re´pression des fraudes, and Commission of the European Communities
[2002] ECR I-9011.
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2.2.2.2 Necessity of whistle-blowers for investigations in competition
law and its theoretical framework
Although the Commission has the right to investigate a breach of Art 101 or
102 TFEU, in practice it is quite difficult to recognise a breach of competition law
and to find evidence for it. The most difficult task for the competition authorities is
the disclosure of a breach of Art 101 TFEU by undertakings forming a cartel.80 With
reference to the proceedings of the European Commission from September 2006 to
June 2014, approximately every fine proceeding is based on a leniency application.
In 2005-2014, the Commission imposed fines in 63 cases on 397 undertakings. This is
a relation of approx. 6.31 undertakings per case. From September 2006 to June 2014,
the Commission imposed fines on 299 undertakings and, therefore, ca. 47 cases. In
the same period, the Commission received 46 applications of immunity.81
Cartels are coalitions of adversaries of several undertakings who have joined
together to breach competition law, for instance by a price agreement.82 This is
the reason why the European Commission introduced a leniency programme. Since
Julius Cesar, it has been common practice to break up such a coalition of adversaries
by playing members off against each other (divide et impera).83 Even nowadays:
. . . it is very rare that the EC or a national authority discovers cartels itself:
if you look back on the . . . [year 2010], all of the cases the EC adopted were
via immunity applications.84
The basic idea behind leniency programmes in competition law is to destroy
the trust between the members of the cartel.85 A cartel needs a certain degree of
trust between its members, and the competition authorities give an incentive to
betray the other members of the cartel and disclose the breach of competition law
by promising immunity from fines.86 Theoretically, this approach is based on the
80C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161; Commision, XXXIst Report
on Competition Policy, 2001 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2002) at para 36; K Hu¨schelrath, ‘How
Are Cartels Detected? The Increasing Use of Proactive Methods to Establish Antitrust
Infringements’ (2010) 1 JECL&P 522.
81For the basis of the data see 2.1.2.
82Graphite electrodes (COMP/E-1/36490) Commission Decision number 2002/271/EC
[2002] OJ L100/1 at paras 47 and 59; JM Griffin, ‘An inside view at a cartel at work: Common
characteristics of international cartels’ in A Sundberg (ed), Fighting cartels – why and how?
(Swedish Competition Authority 2001) 29, 37 ff.
83G Spagnolo, Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes, Discussion Paper No 4840
(CEPR 2004) 2.
84Johan Ysewyn, cited by C Edmond, ‘From whom the whistle blows’ Legal Week (London,
22 September 2011).
85G Dannecker and J Biermann, ‘VO 1/2003, Art. 23, Geldbußen’ in U Immenga and
E-J Mestma¨cker (eds), Wettbewerbsrecht, vol 2 (5th edn, CH Beck 2012) at para 232; CT Feddersen,
‘Art 23 VO(EG) 1/2003’ in E Grabitz, M Hilf and M Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europa¨ischen
Union (30th (October 2009) edn, CH Beck 2009) at 236.
86W van Weert and M Maier, ‘European Union’ in J Buhart (ed), Leniency Regimes:
Jurisdictional comparisons (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 123-4.
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‘prisoner’s dilemma’,87 a special form of Game Theory and one which is also used
in the fight against organised crime.88
In general, in Game Theory, a situation is modelled as a game where the decision
making of some players is influenced by the decisions of other players of the game.
With reference to the analysis of the behaviour of a homo oeconomicus, Game Theory
tries to define rational ways of behaving in social conflict situations. One example
of such a game setting is the prisoner’s dilemma. Albert W Tucker was the first
to describe it as a situation where two men are found guilty of a joint breach of
the law with a maximum penalty of four years in prison. The police question them
separately and so they have no possibility of communicating with each other. The
police tell each of the prisoners that if only one of them were to confess then the
confessor would be rewarded with one year whereas the other prisoners would get
the maximum penalty of four years. On the other hand, if both prisoners were to
confess then each of them would be imprisoned for two years. However, if both kept
their side of the bargain and did not confess, they can assume that the police would
find no evidence to arrest either of them.89
Transferred to a competition law scenario, the decision making of the members
of a cartel is affected by the possibility of immunity or the reduction of fines if
they confess and cooperate with the competition authorities to help to uncover and
collect evidence of the breach of competition law.
To find a solution to the described game setting, it is important to look at the
decisions of the players and to find a pair of decisions where it is a disadvantage to the
players and hence not rational to choose another strategy, i.e. Nash Equilibrium.90
In this given game, the Nash Equilibrium is if both prisoners choose to confess or not
to confess because in any other situation it is better for one of them to change his
decision. In those situations, both of them will be arrested for two years or not at all,
and hence the penalty for both together is four or zero years. Every other situation
of confessing and not confessing would result in a higher overall penalty (collective
solution). The Nash Equilibrium is also pareto optimal because it is not possible
to improve the situation of one prisoner unless the situation of the other prisoner
deteriorates.91 However, for the individual prisoner who does not know how the
other prisoner is acting, it can be better to confess independently of the decision of
the other prisoner. For him, the situation is the following: if only he confesses then
he will get one year, if both prisoners confess then he will get two years. In that
scenario, the confessing prisoner avoids the maximum penalty of four years. The
87CG Veljanovski, Economic Principles of Law (CUP 2007) 262.
88P Buccirossia and G Spagnolo, Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions, Discussion Paper
No 5442 (CEPR 2006) 1.
89AW Tucker, ‘The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler’ (1983) 14 Two-YearCollMathJ 228.
90JF Nash, ‘Non-Cooperative Games’ (1950) 54 AnnMath 286; JF Nash, ‘Equilibrium points in
n-person games’ (1950) 36 ProcNatAcadSci 48.
91M Martorana, ‘Pareto Efficiency’ (2007) 11 Region Focus 8.
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only rational consideration he has to make is the probability of the situation where
both prisoners do not confess. Even if we assume a consistent probability of both
prisoners confessing or not confessing, the combined probability for the setting not
confess/not confess is 25% and the probability for a setting where at least one of the
prisoners confesses is all together 75%.92 Therefore, it is always individually better
for the prisoner to confess (individual solution). Although, this solution is not pareto
optimal, both players have no reason to differ from its individual Nash Equilibrium
and not confess.
In a competition law context, it is therefore always preferable for a member of
a cartel to cooperate with the competition authorities and to apply for a leniency
programme. That is also the reason why the Leniency Policy 1993 of the Antitrust
Division of the US Department of Justice93 has been described as the most significant
innovation in antitrust policy and the reason why the number of discovered cartels
has substantially increased.94
Besides the investigation effect, leniency regimes have a deterrent effect too. If
a member of cartel cannot be sure that the other members of the cartel are not
cooperating with the competition authorities, they are less likely to join a cartel.95
2.2.2.3 Leniency regimes as a protection for whistle-blowers in public
enforcement and its protection limits in private enforcement
2.2.2.3.1 Developments of the leniency regimes under German, English and
European law
Although the first leniency regime in competition law was established in the US
in 1979,96 the example which inspired the leniency regimes in Europe was the
‘Leniency Policy’ of the US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (DoJ) 1993.
That leniency regime is a key part of the enforcement system of US antitrust
law. The enforcement mechanisms in this policy are shaped around three major
92Mathematical computation: Decision A: ‘confess’ (0,5) or ‘not confess’ (0,5); Decision B :
‘confess’ (0,5) or ‘not confess’ (0,5). Combined probabilities: ‘confess’ + ‘confess’ = 0,5 · 0,5 = 0,25;
‘confess’ + ‘not confess’ = 0,5 · 0,5 = 0,25; ‘not confess’ + ‘confess’ = 0,5 · 0,5 = 0,25;
‘not confess’ + ‘not confess’ = 0,5 · 0,5 = 0,25; Overall probability for at least one ‘not
confess’ = 0,5 + 0,5 + 0,5 = 0,75.
93<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf> (accessed 01/03/2016);
DC Klawiter, ‘Corporate Leniency in the Age of International Cartels: The American
Experience’ (2000) 14 Antitrust 13.
94M Blatter, W Emons and S Sticher, Optimal leniency programs when firms have cumulative
and asymmetric evidence, Discussion Paper No 10106 (CEPR 2014) 1; More critically on the
positive effect of a leniency programme G Spagnolo (n 83) 2.
95Bundeskartellamt, Erfolgreiche Kartellverfolgung: Nutzen fu¨r Wirtschaft und Verbraucher
(Bonn 2011) 11; C Seitz, ‘Public over Private Enforcement of Competition Law?’
[2012] GRUR-RR 137, 139.
96CT Feddersen (n 85) at para 237.
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principles.97 Firstly, the competition authority should impose high fines. Secondly,
cartel members must realise that there is a risk of discovery and prosecution for
the breach of competition law. Thirdly, leniency regimes must be as transparent
as possible to allow the members of the cartel to calculate the consequences of a
leniency application.98
The first leniency regime in Europe was introduced in 1996 by the European
Commission.99 However, even before the first formal adoption of a Leniency Notice,
the Commission was always content to cooperate with whistle-blowers over a breach
of competition law and to consider the cooperation by calculating the imposed
fines.100 Even the CFI confirmed the practice of the Commission and established
a legal framework by deciding that it was not lawful only to reduce the fines by
10 percent if an undertaking fully cooperated with the Commission, and it would
be much more difficult to investigate for the Commission without the information
of that undertaking.101
On the 18th July 1996 the European Commission published the first formal
‘Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel
97SD Hammond, ‘Cornerstones of an effective leniency program’ (ICN Workshop on Leniency
Programs, Sydney, Australia, 22nd/23rd November 2004) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/speeches/206611.htm> accessed 01/03/2016; OECD, Fighting Hard Core Cartels: Harm,
Effective Sanctions and Leniency Programmes (OECD 2002) 7.
98SD Hammond, ‘Dettecting and deterring cartel activity through an effective leniency
program’ (International Workshop on Cartels, Brighton, 21st/22nd November 2000) <http:
//www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/9928.htm> accessed 01/03/2016; M Jephcott, ‘The
European Commission's New Leniency Notice – Whistling the right tune’ (2002) 23 ECLR 378, 384;
JD Medinger, ‘Antitrust Leniency Programs: A Call for Increased Harmonization as Proliferating
Programs Undermine Deterrence’ (2003) 52 EmoryLJ 1439, 1458; P Hetzel, ‘Die Vielzahl
kartellrechtlicher Kronzeugenregelungen als Hindernis fu¨r die Effektivita¨t der europa¨ischen
Kartellbeka¨mpfung’ [2005] EuR 735, 735-6.
99Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases
[1996] OJ C207/4; W van Weert and M Maier (n 86) 123-4; G Murray, ‘European Union’ in
SJ Mobley and R Denton (eds), Global Cartels Handbook (OUP 2011) 188; P Chappatte and
P Walter, ‘European Union’ in CA Varney (ed), The Cartels and Leniency Review (2nd edn, Law
Business Research 2014) 104-6.
100Bandengroothandel Frieschebrug BV/NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin
(IV29491) Commission Decision number 81/969/EEC [1981] OJ L353/33; National
Panasonic (IV/30070) Commission Decision number 82/853/EEC [1982] OJ L354/28;
Polistil/Arbois (IV/30658) Commission Decision number 84/282/EEC [1984] OJ L136/9;
Agreements and concerted practices in the flat-glass sector in the Benelux countries (IV/30988)
Commission Decision number 84/388/EEC [1984] OJ L212/13; Zinc producer group (IV/30350)
Commission Decision number 84/405/EEC [1984] OJ L220/27 at para 104; Wood
pulp (IV/29725) Commission Decision number 85/202/EEC [1985] OJ L85/1 at paras 148
and 410; Sperry New Holland (IV/30839) Commission Decision number 85/617/EEC
[1985] OJ L376/21 at para 68; British Dental Trade Association (IV/31593) Commission Decision
number 88/477/EEC [1988] OJ L233/15 at para 54; Viho/Toshiba (IV/32879) Commission
Decision number 91/532/EEC [1991] OJ L287/39 at paras 28-9; French-West African shipowners'
committees (IV/32450) Commission Decision number 92/262/EEC [1992] OJ L134/1 at para 74;
Viho/Parker Pen (IV/32725) Commission Decision number 92/426/EEC [1992] OJ L233/27 at
para 24.
101Case T-13/89 Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission of the European Communities
[1992] ECR II-1021 at para 392-3; Commision, XXIInd Report on Competition Policy, 1992
(Brussels/Luxembourg, 1993) at para 313.
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cases’ (Notice 1996).102 Although the Notice was highly criticised, it became
an important mechanism in competition law enforcement.103 On the other hand, the
Notice resulted in a self-commitment of the European Commission in its leniency
practice.104 Even though 80 undertakings applied for leniency during the five year
application period of the Notice 1996,105 the success of the Notice is not universally
proclaimed. On the one hand, the non-imposition or immunity of fines constituted
a miniscule minority.106 On the other hand, the vague criteria of the Notice and the
wide discretion of the Commission resulted in uncertainty for the undertakings and,
thus, in a low incentive effect.107 Therefore, many commentators concluded that the
positive effects of the Notice on the investigation of cartels and the work relief of
the Commission were insufficient.108
Considering the experiences in applying the Notice 1996, the European
Commission adopted a new, fundamentally revised Leniency Notice on the
14th February 2002.109 The main objective was to inject more transparency and
predictability into the leniency proceeding.110 As a result, the Leniency Notice 2002
regulated explicitly the requirements and proceedings for a successful leniency
102[1996] OJ C207/4.
103JD Hunter and S Hornsby, ‘New incentives for ”whistle-blowing”: will the E.C. Commission's
notice bear fruit?’ (1997) 18 ECLR 38; H Dieckmann, ‘§ 46 – Geldbußen und Zwangsgelder’
in G Wiedemann (ed), Handbuch des Kartellrechts (1st edn, CH Beck 1999) at paras 18 ff.;
A Weitbrecht, ‘Die Kronzeugenmitteilung in EG-Kartellsachen’ [1997] EuZW 555.
104Case T-322/01 Roquette Fre`res SA v Commission of the European Communities
[2006] ECR II-3137 at para 223; Case T-59/02 Archer Daniels Midland Co. v Commission of
the European Communities [2006] II-3627 at para 409; Joined cases T-101/05 and T-111/05
BASF AG and UCB SA v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-4949 at
para 89; LMM Brokx, ‘A patchwork of leniency programmes’ (2001) 22 ECLR 35.
105M Sura, ‘Art. 23 VO(EG) 1/2003’ in E Langen and H-J Bunte (eds), Kartellrecht, vol 2
(14th edn, Luchterhand 2014) at para 55; Commision, XXXIst Report on Competition Policy (n 80)
at para 37.
106Full immunity was granted by the Commission in Luxembourg Brewers (COMP/37800/F3)
Commission Decision number 2002/759/EC [2001] OJ L253/21 at para 108; Vitamins
(COMP/E-1/37512) Commission Decision number 2003/2/EC [2003] OJ L6/1 at para 742;
Methionine (C37519) Commission Decision number 2003/674/EC [2003] OJ L255/1 at
para 340; Methylglukamin (COMP/E-2/37978) Commission Decision number 2004/104/EC
[2004] OJ L38/18 at para 272; Flood flavour enhancers (COMP/C37671) Commission Decision
number 2004/206/EC [2004] OJ L75/1 at para 287; Carbonless paper (COMP/E-1/36212)
Commission Decision number 2004/337/EC [2004] OJ L115/1 at para 443; Electrical and
mechanical carbon and graphite products (C38359) Commission Decision number 2004/420/EC
[2004] OJ L125/45 at para 13; Copper Plumbing tubes (C38069) Commission Decision
number 2006/485/EC [2006] OJ L192/21 at para 39.
107M Jephcott (n 98) 380 ff.; M Klusmann, ‘Internationale Kartelle und das Europa¨ische
Leniency-Programm aus Sicht der Verteidigung – Kritik nach fu¨nf Jahren Anwendungspraxis’
[2001] WuW 820, 824 ff.; U Solte´sz, ‘Bußgeldreduzierung bei Zusammenarbeit mit der Kommission
in Kartellsachen – ”Kronzeugenmitteilung”’ [2000] EWS 240, 244 ff.; A Weitbrecht (n 103) 558.
108A Winterstein, ‘Art. 81 – Fallgruppen Marktabsprachen’ in H Schro¨ter, T Jakob and
W Mederer (eds), Europa¨isches Wettbewerbsrecht (1st edn, 2003) at paras 106-7.
109Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases
[2002] OJ C45/3.
110Ibid at para 5; Commision, XXXIst Report on Competition Policy (n 80) at para 38;
Commission, XXXVth Report on Competition Policy, 2005 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2006) at
paras 174 ff.
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application.111 In contrast to the Notice 1996, the Commission focused more on
investigation of unknown cartels and less on cooperation in the administrative
proceeding.112
In 2006 the European Commission amended its Leniency Notice113 to reduce the
weak points of the Leniency Notice 2002 and to concretise the requirements for a
successful leniency application.114 A new instrument in the Leniency Notice 2006 is
the ‘marker system’. Now, it is possible for an undertaking to apply early for a marker
to save its position in the queue of applicants and to hand in the necessary evidence
later.115 However, this system only applies to an application for full immunity from
fines.116
All Member States of the European Union except Malta117 concurrently
implemented a leniency regime.118 Although, the ‘Commission’s Notice on
co-operation within the Network of Competition Authorities’119 sets out that
the European Commission is usually the best place to handle pan-European cases,
or even cases with more than three jurisdiction involved, the application procedure
for leniency in the EU is no ‘one-stop-shop’ and, therefore, applications for national
leniency programmes should be necessary.120 As a matter of soft-law harmonisation,
the European Competition Network (ECN), a network of the national competition
authorities and the European Commission, established shared principles generally
followed by all the leniency programmes of the Member States.121
Based on the published general principles of leniency programmes by the
European Competition Authorities (ECA) – another albeit informal forum of the
national competition authorities of the European Union, the European Commission
111C Nowak, ‘Art 23 VO(EG) 1/2003’ in U Loewenheim, KM Meessen and A Riesenkampff (eds),
Kartellrecht (2nd edn, CH Beck 2009) at para 37.
112M Sura (n 105) at para 54.
113[2006] OJ C298/17.
114C Nowak, ‘Art 23 VO(EG) 1/2003’ (n 111) at para 37.
115MJ Reynolds and DG Anderson, ‘Immunity and leniency in EU cartel cases: current
issues’ (2006) 27 ECLR 82, 85.
116M Dreher, ‘Kartellrechtliche Kronzeugenprogramme und Gesellschaftsrecht’ [2009] ZWeR 397;
E Panizza, ‘Ausgewa¨hlte Probleme der Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamts vom 07.03.2006’
[2008] ZWeR 58, 85.
117The Maltese Competition Authority (Office for Competition) published on 14 June 2013 a
draft for a leniency programme based on the Model Leniency Programmes: <http://www.mccaa.
org.mt/loadfile/d545ac5a-c7d3-4c61-a6ac-82f8f795fba4> accessed 01/03/2016.
118See <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/leniency_programme_nca.pdf> accessed
01/03/2016; Croatia is not in the list because it became a Member State in 2013 but has
a Leniency Regime since 2010: Regulation on immunity from fines and reduction of fines
[2010] OG 129, accessible under <http://www.aztn.hr/uploads/documents/eng/documents/
legislation/Regulation_on_immunity_from_fines_and_reduction_of_fines_CCA.pdf>
accessed 01/03/2016.
119[2004] OJ C101/43.
120W van Weert and M Maier (n 86) 123-4; G Murray (n 99) 188; P Chappatte and
P Walter (n 99) 104-6.
121Commision, ‘Antitrust: European Competition Network publishes report on leniency
convergence’ MEMO/09/456 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-456_en.
pdf> accessed 01/03/2016.
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and the competition authorities of the EFTA States – from 2001,122 the OECD set
out the key principles of a successful leniency regime: firstly, the granting of full
immunity for the first applicant and grading of leniency for the next applications
with a distinctive gap for full immunity to encourage applications and, secondly,
maximum transparency and confidentiality.123
In 2006 the ECN published its first Model Leniency Programme.124 A revised
version of the Model Leniency Programme was published in 2012.125 Its main purpose
was to introduce a harmonised summary leniency application if the undertaking had
already applied for the leniency programme of the Commission and to harmonise the
requirements for a successful leniency application. However, the national competition
authorities could apply more generous policies.126 Moreover, the Model Leniency
Programme influenced the amendments of the leniency policy of the European
Commission.127
In Germany, the Federal Cartel Office (FCO)128 implemented its first Leniency
Programme in 2000.129 The latest amendment of the Leniency Programme in 2006
reflected the amended Leniency Regime of the European Commission and the Model
Leniency Programme of the ECN.130
At the time of the first FCO Leniency Programme, the Office of Fair
Trading (OFT) of the United Kingdom published its own leniency policy as part
of its penalty guidance.131 A revised guidance and leniency policy was published
on 21st December 2004.132 With the Leniency Guidance 2008 (OFT 803), the OFT
refined its practice on how to handle leniency and immunity applications. The latest
122‘Principles for Leniency Programmes’ Directors’ General of European Competition Authorities
meeting in Dublin on 3 and 4 September 2001 <http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/
documents/2001-09-04\%20eca\%20leniency\%20principles.pdf> accessed 01/03/2016.
123OECD (n 97) 22 ff.
124<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/model_leniency_en.pdf> accessed 01/03/
2016.
125<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/mlp_revised_2012_en.pdf> accessed 01/03/
2016.
126W van Weert and M Maier (n 86) 124.
127G Dannecker and J Biermann (n 85) at para 243.
128Bundeskartellamt, BKartA.
129Notice no. 9/2006 of the Bundeskartellamt on the immunity from and reduction of fines in
cartel cases – Leniency Programme – of 7 March 2006, <http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/
SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Leitlinien/Notice\%20-\%20Leniency\%20Guidelines.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile\&v=5> accessed 01/03/2016.
130M Wirtz, S Mo¨ller and E Eden, ‘Germany’ in J Buhart (ed), Leniency Regimes: Jurisdictional
comparisons (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 171; N Kredel and S Kiani, ‘Germany’ in SJ Mobley
and R Denton (eds), Global Cartels Handbook (OUP 2011) 235-6.
131S Wisking and K Dietzel, ‘United Kingdom’ in J Buhart (ed), Leniency Regimes: Jurisdictional
comparisons (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 357-8.
132OFT's guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, OFT 423, September 2012
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284393
/oft423.pdf> accessed 01/03/2016.
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amended Leniency Guidance was introduced in 2013.133 On 1st April 2014 the OFT
closed and passed its responsibilities to the Competition and Markets Authority.
2.2.2.3.2 General requirements for a successful leniency application
Because of the implementation of the ECN Model Leniency Regime, the general
requirements for a successful leniency application are duplicated in national leniency
programmes and the programme of the European Commission. As such, it is only
necessary to examine the requirements for an application under the Commission’s
Notice.
The fundamental condition for a successful leniency application is regulated in
para 8 of the Commission’s Notice. The fulfilment of the requirements of its first
alternative in para 8a leads automatically to full immunity from fines. It requires
that the applying undertaking is the first to provide information and evidence about
a cartel which enables the Commission to carry out a targeted inspection and that
the Commission does not already have enough evidence to start such an investigation
or has already started an investigation.134 For this purpose, the undertaking has to
provide a so-called corporate statement.135 If the undertaking cannot provide enough
evidence to carry out a target inspection but can provide information and evidence to
uncover an infringement of Art 101 TFEU, the second alternative of para 8 provides
another possibility to get fine immunity. This is in contrast to para 8a which requires
that no other undertaking gets fine immunity.136 As mentioned above, since the
Leniency Programme 2006 it is possible for the undertaking to apply for a marker
to save its position in the queue and provide evidence later.
If the undertaking cannot fulfil the fundamental condition because it is not the
first to provide evidence, it can apply for a reduction in the fine.137 For this, the
undertaking has to provide evidence that adds substantial value to the Commission’s
investigation.138
In addition, the applying undertaking has to cumulatively fulfil the following
four conditions. The Commission requires the undertaking to cooperate ‘genuinely,
133Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases – OFT's detailed guidance on
the principles and process, OFT 1495 July 2013 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284417/OFT1495.pdf> accessed 01/03/2016.
134Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases
[2006] OJ C298/17 at para 10.
135Ibid at para 9.
136Ibid at para 11.
137Ibid at paras 23-30.
138Ibid at paras 24-5; Case T-347/94 Mayr-Melnhof Kartongesellschaft mbH v Commission
of the European Communities [1998] ECR II-1751 at paras 309 and 330; Case T-48/02
Brouwerij Haacht NV v Commission of the European Communities [2005] ECR II-5259 at
para 104; Case T-30/05 William Prym GmbH & Co KG and Prym Consumer GmbH & Co KG
v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-107 at para 251; Joined cases T-109/02,
T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02, T-129/02, T-132/02 and T-136/02 Bollore´ SA
and Others v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-947 at paras 677 and 716.
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fully, on a continuous basis and expeditiously’ in the administrative proceeding of the
Commission.139 Generally, it is not enough for the undertaking to do only what it has
to do under the investigation rights of the Commission.140 The Commission requires
that the undertaking terminates its involvement in the cartel141 and that it has not
forced other undertakings to form or carry on the cartel.142 Moreover, the applicant
must not have destroyed, falsified or concealed evidence nor disclosed the fact or any
of the content of its application except to other competition authorities.143
In applying the Leniency Programme, the Commission has to treat every
applicant equally.144 That does not mean that the Commission has to grant every
undertaking the same benefits but it does have to treat every undertaking which
provides the same evidence at the same time equally.145 As set out in Art 31 of the
Regulation 1/2003, the European Court of Justice can review the whole proceeding
of the Commission.146
139Commission Notice on Immunity 2006 at para 12a.
140Joined cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk
Rørindustri A/S (C-189/02 P), Isoplus Fernwa¨rmetechnik Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH and Others
(C-202/02 P), KE KELIT Kunststoffwerk GmbH (C-205/02 P), LR af 1998 A/S (C-206/02 P),
Brugg Rohrsysteme GmbH (C-207/02 P), LR af 1998 (Deutschland) GmbH (C-208/02 P) and
ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd (C-213/02 P) v Commission of the European Communities
[2005] ECR I-5425 at para 395; Case C-301/04 P Commission of the European Communities
v SGL Carbon AG [2006] I-5915 at para 68; Case T-38/02 Groupe Danone v Commission of
the European Communities [2005] ECR II-4407 at para 451; Brouwerij Haacht v Commission at
para 106; Joined cases T-259/02 to T-264/02 and T-271/02 Raiffeisen Zentralbank O¨sterreich AG
and Others v Commission of the European Communities [2006] II-5169 at para 530; BASF and
UCB v Commission at para 92.
141Commission Notice on Immunity 2006 at para 12b.
142Ibid at para 13.
143Ibid at para 12c.
144Joined cases T-45/98 and T-47/98 Krupp Thyssen Stainless GmbH and Acciai speciali
Terni SpA v Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR II-3757 at para 237;
Case T-31/99 ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd v Commission of the European Communities
[2002] ECR II-1881 at paras 65 ff.; Joined cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01,
T-251/01 and T-252/01 Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd and Others v Commission of the European
Communities [2004] II-1181 at para 394; Joined cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00
JFE Engineering Corp, formerly NKK Corp, Nippon Steel Corp, JFE Steel Corp and Sumitomo
Metal Industries Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [2004] II-2501 at para 411 ff.;
Brouwerij Haacht v Commission at paras 109 ff.; Bollore´ v Commission at para 689;
Case T-410/03 Hoechst GmbH v Commission of the European Communities [2008] II-881;
CT Feddersen (n 85) at paras 327-8; C Seitz, ‘Grundsa¨tze der ordnungsgema¨ßen Verwaltung und
der Gleichbehandlung – Sanktionsreduzierung wegen Nichtbeachtung der im Gemeinschaftsrecht
geltenden Verfahrensgarantien durch die Europa¨ische Kommission’ [2008] EuZW 525, 527-8.
145Case T-48/98 Compan˜ia espan˜ola para la fabricacio´n inoxidables, SA (Acerinox)
v Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR II-3859 at para 140; Krupp Thyssen
Stainless v Commission at para 245; Case T-44/00 Mannesmannro¨hren-Werke AG v Commission
of the European Communities [2004] ECR II-2223 at paras 263 ff.; Groupe Danone v Commission
at paras 453-4.
146Case T-224/00 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients Ltd
v Commission of the European Communities [2003] II-2597 at para 310; CT Feddersen (n 85) at
paras 322 ff.; G Dannecker and J Biermann (n 85) at para 248; R Bechtold, ‘Zum Ermessen der
Kommission in Bußgeldverfahren’ [2009] WuW 1115.
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2.2.2.3.3 Benefits and protection limits of the leniency regimes
The central benefit of a successful leniency application is the immunity or at least
reduction in the fines imposed by the competition authorities. Although the leniency
regime of the European Commission does not cover immunity from individual
criminal liability or penalty – because European law does not impose any penalties
on individuals – national leniency regimes can provide regulations about criminal
immunity.147
Consequently, European law and the Commission’s Leniency Notice does not
protect the undertaking from any civil damage claims based on the infringement
of Art 101 TFEU because the civil damage claim is not based on European law
but rather on national law.148 On the other hand, the leniency regimes of both
the English and the German competition authorities have no effect and do not
protect from the civil enforcement of competition law by civil damage claims (or
even criminal investigations).149
Therefore, it is a crucial risk for leniency applicants to be claimed by
victims in civil damage claims. A too low protection of the documents of a
leniency applicant leads therefore to a lower willingness of the members of a
cartel to apply for leniency and thus to provide information and evidence for
the infringement of Art 101 TFEU to the Commission or national competition
authority.150 Consequently, the enforcement framework has to provide a minimum
protection of the leniency documents to enable an effective public enforcement of
competition law.
2.2.2.4 Conclusion
In summary, it can be stated that the effectiveness of the European leniency
programmes is a reason for weak private competition law enforcement. The
information gathering of competition authorities within public enforcement
proceedings is based on a procedural and institutional inquisitorial system. The
given rights of the European Commission make its fine proceedings an effective
information gathering system and thus an effective way of detecting and proving an
infringement of European competition law, especially Art 101 TFEU.
147W van Weert and M Maier (n 86) 124-5.
148Commission Notice on Immunity 2006 at para 39; G Murray (n 99) 191; See chapter 4 and 5.
149N Kredel and S Kiani (n 130) 238; L Gomez and F Harrision, ‘Global Cartels Handbook’ in
SJ Mobley and R Denton (eds), Global Cartels Handbook (OUP 2011) 621.
150C Canenbley and T Steinvorth, ‘Kartellbußgeldverfahren, Kronzeugenregelungen und
Schadensersatz – Liegt die Lo¨sung des Konflikts »de lege ferenda« in einem einheitlichen
Verfahren? ’ in FIW (ed), Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft – Festschrift
50 Jahre FIW: 1960 bis 2010 (Heymanns 2010) 143 ff.; G Dannecker and J Biermann (n 85) at
para 251.
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Nevertheless, it has to be remarked that the Commission has to rely on members
of cartels to apply for leniency and therefore to disclose a hidden infringement,
i.e. cartel. On the other hand, the leniency programme is efficient because it gives
psychological incentives to the members of the cartel to disclose the infringement and
to obtain fine immunity. This psychological phenomenon is based on the so-called
Prisoners Dilemma of the Game Theory.
On the other hand, an efficient leniency programme has to offer effective
protection to its whistle-blowers. However, this protection policy is in conflict with an
effective private enforcement because the private plaintiffs have to provide evidence
of an infringement (see Chapter 3).
2.2.3 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how the history of competition law enforcement in Europe
and the effectiveness of the European leniency programme are the main reasons for
the underdevelopment of private enforcement of European competition law.
On the one hand, the extensive enforcement power of the European Commission
and the meagre regulation of private enforcement, especially of private damage
claims, are an outcome of the long standing tradition of public competition law
enforcement in Europe. Unlike the enforcement of antitrust law in the US, and in
order to distinguish European regulation from the fear of an extensive and misleading
usage of private damage claims, the early lawgivers of European competition law
mainly focused on public enforcement by powerful public competition authorities.
On the other hand, the European leniency programme is another crucial reason
for the weak private enforcement of European competition law. It has to be
acknowledged that the European Commission has to rely on whistle-blowers to
detect an infringement of European competition law, especially of an infringement of
Art 101 TFEU. Therefore, an effective leniency programme is necessary to protect
whistle-blowers and give them incentives to betray the other members of the hidden
cartel. However, the effective leniency programme could lead to overprotection,
especially against private damage claims.
2.3 Necessity of private enforcement of
competition law as access to justice
The previous chapter concluded that public enforcement is the common and
traditional way of enforcing competition law in Europe. It also showed that the
well-developed enforcement mechanisms of the competition authorities, especially
the European Commission, are not only effective but also put obstacles in the way
of effective private enforcement.
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This leads to the question as to whether another system of private enforcement
besides the administrative proceeding is needed. Often, the question is answered
briefly151 and sometimes with reference to justice and the rights of victims to claim
compensation for their losses.152 However, it is unclear whether it is possible to
establish a damage claim on the basis of justice. To answer this question, it is first
necessary to examine whether there is a right of damages beyond law, which arises
out of the philosophical principle of justice. In particular, it is crucial to analyse what
justice is within the meaning of a corrective, distributive, universal and individual
justice by referring to the classical definitions of justice. Based on the distinction
between distributive and corrective justice as well as universal and individual justice
in the classical definition of Aristotle and the criticism and the negation of moral
justice by Legal Positivism, this chapter argues in favour of a re-classification of
justice based on the objectives of punishment as the central outcome of public law
enforcement.
Furthermore, private enforcement of European competition law is sometimes
described as a mechanism of deterrence.153 Therefore, the chapter analyses, on the
one hand, the possibility of deterrence in private enforcement and, on the other
hand, the necessity of private enforcement as a corrective and a complement to
public enforcement of European competition law.
2.3.1 Universal and distributive justice as the central aims of public
law enforcement
2.3.1.1 Distinction between distributive and corrective justice, and
universal and individual justice in the classical definition of Aristotle
It is Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics who has mainly shaped the classical
definition of justice. Broadly speaking, Aristotle proclaimed a justice based on
equality. The theory of justice in Aristotle’s philosophy refers back to the older
analysis of Plato in his theory of a just state in the Republic. For Plato, justice is
the ‘principle of doing one's own business’.154 Therefore, justice is when everybody
plays their own part in their own way for society. On the other hand, it is unjust if
somebody interferes in the responsibilities of others. Transferred to a legal conflict,
Plato argues that it is just if ‘no one shall have what belongs to others or be deprived
151See Commision, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper’ (n 11) 7.
152H Stakheyeva, ‘Removing obstacles to a more effective private enforcement of competition
law’ (2012) 33 ECLR 398, 399-400; T Eger and P Weise, ‘Some limits to the private enforcement
of antitrust law: a grumbler's view on harm and damages in hardcore price cartel cases’ (2010)
3 GCLR 152, 154; P Nebbia, ‘Damages actions for the infringement of EC competition law:
compensation or deterrence?’ (2008) 33 ELRev 23, 27; S Bourjade (n 8) 119.
153Commision, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper’ (n 11) 8.
154Plato, Republic (P Shorey tr, Harvard University Press 1935) IV 433b.
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of his own’.155 However, for Plato justice is merely an internal matter for a person.
Thus, justice cannot be defined through relationships with other people. As such,
Plato rejects the principle of suum cuique as a principle of justice.156
Based on that principle of justice, Aristotle established a definition of justice in
society. His analysis is the most classical influence of the theoretical explanation of
the law of damages from a moral perspective.157 Even if the Nicomachean Ethics158
and Politics159 refer to separate academic departments, they can be read as a single
theory of human affairs.160 Also, Aristotle himself described the scope of both books
as covering political science.161 At the end of his Nicomachean Ethics he considers
that the insight created by his ethical analysis certainly leads neatly into his political
analysis as humans are political animals by nature.162
In his works, Aristotle developed his theory of special justice. In contrast to Plato,
Aristotle argues that justice is not purely an internal matter but a system/institution
of society. Justice is a human characteristic and refers to relationships with other
people.163 Furthermore, justice is not a pure abstract idea but a human behaviour.164
Similarly to Plato, Aristotle generally argues that a person acts unjustly if he wants
more than is due to him. Aristotle describes this as the common human urge of
pleonexia; the voracious desire to own what rightfully belongs to others.
As a first step, Aristotle divides the phenomenon of justice into two main
parts. On the one hand, there is the so-called universal justice which addresses
the whole virtue of justice and on the other hand there is individual justice (iustitia
particularis165) which refers to the individual virtue of character coordination as a
part of universal justice.166 Although there is an explanation of individual justice
in chapters IV and V of the Nicomachean Ethics and no definition of universal
155Ibid IV 433e.
156C Scha¨fer, ‘Gerechtigkeit’ in C Scha¨fer (ed), Platon-Lexikon (Wiss Buchges 2007) 132-3.
157F Giglio, The foundations of restitution for wrongs (Hart Pub 2007) 148; E Weinrib, The Idea
of Private Law (rev edn, OUP 2012) 56; different opinion by P Cane, ‘The Anatomy of Private
Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 OJLS 203.
158Especially chapter V.
159Especially chapter III.
160S Salkever, ‘Reading Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics as a Single Course of
Lectures: Rhetoric, Politics, and Philosophy’ in S Salkever (ed), The Cambridge Companion to
Ancient Greek Political Thought (CUP 2009) 209.
161Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (JAK Thomson tr, Penguin 1955) 1094a-b.
162Aristotle, Politics (H Rackham tr, Harvard University Press 1944) 1253a7-18.
163Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (n 161) 1129b.
164Ibid 1137a30.
165T St Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics (R McInerny and
CI Litzinger trs, Dumb Ox Books 1993).
166Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (n 161) V 1-2; CM Young, ‘Aristotle’s Justice’ in R Kraut (ed),
Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell 2007) 181.
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justice, universal justice can be seen as a collection of a number of particular virtues,
including individual justice,167 which, broadly speaking, is a justice of equality.168
For the purpose of a practical application of the concept of justice, it is crucial
to focus on the shape of individual justice. Aristotle himself breaks up particular
justice into two component parts: distributive and corrective justice. Whereas
distributive justice (iustitia distributiva169) focuses on the distribution of ‘honor,
wealth, and other items that may be divided among those who share in a political
arrangement’,170 corrective justice (iustitia correctiva171) deals with the restoration
of equality between people after one party has harmed the other.172 It is one of the
main principles in Aristotle’s theory that the worth of a person does not matter:
It makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a
bad man a good one . . . the law looks only to the distinctive character of the
injuries, and treats the parties as equals where one is in the wrong and the
other is being wronged.173
Therefore, the principle of restitution only refers to one wrongdoing and to a
single unequal situation. As such. it is a matter of wrongdoing if a victim of a theft
reclaims his goods by stealing them from the former thief. Aristotle argues in favour
of a restitution based on law and judication by courts and less of a system where
the victim takes the law into his own hands.
To find a basis for the concept of a damages claim, it is obvious that the concept
of corrective justice is the main principle to apply because it deals with the situation
where one person has wronged another.174 Aristotle states that the result of such
a wrongdoing is the creation of an inequality between the involved people.175 The
main objective of corrective justice now is to rectify that inequality (injustice). It
does so by taking away the gain of the perpetrator and restoring it to the victim.176
By doing so, the concept of corrective justice considers the above principle, namely
that the worth of a person does not matter. Therefore, it is clear that the aim of
corrective justice is not geometric equality (both have the same position after the
167CM Young (n 166) 181; G Bien, ‘Gerechtigkeit bei Aristoteles’ in O Ho¨ffe (ed), Aristoteles,
Nikomachische Ethik (2nd edn, Akademie Verlag 2006) 149 with reference to NE 1130a28-32.
168Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (n 161) 1130a28-32; G Bien (n 167) 149.
169CM Young (n 166) 184.
170Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (n 161) 1130b31-2.
171F Giglio (n 157) 150.
172CM Young (n 166) 185.
173Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (n 161) 1132a2-6.
174Only in claims against a public authority or other institutions distributing public goods (eg
health service, education, etc) it is often not a question of corrective rather of distributive justice.
See J Lord Steyn, ‘Perspectives of corrective and distributive justice in tort law’ (2002) 37 Irish
Jurist 1.
175FD Miller, Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics (OUP 1995) 71-2.
176CM Young (n 166) 185-6; DG Ritchie, ‘Aristotle’s Subdivision of Particular Justice’ (1894)
8 CR 185, 186.
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correction) but rather arithmetic equality (so called equality of difference177) in that
it only mentions the difference between the positions before the infringement and
after the correction and tries to adjust both differences.178 In Aristotle’s Politics it
is described in the following way:
They think justice is equality, and indeed it is, but not to all, only to equals,
and they think inequality is justice, as it is, but not to everyone, only to the
unequals; they skip the part explaining ‘to whom’ and judge badly.179
What this all amounts to is that Aristotle first divides justice into universal and
individual justice. Whereas the aims of universal justice are to establish a just society
in general and to allow the realisation of individual justice, individual justice itself
focuses on the situation of a single individual. As part of universal justice, individual
justice wants to achieve social welfare through the principle of equality in a specific
situation. In one way, this can be by distributing goods in an equal manner or by
restoring equality after an infringement.
That concept of individual justice as a part of a society-wide universal justice
which aims to achieve a peaceful communal life has been described by the Roman
philosopher, lawyer and politician Marcus Tullius Cicero. In doing so, he refined the
practical application of Aristotle’s theory of justice.180
This approach of absolute justice was first criticised by the ancient Greek
philosopher Epicurus. In contrast to Aristotle, he described justice as an individual
agreement or contract between individuals ‘made in mutual dealings among men
in whatever places at various times providing against the infliction or suffering of
harm’.181 However, even in the concept of Epicurus is the broad recognition that the
damnification is congruent with injustice. Even though he does not apply a higher
principle of how justice has to be (e.g. equality).
2.3.1.2 Criticism and the negation of moral justice by legal positivism
Hans Kelsen and other philosophers of legal positivism pursued an entirely different
approach. Kelsen proclaimed a science of law free of ideology (Reine Rechtslehre)
and argued that everything legal was just. He appreciated the distinction between
the categories of ought and being : simply because something is, it cannot be said
that it will be. As such, law falls into the ought category. Therefore, a rule of law can
only be justified by other (higher) rules of law and not by a mere fact or ideology:
177DG Ritchie (n 176) 186; CM Young (n 166) 185-6.
178JV Robert, Routledge philosophy guidebook to Aristotle and the Politics (Routledge 2009) 85;
FD Miller (n 175) 71-2.
179Aristotle, Politics (n 162) 1280a12-15.
180MT Cicero, De Officiis (W Miller tr, Harvard University Press 1931) Sec 20.
181Epicurus, Principal doctrines (GRG Mure tr, Infomotions 1996) No 33.
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The determination of these absolute values, and in particular the definition
of the idea of justice, achieved in this way, are but empty formulas by which
any social order whatever may be justified as just.182
For Kelsen, justice is only a concept that deals with the relationship between
individuals.183 He claims that:
Justice is primarily a possible, but not a necessary, quality of a social order
regulating the mutual relations of men. Only secondarily is it a virtue of a
man, since a man is just, if his behavior conforms to the norms of a social
order supposed to be just.184
In opposition to Aristotle and in line with Epicurus, Kelsen argues that law is
based on human will. Therefore, it is illogical to use a metaphysical speculation as a
normative authority to justify law as human regulations.185 Consequently, there is no
objective and consistent definition of justice.186 For Kelsen, individual and universal
‘justice’ as well as equality are not a question of justice but rather of logic.187 With
reference to Plato, he affirms that a picture of justice as a higher regime different
from positive law is as far from the reality as the transcendental things in Plato’s
philosophy is on the far side of the reality.188 He argues that if there were a principle
of justice outside the law, positive law would be completely redundant.189
A more integrated approach is proclaimed by Ju¨rgen Habermas. He rejects
factual historical and metaphysical (e.g. law by god or rationality) justifications
of law.190 However, in contrast to the philosophers of legal positivism, he argues
that law needs justification for its validity. Without any legitimation, its recipients
will not accept law.191 Positive law is not justified by itself, rather its individual
configuration has to be justified.192
In conclusion, it can be said that a legal system has to promote individual justice
as well as ensure a system of effective enforcement of individual rights of every victim
guaranteed by law. This can be called universal justice.
182H Kelsen, What is justice?: justice, law, and politics in the mirror of science (University of
California Press 1957) 11.
183K Engliˇs, ‘Hans Kelsens Lehre von der Gerechtigkeit: ein Beitrag zur Theorie der
Gesellschaftsordnungen’ (1961) 47 ARSP 301, 305.
184H Kelsen, What is justice? (n 182) 1-2.
185Ibid 20-1; K Engliˇs (n 183) 327.
186H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (M Knight tr, 2nd Revised and Enlarged edn, University of
California Press 1967) 319; K Engliˇs (n 183) 329.
187Cf H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 186) 24.
188H Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre: Einleitung in die Rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik (1st edn,
Deuticke 1934) 14.
189Ibid 15.
190J Habermas, Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and
democracy (W Rehg tr, Polity 1996).
191Ibid 23.
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2.3.1.3 Re-classification of justice based on the objectives of
punishment as the central outcome of public law enforcement
Whereas Aristotle defines the starting point for the philosophical principle of justice
and its classification, the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas has been more influential
in shaping the modern law of damages.193 In his well-known commentary on
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,194 he adds the principle of punishment to Aristotle’s
purely compensatory approach of individual justice. Aquinas argues that a person
who causes damage voluntarily (in a malicious way) should be punished more
severely than an accidental (or to a certain extent careless) wrongdoer. For Aquinas,
punishment is a type of restitution and restitution is an act of corrective justice.
Therefore, he argues that punishment would bring about justice in cases where
straightforward reciprocation (compensation of damages) would not be enough.195
Considering the outcomes of the last chapter, punishment is mainly based on the
public enforcement of the law.
Building on that, punishment should be considered as a part of justice. However,
in contrast to Aquinas, punishment is not only a point of corrective justice as part
of individual justice. It is rather a fact in the whole system of universal justice.
This fact could be brought to light by defining the central objectives of punishment.
These aims are often divided into two different approaches: absolute and relative
criminal justice or revenge, and prevention of breaches and deterrence.
On the one hand, the theory of absolute criminal justice or revenge is shaped
by the principle of retribution.196 This theory seeks to balance out the wrong of the
perpetrator with punishment. It tries to establish justice through a compensation of
culpability. While Immanuel Kant strengthened the strict principle of ‘an eye for an
eye and a tooth for a tooth’,197 Georg WF Hegel argued for a more flexible way of
an equality of the values.198 In its application the theory of revenge tries to achieve
a metaphysical justice not based on the social being of humans in a state but rather
on a transcendental philosophical concept. In consequence, Kant argued that:
[even] if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its
members . . . the last Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before
the resolution was carried out. This ought to be done in order that every one
may realize the desert of his deeds, and that bloodguiltiness may not remain
193F Giglio (n 157) 162.
194T St Aquinas (n 165).
195F Giglio (n 157) 155, 165.
196See J Johnson, An Idealist Justification of Punishment – Kant, Hegel and the problem of
punishment (VDM 2008) 70 ff., 133 ff.
197N Potter, ‘Kant on Punishment’ in TE Hill (ed), The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics
(Wiley-Blackwell 2009) 179 ff.; J Johnson (n 196) 70 ff.
198GWF Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of right (SW Dyde tr, George Bell and Sons 1896)
sections 99 ff.; J Johnson (n 196) 133 ff.
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upon the people; for otherwise they might all be regarded as participators in
the murder as a public violation of Justice.199
Therefore, punishment is a categorical imperative, i.e. an absolute precept not
bounded to a purpose.200 Consequently, punishment has to be considered as a part
of individual justice. Even though Kant argued that punishment has no purpose and
is a consequence of the extensive conception of universal justice, satisfaction for a
pain or suffering can be defined as the central aim of punishment. By doing this,
punishment can be defined as a part of individual justice. For his part, Aquinas
argued that punishment is a corrective measure for an unjust situation where pure
compensation is not sufficient and so it acts as an addition to a (private) system of
restitution.
On the other hand, the theory of relative criminal justice does not see punishment
in general outside any objectives. The theory connects punishment with prevention
or deterrence to enforce the law in an efficient way. However, it is imprecise to
see the theory of relative criminal justice as one consistent approach. It can be
generally divided into two main specifications. Franz von Liszt strengthened the
position of special prevention, i.e. he focused on the actual dangerousness of a
perpetrator.201 Under the usage of positive sanctions (e.g. rewards) and negative
sanctions (e.g. imprisonment, injury award) the theory of special prevention tries
to dissuade a perpetrator from repeating his wrongdoing.202 Beyond this, Paul JA
von Feuerbach focused more on the socio-legal perspective. His theory of general
preventions is geared towards the protection of the whole community and tries to
strengthen confidence in the legal system.203 Feuerbach wants to eliminate crime
even before the law has been breached. He states that:
. . . [because] even [the state] has to fulfil the task of securing and protecting
the rights of its citizens from injury, it must necessarily be both entitled and
obliged to take coercive institutions whereby violations of law are impossible
at all.204
199I Kant, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence
as the Science of Right (W Hastie tr, Clark 1887) 198.
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3 ZStW 1.
202F von Liszt, Strafrechtliche Aufsa¨tze und Vortra¨ge, vol 1 (de Gruyter 1970) 171; W Gropp,
Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (Springer 2005) 113 ff.
203O Do¨ring (n 200) 25.
204Translation of PJA von Feuerbach, Lehrbuch des gemeinen, in Deutschland geltenden
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In Section 15 of his coursebook on criminal law, Feuerbach saw the main reason
for punishment and public enforcement of the law in general in the need to curtail the
mutual freedom of every individual in a society by the abolition of the psychological
compulsion to breach the law.205
In summary, it can be said that punishment can be seen as a part of universal
justice as well as distributive justice. Regarding the moral basis of justice, Aristotle
argued in his Politics that the state has the obligation to provide justice; distributive
justice is the equal allocation of goods; and justice can be described as a good itself.
Therefore, the allocation of justice is universal and distributive justice all at once.
The strict distinction between universal and distributive justice as part of individual
justice as set out by Aristotle is diffuse or ambiguous.
Public enforcement of law in general, and competition law in particular, focuses
on the principal of distributive and universal justice by using deterrence and
punishment to evolve an undisrupted market less on individual or particular
justice.206 The central aim of public enforcement has often been portrayed as
a maximisation of social welfare.207 On the other hand, public enfocement is
a complement to a (private) system of restitution in providing individual and
corrective justice.
2.3.2 Individual and corrective justice as the main objectives of
private enforcement
2.3.2.1 Possibility of deterrence in private enforcement
In the knowledge that public enforcement mainly deals with universal justice and
tries to achieve social welfare, the question arises whether the goal of private law
enforcement differs from this.
Private law enforcement has been possible since the Treaty of Rome in 1957.208
Whereas the contribution of private enforcement of competition law is still a subject
of debate, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided in favour of a guarantee
205Ibid § 15; O Do¨ring (n 200) 26.
206PH Rosochowicz, ‘Deterrence and the relationship between public and private enforcement of
competition law’ Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics, Competition & Regulation Meeting
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icz.pdf?1345929891801> accessed 01/03/2016.
207AM Polinsky, ‘Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines’ (1980) 9 JLS 105; RP McAfee,
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92 JPublicEcon 1863; criticised by I Segal and M Whinston (n 3) 310.
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to claimants in private competition law litigations.209 Therefore, the Commission
strengthened the effectiveness of private competition law enforcement.
If it is assumed that the achievement of societal goods and the maximisation of
social welfare through deterrence is the main goal of competition law enforcement,
there is no need of private enforcement of competition law because there are
statutory agencies.210 The ECJ stated that:
[t]he full effectiveness of Article [101] of the Treaty . . . would be put at risk
if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to
him . . . [A]ctions for damages . . . can make a significant contribution to the
maintenance of effective competition in the Community.211
However, it is still under debate whether private enforcement has a positive
impact on the general effectiveness of enforcement and on deterrence in particular.
It is certainly clear that punitive damages (as in the UK or USA) can have a
deterrent effect.212 In addition, it can be argued that even ‘normal’ damages claims
can have such an impact because all damages can be seen as a form of punishment
for the injurer.213 This is in spite of the fact that some commentators restrict
the effect to claims of class actions or collective redress mechanisms.214 Moreover,
with reference to the limited resources of public authorities and, as a consequence,
the limited comprehensive monitoring and public enforcement (enforcement gap),
private litigants can help to fill the gaps215 and achieve high financial savings within
the public sector.216
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On the other hand, the incentives for victims to sue for compensatory awards do
not correlate with that idealistic view.217 Often, victims do not sue for a breach
of competition law if the damages will fall short of the litigation costs.218 On
the contrary, private enforcement leads to excessive amount of litigation, and in
consequence deterrence if the claimed damages exceed litigation costs even if there
is just a minor breach of competition law.219 Apart from this, private enforcement of
competition law cannot be as efficient as public enforcement in deterring potential
lawbreakers.220 On the one hand, victims may not even realise that they suffered any
harm as they may consider more their personal rather than social benefits and so
wait for other victims to share the costs and risks of the trial.221 On the other hand,
the current public enforcement already enables close-to-optimal deterrence,222 and a
lack of deterrence should be solved by reforming public enforcement mechanisms.223
In summary, an accumulation of fines and claims for damages and, thus, a combined
enforcement strategy, increases public deterrence224 – often only as a ‘socially
beneficial byproduct’225 – but it is not able to replace public law enforcement.226
However, the enforcement of law through private litigation is usually combined
with the rights of individuals to claim compensation.227 Its primary aim is to
enforce individual’s interests and rights.228 Besides this, private litigators who sue for
damages do not normally care about the deterrent effect of the lawsuit.229 Typically,
it is the potential monetary awards that motivate them.230
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What all this amounts to is that the primary goal of private law enforcement is the
compensation of victims for damages caused by competition law infringements.231 In
consequence, even if private enforcement has an impact on deterrence and universal
justice, public enforcement is indispensable.232
2.3.2.2 Necessity of private enforcement as corrective and complement
of public enforcement
Based on the outcome that public and private enforcement focus on different aims,
it is necessary to define the relationship between both types of law enforcement.
From an economic point of view, the social award of competition law has been
described as just one design parameter for litigation incentives of plaintiffs and the
deterrence effect on violators.233 Therefore, that single parameter cannot achieve an
optimal litigation (private enforcement) and optimal deterrence (primarily public
enforcement).234 In consequence, public enforcement, especially fines, should be
imposed and private enforcement, i.e. the probability of detection, should be
minimised. This is what is known as the Becker-Optimum.235 It has been argued
that private litigation cannot achieve that point of deterrence236 because competition
authorities can rely on the state power and have an information advantage.237 It is
also cheaper than private litigation and is not as likely to be abused as private
claims.238
However, the Becker-Optimum ignores the fact that private enforcement of
competition law does not only have the task of achieving an effective enforcement of
the law (e.g. through deterrence). The main outcome for private claims for damages
is to establish corrective justice. It suffices to look to the workload of competition
authorities to see that public enforcement can only be concentrated on the most
damaging infractions of competition law.239 With regard to the deterrent effect, it
is just a minor weakness but, with reference to justice, it leads to a major problem.
That enforcement gap or gap of justice can only be bridged through a combined law
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A Aresu (n 213) 354, who says that there is no need of a private enforcement if an optimal
public enforcement is given.
237S Weishaar, Cartels, competition and public procurement: law and economic approaches to bid
rigging (Edward Elgar 2013) 11 ff.
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enforcement with a strong private part avoiding the intervention-oriented approach
of public competition law enforcement.240
For that reason, it is necessary to establish an efficient relationship between
private and public enforcement to achieve both aims in a nearly optimal way.241
In doing so, it is not necessary to distinguish strictly between both ways of law
enforcement. The most efficient way is to combine them and to use the advantages of
both approaches, for example, to use the information of public authorities in private
claims through ‘follow-on claims’.242 Consequently, the mechanisms of public and
private enforcement have to be fine-tuned to achieve an effective relationship.243
2.3.3 Conclusion
To sum up, it can be said that private enforcement of competition law is necessary
to achieve access to individual justice.
Based on the basic definition of justice by Aristotle and his distinction between
universal and individual justice, as well as corrective and distributive justice, it is
necessary for a legal enforcement system to achieve the aims of all forms of justice. It
is therefore necessary for a legal system to promote individual justice as well as ensure
a system of effective enforcement of individual rights of every victim guaranteed by
law to promote universal justice.
Furthermore, according to the more influential analysis of St Thomas Aquinas,
universal justice and distributive justice are connected and can be achieved by an
effective punishment regime, i.e. public enforcement. Regarding Aristotle’s moral
definition of distributive justice, he describes how it is an equal allocation of goods,
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and justice can be described as a good itself and an equal allocation of justice is a
way to achieve distributive justice. Therefore, the strict distinction between universal
and distributive justice as part of individual justice as set out by Aristotle is diffuse
or ambiguous.
On the other hand, public enforcement is a complement to a (private) system of
restitution in providing individual and corrective justice. The primary goal of private
law enforcement is compensation of victims for damages caused by competition
law infringements. In consequence, even if private enforcement has an impact on
deterrence and universal justice, public enforcement is indispensable.
Consequently, it is necessary to define the relationship between both types of
law enforcement because both enforcement regimes are based on different aims.
Moreover, it is necessary to establish an efficient relationship between private and
public enforcement to achieve both aims in a nearly optimal way. This can only
be done by combined law enforcement with a strong private part avoiding the
intervention-oriented approach of public competition law enforcement.
2.4 Conclusion
In summary, it can be said that an effective relationship between public and private
enforcement of European competition law is necessary.
Even if public enforcement has historically been the main enforcement mechanism
of European competition law, private enforcement is necessary to achieve individual
justice. Based on the long tradition of public competition law enforcement by
national competition authorities and the European Commission, it is a fact that
private competition law enforcement in Europe, especially with regard to damage
claims based on an infringement of Art 101 TFEU, is underdeveloped. Furthermore,
public enforcement can be described as an efficient enforcement proceeding.
However, the effectiveness of the European leniency programmes is a reason
for weak private competition law enforcement. Although, the Commission has to
trust members of cartels to apply for leniency and, therefore, to disclose a hidden
infringement, i.e. cartel, the information gathering of the European Commission
within public enforcement proceedings has turned its fine proceedings into an
effective information gathering system and thus into an effective way of detecting and
proving an infringement of European competition law, especially Art 101 TFEU.
Consequently, the leniency programme has to be efficient as well and, therefore,
it is necessary to provide psychological incentives to the members of the cartel
to disclose the infringement. The main incentive is the immunity of fines by the
European Commission and national competition authorities but this protection
policy of whistle-blowers is in conflict with an effective private enforcement because
the private plaintiffs have to provide evidence of an infringement. Therefore, an
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effective leniency programme could lead to overprotection, especially against private
damage claims.
Nevertheless, private enforcement of competition law is necessary to achieve
access to individual justice. The primary goal of private law enforcement is
compensation of victims for damages caused by competition law infringements. In
consequence, even if private enforcement has an impact on deterrence and universal
justice, its main outcome is to provide individual and corrective justice.
As a result, it is necessary to define an effective relationship between public
and private enforcement of European competition law because both types of law
enforcement and enforcement regimes are based on different aims. This can only
be done by combined law enforcement with a strong private part avoiding the
intervention-oriented approach of public competition law enforcement. The most
efficient way is to combine them and to use the advantages of both approaches; for
example, by using the information of public authorities in private claims through
‘follow-on claims’.
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3. Burden of proof as weak point of
private competition law enforcement
After stressing the need for an effective relationship between public and private
enforcement of competition law in the last chapter, this chapter analyses the legal
realisation of damage claims for the breach of European competition law.
The chapter begins with an analysis of the factual and legal basis for burden
of proof in European competition law. This necessarily includes an examination of
burden of proof as an expression of fair proceeding and information asymmetry in
competition cases.
The chapter then considers the developments in the European provisions on
damage claims based on the breach of European competition law. This will start
with the situation prior to the decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in
Courage v Crehan244 and the considerations in establishing a right for civil damages
claims based on the principle of state liability.245 After analysing the landmark
decision of the ECJ in Courage v Crehan, the chapter will highlight the European
provisions de lege lata about civil damage claims based on the breach of Arts 101 or
102 TFEU. The focus will then turn to the recent European harmonisation leading
to the Directive 2014/104/EU.
Thirdly, the section examines the classification in German law as a claim of the
law of delicts and its requirements. In doing so, it firstly show up the distinction
between a damage claim based on the law of contracts and the delicts. Here, the
section begins by giving the main distinction between a damage claim based on
contracts and on torts or delicts. Based on the ancient distinction between voluntary
and involuntary contractual relationships in Aristotle’s theory of justice and the
244Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others
[2001] ECR I-6297.
245Joined case C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others
v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357; H Smith, ‘The Francovich case: state liability and the
individual's right to damages’ (1992) 13 ECLR 129, 132; M Hoskins, ‘Garden Cottage revisited:
the availability of damages in the national courts for breaches of the EEC competition rules’ (1992)
13 ECLR 257, 259; criticised by E Deards, ‘”Curiouser and Curiouser”? The Development of
Member State Liability in the Court of Justice’ (1997) 3 EPL 117, 143; C Kremer, ‘Liability
for Breach of European Community Law – An Analysis of the New Remedy in the Light of English
and German Law’ (2003) 22 YEL 203, 209 with further references; S Moore and C Lewis, ‘Duties,
Directives and damages in European Community law’ [1993] PL 151, 170; R Nazzini, ‘The objective
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principle of the freedom of contracts as well as the separation of claims ‘in rem’ and
‘in personam’ under Roman law.
After doing so, the chapter compares the German and the English regulations
on civil damage claims based on an infringement of European competition law and
highlights the main differences of both jurisdictions.
3.1 Factual and legal basis for burden of proof in
European competition law
3.1.1 Burden of proof as an expression of fair proceeding
The first question that arises is whether the burden of proof in civil damage claims
is necessary with reference to a fair legal proceeding.
In international law, the requirements of a fair legal proceeding are regulated
in various intergovernmental treaties. One of these is the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) in which the signatory states commit themselves to
comply with the principles set out for human rights and fundamental freedoms and
be subject to justice-like processes safeguarding those rights before the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).246 Like every other international agreement, the
ECHR only takes effect between the signatory states (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec
prosunt).247 However, whereas all Member States of the EU ratified the ECHR,
the European Union itself as a legal entity according to international law has not
ratified the Convention yet, even though a ratification is intended in Art 6(2) Treaty
of the European Union (TEU). The most recent attempt at ratification was rejected
by the ECJ in December 2014 with its Opinion 2/13.248 The main reason for the
rejection was the lack of clarification of the material scope of European law249 and
the lack of conformity of Art 53 ECHR and Art 53 of the European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights (EUCFR).250 In particular, the ECJ was concerned that entities
of the ECHR (e.g. ECtHR) were entitled to take binding decisions on the internal
responsibility mechanisms of the European Union.251 However, the ECJ stated that
246See M Herdegen, Vo¨lkerrecht (13th edn, CH Beck 2014) § 49 at paras 3-4.
247See E Klein, Statusvertra¨ge im Vo¨lkerrecht. Rechtsfragen territorialer Sonderregime (Springer
1980); C Tomuschat, H Neuhold and J Kropholler, Vo¨lkerrechtlicher Vertrag und Drittstaaten
(CF Mu¨ller 1988) 9 ff.; M Herdegen (n 246) § 15 at para 19.
248Opinion 2/13 Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – Compatibility of the draft agreement with the EU
and FEU Treaties [2015] 2 CMLR 21 (ECJ).
249Ibid at para 186.
250Ibid at para 187 ff.
251Ibid at para 185 with refence to Opinion 1/91 Draft agreement between the Community, on
the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating
to the creation of the European Economic Area [1991] ECR I-6079 and Opinion 1/00 Proposed
agreement between the European Community and non-Member States on the establishment of a
European Common Aviation Area [2002] ECR I-3493 at para 13.
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an external binding of European courts is generally permitted, especially because
the Treaties already provide this.252
However, even without the accession of the European Union to the ECHR,
Art 6(3) TEU states that the rights conferred by the ECHR are general legal
principles of the law of the European Union. This corresponds to the case law of
the ECJ.253 Such a commitment of a third country to comply with an international
treaty is not uncommon in international law.254 Havin said this, all EU Member
States that have had to ratify the ECHR are obliged to apply the provisions of
the ECHR by the implementation of European law.255
Therefore, the burden of proof in a civil procedure could be an expression of
the requirement of a fair proceeding with reference to Art 6 ECHR. However, this
would not affect the order to be heard before an unbiased court nor the demand for
equality of arms which is the fundamental requirement of the burden of proof. The
decisive criterion is whether the parties are equipped with their own rights and can
affect the conduct of the proceedings.256 In particular, therefore, the counter-didactic
proceeding is protected, which is intended to enable the parties to take a position
on submitted evidence.257 However, this is also possible in an inquisitorial system
and so it is not necessary to organise civil law proceedings with a burden of proof
regarding Art 6(1) ECHR. The fairness requirement of Art 6(1) ECHR requires that
the parties shall have the opportunity to comment on evidence during the legal
process.258 However, the ECHR does not regulate the finding of facts and how the
burden of proof is to be structured.259 The ECtHR only makes an overall assessment
252Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU (2/13 ) at para 182 with refence to Opinion
delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228 (1) of the Treaty (1/91), Opinion
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und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities [1977] ECR 1 at
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Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and
others [1991] ECR I-2925 at para 41; Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah
Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission
of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-6351 at para 283; Case C-571/10 Servet Kamberaj
v Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano (IPES) and Others
[2012] 2 CMLR 43 (ECJ) at para 60; Case C-617/10 REC A˚klagaren v Hans A˚kerberg Fransson
[2013] 2 CMLR 46 at para 44.
254See Art 35-6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT); E Klein (n 247);
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256See BVerfGE 64, 133 at 145; BVerfGE 107, 395 at 408; BVerfG NJW 2007, 204 at 205.
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of the proceeding, including the taking of evidence in general.260 Furthermore, from
the systematic and clear wording of Art 6 ECHR it is clear that the presumption of
innocence, proclaimed by Art 6(2) ECHR, does not apply to civil proceedings.261
On the other hand, both juristidictions analysed in this dissertation, English
and German law, apply an adversarial system in civil damage proceedings.262
This adversarial system is the main distinction between private litigation and
administrative authorities wich follow the inquisitorial system.263 In addition to this,
it is accepted as a principle of customary international law that in an adversarial
system each party has the burden to prove all facts that are the basis of that party’s
case.264 Thus, each party has to prove the facts necessary to the success of his claim
or defence.265
3.1.2 Information asymmetry in competition cases
Whereas the general burden of proof in adversarial procedural systems works quite
well and is a matter of fair proceeding as described in the last section, it is a reason
for the weakness of private enforcement in competition law cases because the relevant
evidence for a successful claim is in the possession of the defendant. This unusual
situation can be described as information asymmetry about the relevant files and
evidence.
As mentioned above, cartels are a form of organised crime, and it is a common
phenomenon that externals find it difficult to gather evidence, especially for the
infringement of the law itself and the suffered harm.266 Furthermore, customers only
have the documentation about their contracts with their direct suppliers, and they
usually do not know anything about the internal cartel agreement yet this agreement
is the main infringement of the competition law. As mentioned above, that is one of
the reasons why whistle-blowers are needed in competition law cases. Consequently,
the plaintiff can only rely on indications to establish a damage claim based on an
infringement of European competition law.267
260Volkmer and Petersen v Germany (2009) NJW 2002, 3087 (ECtHR) at para 4; See
J Meyer-Ladewig (n 258) Art 6 at para 141.
261See as well J Meyer-Ladewig (n 258) Art 6 at para 211; H-J Blanke, ‘EU-GRCharta
Art. 48 – Unschuldsvermutung und Verteidigungsrechte’ in C Calliess and M Ruffert (eds), (4th edn,
CH Beck 2011) at para 1.
262See e.g. in detail T Rauscher, ‘Einleitung’ in T Rauscher and W Kru¨ger (eds), Mu¨nchener
Kommentar zur ZPO, vol 1 (4th edn, CH Beck 2013) at paras 310-2.
263See AP Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement (n 9) 225-6.
264See ALI/UNIDROIT – Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure Principle 21.1-2;
R Stu¨rner, ‘Duties of Disclosure and Burden of Proof in the Private Enforcement of European
Competition Law’ in J Basedow (ed), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law (Kluwer 2007)
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265JA Jolowicz, On Civil Procedure (CUP 2000) 222.
266See in detail under Section 3.3.2.1 for German law and 3.4.2.1 for English law.
267See T Wißmann, ‘Decentralised Enforcement of EC Competition Law and the New Polify on
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3.1.3 Conclusion
The burden of proof in civil law cases and the linked adversarial system is a central
rule of German and English civil procedure rule. It must also be mentioned that it
is not an outcome of Art 6 ECHR that an adversarial system has to be introduced
in civil law, especially in civil damage law. However, it is generally accepted as a
principle of fair proceeding that each party has the burden to prove all facts that
are the basis of that party’s case.
In competition law cases, this general principle leads to the problem that the
relevant evidence is usually in the possession of the defendant. Therefore, it is
necessary to find a mechanism to provide access to that evidence for the plaintiff
whilst not bypassing the principle of the adversarial system.
3.2 Provisions about evidence under
European law
After analysing the possession of relevant evidence and hence the information
asymmetry in competition cases, this chapter examines the provisions under
European, German and English law to find a procedural answer for the question
of evidence in damage claims based on an infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU.
The most recent development in the field of European competition law and
private enforcement is Directive 2014/104/EU which harmonises the national system
of competition law damage claims. However, before analysing the provisions of
Directive 2014/104/EU, this section seeks to highlight the development under
European competition law enforcement, especially the provisions about private
enforcement.
It is necessary to understand the history of Directive 2014/104/EU, the case law
of the European courts before 2014 and the questions that arise from these. The main
emphasis is on the decisions of the ECJ in Courage v Crehan and Manfredi. The
last section analyses the possible impacts of the proposed Guideline of the European
Commission on cartel damage claims.
3.2.1 Developments up to European Court of Justice in
Courage v Crehan
Until its decision in Courage v Crehan, the ECJ had not had an opportunity to decide
about the liability for and the basis of a European civil damage claim in competition
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law.268 However, the ECJ had earlier referred to the possibility of claiming damages
under national law but without examining the legal requirements in any depth.269
In contrast to the provisions of the American antitrust law,270 the European
treaties had no regulations about a European based right of damage claims.
At the same time, the Member States of the European Union solved the
questions through the general provisions in tort or, rarely, contract law. Albeit
scattered, there were some explicit regulations, for example in § 33 German
Competition Act 1998,271 Art 33 (1) Swedish Competition Act 1993272 and Art 18a
Finnish Act on Competition Restrictions 1992273.274
The consideration of a European law based right to claim damages against an
infringer of European competition law arose from the leading state liability decision
of the ECJ, Francovich v Italy275 in 1991. According to some commentators, mainly
in the English legal literature,276 the principle of state liability of a Member State
that does not fulfil its obligation to implement a European regulation was transferred
to a liability of individuals for direct applicable European law.277 This reasoning is
based on the grounds that there is no compelling reason to distinguish between the
liability of a state for not implementing a European legislation, which is obliged to
do this under Art 288 TFEU, and the liability of an individual for the breach of
direct applicable European law.278 With reference to this, the commentators argue
that the liability of an offender is not bound by the identity of the perpetrator but
rather an expression of the European principle of effet utile.279
Against this argumentation, the Court of First Instance decided in Automec II 280
that the basis of a damage claim for breach of European competition law is a
268AP Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement (n 9) 165.
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De Danske Statsbaner (DSB) [1997] ECR I-4449 para 57; Case C-282/95 P Gue´rin automobiles
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272Konkurrenslag, SFS 1993:20.
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(Conference Organised by the Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics on Remedies and
Sacntions in Competition Policy, Amsterdam, 17-18 Feb 2005); AP Komninos, EC Private
Antitrust Enforcement (n 9) 186 fn 270; FW Bulst, Schadensersatzanspru¨che der Marktgegenseite
im Kartellrecht – zur Schadensabwa¨lzung nach deutschem, europa¨ischem und US-amerikanischem
Recht (Nomos 2006) 108 ff.
275Joined case C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian
Republic [1991] ECR I-5357.
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Remedy in the Light of English and German Law’ (2003) 22 YEL 203, 209 with further references.
277H Smith (n 245) 132; M Hoskins (n 245) 259; criticised by E Deards (n 245), 143.
278S Moore and C Lewis (n 245); R Nazzini (n 245) 137-8.
279H Smith (n 245); M Hoskins (n 245) 259.
280Case T-24/90 Automec Srl v Commission of the European Communities [1992] ECR II-2223.
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problem for the national law of the Member States. Referencing the wording of
Art 101 TFEU (ex-Art 85 EEC-Treaty), the CFI argued that:
. . . [among] the consequences which an infringement of [the European
competition rules] may have in civil law, only one is expressly provided for in
Article [101](2), namely the nullity of the agreement.281
Building on this, the CFI stated it was a principle of subsidiarity282 that only
the Member States had the power to establish rights in procedural and substantive
law. In comparison with this, the Advocate-General van Gerven strengthened the
opinion that the principle of state liability for a breach of European law was a
fortiori applicable. A special regulation in the Treaty is therefore insignificant.283
Sadly, the ECJ did not take a stand on the position of the AG. Against the opinion
of the AG, the ECJ rejected the applicability of the ECSC-Treaty in the present
case and, therefore, it was not necessary to take a position about the liability of the
defendant.284
That decision encouraged the European Commission to attend to the problem.
Already by 1962, the Deringer-Report (Report of the Internal Market Committee
of the (first) European Parliament concerning the then-draft Regulation) of
the European Parliament285 acknowledged the need for private claims for the
effective enforcement of the European competition law, and it recommended a
study about the national regulations in the Member States de lege lata. The
European Commission published this study in 1966.286 In 1993 – after 30 years of
silence287 – the European Commission adopted a notice about the possibility of
damages claims before national courts. However, the main provisions were about the
procedural enforcement of competition law.288 It seems that the Commission wanted
281Ibid para 50.
282Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to
the Treaty establishing the European Community [1997] OJ C340/105 and Art 51 TEU.
283Case C-128/92 HJ Banks & Co Ltd v British Coal Corporation [1994] ECR I-1209, Opinion
of AG van Gerven, para 37 ff., esp 40, 43.
284Ibid para 15 ff.
285A Deringer, Rapport fait au nom de la commission du marche´ interieur ayant pour objet la
consultation demande´e a` l’Assemble´e parlementaire europe´ene par le Conseil da la Communaute´
e´conomique europe´ene sur un premier re`glement d’application des articles 85 et 86 du traite´ de
la CEE (Document 104/1960-1961, 1961); A Deringer and C Tessin, ‘Das erste Kartellgesetz des
Gemeinsamen Marktes’ [1962] NJW 989, 993.
286FG Jacobs (n 31); P Nebbia and E Szyszczak, ‘White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach
of the EC Antitrust Rules’ (2009) 20 EBLR 635, 637.
287Commission, XIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1983 (Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities, 1984) 135-6; V Milutinovic´, The 'right to damages' under EU competition
law: from Courage v. Crehan to the White Paper and beyond (Kluwer 2010) 28.
288See also J-F Verstrynge, ‘Current Antitrust Policy Issues in the EEC: Some Reflections on
the Second Generation of Competition Policy’ in BE Hawk (ed), Antitrust and Trade Policies in
International Trade (Matthew Bender 1985) 686-7; L Hiljemark, ‘Enforcement of EC Competition
Law in National Courts. The Perspective of Judicial Protection’ (1997) 17 YEL 83, 87 ff.
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to keep the enforcement of European competition law firmly under control.289 On the
one hand, the Commission Notice was satisfied with the principle of effectiveness and
adequacy, which ensures the autonomy of the Member States over the procedural
proceedings.290 On the other hand, the Commission strengthened the position that
private enforcement is effective but not absolutely essential to enforce European
competition law. This could be the reason why the Commission had chosen the way
of a non-binding Commission Notice.291
This approach was continued in the 1999 ‘White Paper on Modernisation of
the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty’.292 The Commission
awarded competence to the courts of the Member States to adjudicate damages for
the breach of European competition law, and the Commission accepted the private
enforcement as a necessary supplement of the public (administrative) enforcement
through the competition authorities.293
3.2.2 Courage v Crehan and Manfredi
In its decision in Courage v Crehan the ECJ had for the first time the opportunity
to discuss whether the basis for a damage claim for the breach of European
competition law was based on European or national law. In doing so, the ECJ
had to decide between a traditional and a more integrating approach.294 On the one
hand, several commentators – mainly from a common law tradition – argued for
the recognition of a European right of damage claims that was shaped by European
289So for instance A Jones and B Sufrin, EU Competition Law – Text, Cases, and
Materials (5th edn, OUP 2014) 1306.
290AP Komninos, ‘New Prospects for Private Enforcement of Competition Law: Courage
v. Crehan and the Community Right in Damages’ (2002) 39 CMLRev 447, 451-2; AP Komninos,
EC Private Antitrust Enforcement (n 9) 163-4; FG Jacobs and T Deisenhofer, ‘Procedural Aspects
of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC Competition Rules: A Community Perspective’ in
C-D Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private
Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (Hart Pub 2003) 207.
291Criticised by W Meibom and U Zinsmeister, ‘Verbesserung des Europa¨ischen
Wettbewerbsverfahrens’ in Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 1991/92, Verwaltungs- und
Rechtsprechungspraxis, Referate des 20 FIW-Seminars 1992 und der 11 Bru¨sseler
Informationstagung 1992, FIW-Schriftenreihe Heft 153 (FIW 1993) 62; R Wesseling, The
Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law (Hart Pub 2000) 198-200; AP Komninos, EC Private
Antitrust Enforcement (n 9) 163.
292[1999] OJ C132/1; 2002 (and thus after the decision of the ECJ in Courage v Crehan) enected
as Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1.
293BJ Rodger, ‘The Interface Between Competition Law and Private Law – Article 81, Illegality
and Unjustified Enrichment’ (2002) 6 EdinLR 217, 223-4.
294AP Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement (n 9) 167.
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provisions.295 Primarily because of the structural differences between the two main
legal systems,296 mainly scholars with a civil law background endorsed a European
regulation that only focused on the principle of effectiveness and adequacy, and
they allocated the question of damage claims and procedural aspects to the Member
States.297
In Courage v Crehan the ECJ had to decide about two questions from the Court
of Appeal of England and Wales (Civil Division). The dispute before the Court
of Appeal was about a claim by Mr Bernard Crehan, who ran a pub, against his
lessor, the Courage brewery. In the UK, it is common for a brewery, which leases
a pub to a tenant who operates it, to own the pub. The agreed rent is usually
below the market average but the tenant binds himself to buy nearly all his beer
from the landlord. In 1991 Mr Crehan concluded such a 20 year lease agreement
with Courage Ltd. Herein, Mr Crehan agreed to buy a minimum amount of beer
exclusively from Courage and, in return, Courage agreed to sell the fixed amount of
beer for a price that had been agreed in advance in a pricelist. After two years of
performing the contract, Mr Crehan and other tenants got into financial difficulties
because Courage would sell its beer to pubs without a lease agreement (‘free houses’)
cheaper than to its tenants. Mr Crehan alleged that this was a breach of European
competition and, among other things, claimed damages.
295As already postulated by AG van Gerven in Banks v British Coal ; J Maitland-Walker,
‘Editorial: A step closer to a definitive ruling on a right in damages for breach of the EC competition
rules’ (1992) 13 ECLR 1; RM D'Sa, European Community Law and Civil Remedies in England and
Wales (Sweet & Maxwell 1994) 169-174; J Shaw, ‘Decentralization and law enforcement in EC
competition law’ (1995) 15 LS 128, 138 ff.; A Winterstein, ‘A community right in damages for
breach of EC competition rules?’ (1995) 16 ECLR 49; BPB Francis, ‘Subsidiarity and Antitrust:
The Enforcement of European Competition Law in the National Courts of Member States’ (1995)
27 Law & PolIntBus 247, 254, 273; D Vaughan, ‘EC Competition Law in National Proceedings’
in G Slynn and SA Pappas (eds), Procedural Aspects of EC Competition Law (EIPA 1995) 27;
C Lewis, Remedies and the Enforcement of European Community Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1996)
137-8; S Weatherill, ‘Public Interest Litigation in EC Competition Law’ in H-W Micklitz and
N Reich (eds), Public Interest Litigation Before European Courts (Nomos 1996) 185; G Tickle and
C Tyler, ‘Community Competition Law, Recovering Damages in the English Courts’ in J Lonbay
and A Biondi (eds), Remedies for Breach of EC Law (Wiley 1997); DG Anderson, ‘Damages for
Breach of Competition Rules’ in M Andenas and F Jacobs (eds), European Community Law in
the English Courts (OUP 1998); L Hiljemark (n 288) 126 ff.; BJ Rodger and A MacCulloch,
‘Community Competition Law Enforcement, Deregulation and Re-regulation: The Commission,
National Authorities and Private Enforcement’ (1998) 4 ColumJEurL 579, 599-600; CS Kerse,
EC Antitrust Procedure (4. Aufl. edn, 1998) 439 ff.; PM Taylor, EC and UK Competition Law and
Compliance (1999) 267; R Lane, EC Competition Law (Longman 2000) 203-4.
296AP Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement (n 9) 167-8.
297L Ritter and WD Braun, European competition law: a practitioner's guide (3rd edn, Kluwer
2004) 926; C Nowak, Konkurrentenschutz in der EG – Interdependenz des gemeinschaftlichen
und mitgliedstaatlichen Rechtsschutzes von Konkurrenten (Nomos 1997) 230 ff.; E-J Mestma¨cker,
‘The EC Commission’s Modernization of Competition Policy: A Challenge to the Community’s
Constitutional Order’ (2000) 1 EBOR 401, 421 ff.; H Weyer, ‘Gemeinschaftsrechtliches Verbot
und nationale Zivilrechtsfolgen’ (1999) 7 ZEuP 424, 437 ff.; esp for Austria: G Stillfried
and P Stockenhuber, ‘Schadensersatz bei Verstoß gegen das Kartellverbot des Art. 85 EG-V’
[1995] WBl 345; esp for France: AP Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement (n 9) 167 with
further references.
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Because the Court of Appeal saw Mr Crehan and Courage as co-perpetrators,298
the Court asked the ECJ about the English interpretation of Art 101 TFEU (ex
Art 81 EC, ex Art 85 EEC) where the rule was only designed to protect third parties
and, therefore, a party of an uncompetitive contract could not claim damages. This
was an expression of the strict interpretation of the in pari delicto299 principle.300
Based on its ruling in Francovich v Italy,301 the ECJ recognised the need for the
right to claim damages before a court of a Member State.302 In favour of Mr Crehan,
the Court decided that even a participant of a joint breach of competition law could
claim damages against other offenders.303
The ECJ stated that the underpinning right was based on European law but
the enforcement and the right of indemnity had to be formulated by the Member
States albeit within the framework of European provisions.304 The Court of Justice
confirmed that it did not assign the Member States the role of creating new
mechanisms to enforce European law but rather to make sure that the existing
mechanisms were applicable. This represents a distinct rejection of the described
opinion of AG van Gerven in Banks, after which the basis for a damage claim had
to be constituted in European law.305 Furthermore, the ECJ took up the position
298Courage Ltd v Crehan (No.2) [1999] UKCLR 407; H-W Micklitz, ‘Anmerkung zu EuGH, Urt.
v. 20.9.2001 – Rs C-453/99 (Courage Ltd.)’ [2001] EWiR 1141, 1142; O Odudu and J Edelman,
‘Compensatory damages for breach of Article 81’ (2002) 27 ELRev 327, 328-9.
299In full length: nemo auditur turpitudinem propriam (suam) allegans or in pari delicto est
conditio defendentis or ex dolo malo non oritur causa.
300See for English law: G Virgo, ‘The Effect of Illegality on Claims for Restitution in English
Law’ in WJ Swadling (ed), The Limits of Restitutionary Claims – A Comparative Analysis (United
Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law 1997) 150 ff.
301Compare Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd
and Others [2001] ECR I-6297 paras 20, 26 with Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy para 33.
302Courage v Crehan para 27.
303Ibid 19 ff.; Discussed critically before the decision of the ECJ: Recommending a right:
J Maitland-Walker (n 295) 3-4; Against a right: T Eilmansberger, Die Bedeutung der Art 85
und 86 EG-V fu¨r das o¨sterreichische Zivilrecht (Verlag der O¨sterreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften 1998) 139-40.
304Courage v Crehan paras 29, 32; H-W Micklitz (n 298) 1142; A Albors-Llorens, ‘Courage
v Crehan: judicial activism or consistent approach?’ (2002) 61 CLJ 1, 40; H Weyer, ‘Anmerkung
zu EuGH, Urteil vom 20.9.2001 – C-453/99 Courage/Crehan-Courage Ltd ./. Bernard Crehan
und Bernard Crehan ./. Courage Ltd u.a.’ [2002] GRUR Int 54, 58; other opinion by C Nowak,
‘Anmerkung zu EuGH, Urteil vom 20.9.2001 – Rs. C-453/99 Courage Ltd/Bernard Crehan und
Bernard Crehan/Courage Ltd u.a.’ [2001] EuZW 715, 718; O Odudu and J Edelman (n 298) 334;
Case 33-76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer fu¨r das
Saarland [1976] ECR 1989 para 5; K Havu, ‘Horizontal Liability for Damages in EU Law – the
Changing Relationship of EU and National Law’ (2012) 18 ELJ 407, 409-10.
305See above; H Weyer, ‘Anmerkung zu EuGH, Urteil vom 20.9.2001 – C-453/99
Courage/Crehan-Courage Ltd ./. Bernard Crehan und Bernard Crehan ./. Courage Ltd
u.a.’ (n 304) 58.
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that it was sufficient to restrict the enforcement of European competition law to the
principles of efficiency and adequacy.306
Despite the distinct recognition of the need to a right of damages,307 the court
did not decide whether third parties (or only contracting parties) could claim
damages.308 However, if it is taken into account that third parties are often the
main victims, it is clear that they, a fortiori, must have a right to claim damages.309
Besides the uncertainty in the detail, the importance of Courage v Crehan is that
the ECJ acknowledged the principle of damage claims for the breach of European
competition law, and this became the legal basis for the development of a European
right of damages.310
Building on that, the ECJ developed the legal framework in Manfredi.311 At the
same time, the ECJ dealt for the first time with a follow-on claim, i.e. a damage
claim after a successful administrative proceeding.312 Again, the court clarified that
the right to claim damages was based on Art 101 TFEU (ex-Art 81 EG) and as a
consequence was based on European law.313 On the other hand, the ECJ stressed
the distinction between the granting of a right and its enforcement. In addition, the
306Courage v Crehan para 29; Already Joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Jeroen
van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor
Fysiotherapeuten [1995] ECR I-4705 Opinions of AG Jacobs, paras 24 ff., 45; T von Danwitz,
Verwaltungsrechtliches System und europa¨ische Integration (Mohr Siebeck 1996) 118 ff.;
T von Danwitz, ‘Die Eigenverantwortung der Mitgliedsstaaten fu¨r die Durchfu¨hrung von
Gemeinschaftsrecht’ [1998] DVBl 421, 427 ff.; Joined cases C-87/90, 88/90 and 89/90
A Verholen and others v Sociale Verzekeringsbank Amsterdam [1991] ECR I-3757 Opinions
of GA Darmon, paras 20-1; A Cahn, ‘Zwingendes EG-Recht und Verfahrensautonomie
der Mitgliedstaaten’ [1998] ZEuP 974, 975; N Notaro, ‘Case C-188/95, Fantask A/S
and Others v. Industriministeriet (Erhvervsministeriet), Judgment of 2 December 1997,
[1997] ECR I-6783’ (1998) 35 CMLRev 1385, 1391; criticized by H Weyer, ‘Anmerkung zu EuGH,
Urteil vom 20.9.2001 – C-453/99 Courage/Crehan-Courage Ltd ./. Bernard Crehan und Bernard
Crehan ./. Courage Ltd u.a.’ (n 304) who argues against a European harmonisation even in a strict
application of the Effet utile.
307OLG Du¨sseldorf EuZW 1999, 188; OLG Hamburg EuZW 2001, 637; N Reich, ‘Rechtfertigung
der Festbetragsregelung durch GKV-Spitzenverba¨nde nach Art. 86 EG?’ [2000] EuZW 653.
308Courage v Crehan para 38 reffering to Banks v British Coal Opinions of AG van Gerven,
paras 43 ff.; I Brinker, ‘Overview of Damage Actions in EU – An Private Enforcement of
Competition Laws’ [2003] IBL 171, 173.
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bei Versto¨ßen gegen das europa¨ische Kartellverbot – ”Courage” und die Folgen’ [2003] EuR 825,
837-8; other opinion by T Eilmansberger, ‘Schadenersatz wegen Kartellverstoßes – Zum
EuGH-Urteil Courage/Crehan’ [2002] ecolex 28, 30.
310S Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law (11th edn, OUP 2014) 606;
J Goyder and A Albors-Llorens (n 47) 560; H Weyer, ‘Anmerkung zu EuGH, Urteil
vom 20.9.2001 – C-453/99 Courage/Crehan-Courage Ltd ./. Bernard Crehan und Bernard
Crehan ./. Courage Ltd u.a.’ (n 304) 57.
311Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA
(C-295/04), Antonio Cannito v Fondiaria Sai SpA (C-296/04) and Nicolo` Tricarico (C-297/04)
and Pasqualina Murgolo (C-298/04) v Assitalia SpA [2006] ECR I-6619.
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Court outlined that everybody (consequently also consumers and other third parties)
had a right to compensate the losses by relying on a causal breach of European
competition law.314 The emphasis should be on the expression of everybody’s right
and the necessity of a causal damage.315 To this extent, the ECJ defined the essential
requirements for a damage claim. Beyond this, the court stressed the principle
that as long as there was no European regulation,316 the procedural enforcement
of the European right was ceded to the Member States and had to be fleshed out
by them.317 In addition, the question about the calculation of damages and the
possibility of establishing punitive damages has been left to the Member States as
long as the underpinning principle of full compensation is maintained.318
3.2.3 Recent European harmonisation
While in the pre-Courage era only non-binding notices of the European Commission
were published, the decision of the ECJ in Courage v Crehan pushed to the fore
a discussion about the future of the private enforcement of European competition
law. This led the European Commission to take a more pro-active course.319 As
an immediate outcome of the decisions of the European courts, the European
Commission retained the international law firm Ashurst LLP which produced a
legal study about the underlying conditions of private damage claims in competition
law cases in the 15 Member States of the EU at the time.320 That so-called
‘Ashurst-Study’ came to the predictable321 conclusion that private enforcement was
deeply, if differently, flawed.322
Synthesising the perceptions of the study, the European Commission published
a ‘Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules’323 on
19th December 2005 for a consultation of the stakeholders and a discussion about
the right way to approach private enforcement in Europe324 until 21st April 2006.
Different to the proposed principle of full compensation and corrective justice
314Ibid paras 61 ff.
315K Havu (n 304) 414.
316S Drake, ‘Scope of Courage and the principle of ”individual liability” for damages – further
development of the principle of effective judicial protection by the Court of Justice’ (2006)
31 ELRev 841, 857; J Kloub, ‘White Paper on Damage Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust
Rules – Plea for a More Holistic Approach to Antitrust Enforcement’ (2009) 5 ECJ 515, 535.
317Manfredi para 64.
318M Hazelhorst, ‘Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law – Why Punitive Damages Are a
Step Too Far’ (2010) 18 ERPL 757, 766; J Kloub (n 316) 536.
319AP Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement (n 9) 179.
320D Waelbroeck, D Slater and G Even-Shoshan, ‘Study on the conditions of claims for
damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules (Ashurst Study)’ (EC Commission
Open Procedure, 2004) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/
comparative_report_clean_en.pdf>.
321AP Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement (n 9) 179.
322D Waelbroeck, D Slater and G Even-Shoshan (n 320) 1.
323COM(2005) 672 final.
324V Milutinovic´ (n 287) 77.
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of the ECJ, the European Commission simply strengthened the principle of an
effective private enforcement and did not consider the principle of compensation
as a manifestation of justice.325
Based on the received contributions, the European Commission published a
white paper on 2nd April 2008.326 On the one hand, the white paper was already
based on the assumption that the private enforcement of European competition law
was widely underdeveloped.327 On the other hand, the Commission ruled out the
principle of effective enforcement of European competition law as a central aim of
private damage claims and strengthened more the aim of compensation for suffered
losses and harm and, therefore, the principle of justice and especially corrective
justice considering the overall economic damage of the breach of competition law.328
Deterrence was downgraded to a mere by-effect or reflex of the central aim of
compensation.329 It has been argued that this relocation of the central aim by the
European Commission was based on the apprehension that the Commission wanted
to introduce a US-American situation of competition law enforcement.330 On the
other hand, the European Commission perceived that it was impossible to introduce
a so-called ‘private attorney’ in Europe and to establish private enforcement as
a central mechanism of competition law enforcement.331 Alongside these central
outcomes, the Commission strengthened other parameters, e.g. access to justice and
an efficient use of the justice system as aims in its Impact Assessment Test.332
Referencing the so-called ‘structural information asymmetry’ between the parties,
the white paper determined that ‘a minimum level of disclosure inter partes for EC
antitrust damages cases should be ensured’ (see in detail under 6.1).333 On the
other hand, the white paper argued for a general inaccessibility of documentation
of the European leniency programme, especially leniency applications (see detail
325Commission, ‘Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust
rules’ COM(2005) 672 final, 3; F Bien, ‘Wozu brauchen wir die Richtlinie u¨ber private
Kartellschadensersatzklagen noch?’ [2013] NZKart 481.
326Commission, ‘White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules’
COM(2008) 165 final.
327J-S Ritter, ‘Private Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts – Vorschla¨ge des Weißbuchs der
Europa¨ischen Kommission’ [2008] WuW 762, 764-5; K Ost, ‘Private Kartellrechtsdurch-
setzung – gesetzgeberische Entwicklungen in Deutschland und Europa –’ in P Behrens, E Braun
and C Nowak (eds), Europa¨isches Wettbewerbsrecht nach der Reform: Forum Wissenschaft und
Praxis zum Internationalen Wirtschaftsrecht (Nomos 2006) 109 ff.
328Commission, ‘White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules’ 2, 4;
Commision, ‘Commission staff working document accompanying document to the White paper
on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules’ (n 13); critically discussed by
J-S Ritter (n 327) 764-5.
329F Bien (n 325) 483.
330Ibid.
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under 8.2.1.2, 8.2.2.2 and 8.3.2.2).334 It is remarkable that the Council did not
directly discuss the white paper and the European Commission started another
round of stakeholder consultation. It seems to be that the European Commission
itself was not clear about the way forward because the suggestions were rather vague
and some elementary problems were delivered directly to the Member States without
any effort at solving them.335
Almost five years later, on 11th June 2013, the European Commission finally
published its draft of the proposed directive (Draft Directive).336 Similar to the
remarks in the white paper, the Commission declared the compensation of victims
as the central aim of the Directive. On the other hand, the Draft Directive
strengthened a guarantee of an effective enforcement of competition law as a
manifestation of an optimal cooperation between public and private enforcement.337
Based on the suggestions of the white paper, the seven main parts of the Draft
Directive regulated the disclosure and access to evidence (Sec 5-8); the binding
effect of decisions of the Commission and other Competition Authorities (Sec 9);
prescription (Sec 10); joint and several liability (Sec 11); passing on defence and
indirect purchaser rule (Sec 12, 13); assumption of damages (Sec 16); and mutual
dispute resolutions (Sec 17).
After political conciliation in the Council,338 the Draft Directive was forwarded
to the European Parliament. Following intense discussions in the ECON339 and
trialogue meetings between Parliament, Commission and Council, the amendments
and the report were adopted by the Committee on 9th April 2014.340 In its plenary
session on the 16th and 17th April 2014, the European Parliament adopted the
amendments of the ECON by a majority.341 Because of mistranslations, the adoption
of the Council was delayed. On the 10th November 2014 the Draft Directive, including
334Ibid 10; G Weidenbach and M Saller, ‘Das Weißbuch der Europa¨ischen Kommission zu
kartellrechtlichen Schadensersatzklagen’ (2008) 20 BB 1020, 1021-2.
335J-S Ritter (n 327) 773.
336Commision, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union’ COM(2013) 404 final.
337Ibid 3; W Mederer, ‘Richtlinienvorschlag u¨ber Schadensersatzklagen im Bereich des
Wettbewerbsrechts’ [2013] EuZW 847; L Fiedler, ‘Der aktuelle Richtlinienvorschlag der
Kommission – der große Wurf fu¨r den kartellrechtlichen Schadensersatz?’ [2013] BB 2179;
I Vandenborre et al, ‘Actions for antitrust damages in the European Union: evaluating the
Commission's Directive proposal’ (2014) 7 GCLR 1.
338On 3rd December 2013; A MacGregor and D Boyle, ‘Private antitrust litigation in the EU:
levelling the playing field’ (2014) 20 IntTLR 30.
339Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.
340First Report of the ECON was on 27st January 2014: A MacGregor and D Boyle (n 338).
341European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 April 2014 on the proposal for a directive of
the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under
national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the
European Union (COM(2013)0404 – C7-0170/2013 – 2013/0185(COD)), P7 TA(2014)0451.
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the amendments of the European Parliament, were passed by the Council.342
Eventually, the Directive was signed into law by the European Parliament on
26th November 2014, and was published in the Official Journal of the European Union
on 5th December 2014.343 Now, the Member States have until 27th December 2016
to transpose the provisions of the Directive into national law.344
3.2.4 Impacts of the Communication on quantifying harm in
antitrust damages actions and the Practical Guide of the Commission
In addition to Directive 2014/104/EU, the European Commission wanted to provide
guidance for national courts about how to quantify the suffered harm in a damage
claim based on an infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU.
The core document is the Communication of the European Commission on
quantifying harm in antitrust damages actions.345 The Communication set out the
central principles of quantification of harm that can help the national civil courts
as well as the involved parties to calculate the harm. Based on the established
case law of the European courts,346 the European Commission mainly defined
the quantification of damage as a comparison of the situation of the injured
parties before and after the infringement of the law.347 This should cover actual
loss (damnum emergens) and compensation for loss of profit (lucrum cessans)348 as
well as appropriate interest.349 On the other hand, the Commission acknowledges
that the question of quantification of harm, as long as it is not governed by European
law, is a matter of national law, especially in relation to the question of the degree
of evidence for the suffered harm and the burden of proof.350 It is also important
to emphasise that the European Commission takes the view that it is a matter
of national law to introduce an appropriate calculation scheme and that it should
be possible for the Member States to shift the burden of proof or to establish a
342Commision, Antitrust: Commission welcomes Council adoption of Directive on antitrust
damages actions (2014).
343As Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union [2014] OJ L349/1.
344Ibid Sec 21(1).
345Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based
on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
[2013] OJ C167/07.
346See above under 3.2.1-3.
347Communication on quantifying harm at para 6.
348Manfredi at para 95-6; Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Peˆcheur SA
v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte:
Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ECR I-1029 at para 87.
349Manfredi at para 97 referring to Case C-271/91 M Helen Marshall v Southampton and
South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1993] ECR I-4367 at para 31.
350Communication on quantifying harm at para 8.
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presumption or the possibility of estimating the damage by the court.351 By doing
so, the Communication stated that the national courts should consider the differences
in claims based on an infringement of competition law in contrast to general damage
claims, especially regarding the information asymmetry mentioned above.352
As a consequence of that Communication, the Commission published a
corresponding Practical Guide.353 Although this Guide is merely informative and
not binding for the national courts or parties,354 it offers assistance to the courts
and the parties by publishing the relevant information for quantifying harm caused
by an infringement of competition law.
3.3 Classification in German law as a claim of
the law of delicts and its requirements
As remarked several times, there is a substantial difference between the regulation of
restitution, compensation, torts or delicts in common and civil law. For the purposes
of comparison, it is necessary to choose a significant example for each legal system.
Because of the historical development of the civil law (Roman-Germanic) system,
it can be divided roughly into three legal systems: the Romance, German and
Scandinavian (or mixed355) legal systems.356 Although each of the different systems
has its own characteristics, this thesis focuses on the German sub-legal system as
one example of civil law. Typical of the German sub-legal system is the law of the
Federal Republic of Germany (German law).357
Before examining the requirements of a civil damage claim in each legal system,
the chapter must define the general underpinning systems. Therefore, first this
section highlights the distinction between a damage claim based on the law of
contracts and delicts. Starting with the distinction by Aristotle between voluntary
and involuntary contractual relationships, the section analyses the separation of
claims ‘in rem’ and ‘in personam’ under Roman law as the basis for the modern
351Ibid at paras 8, 13.
352Ibid at para 9.
353See Ibid at para 10 with reference to Commision, ‘Practical Guide on Quantifying Harm in
Actions for Damages based on Breaches of Articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, Accompanying the Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm
in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union’ SWD(2013) 205.
354Communication on quantifying harm at para 12; Commision, ‘Practical Guide on Quantifying
Harm in Actions for Damages’ at para 7.
355U Mattei, ‘Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems’ (1997)
45 AJCL 5; AK Saidov, Comparative Law (Wildy 2003); P de Cruz, Comparative Law in a
Changing World (3rd edn, Routledge Cavendish 2007).
356K Zweigert and H Ko¨tz, Einfu¨hrung in die Rechtsvergleichung (3rd edn, Mohr Siebeck 1996);
See the historical overview and developments of law classification in M Siems, Comparative Law
(CUP 2014) 76.
357M Siems (n 356) 43-4; 202 ff.; K Zweigert and H Ko¨tz (n 356) 130.
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classification of law. Furthermore, based on Kant’s principle of the freedom of
contracts, the section examines the distinction between a damage claim based on
the law of contracts and delicts and argues in favour of a classification of damage
claims of customers based on a breach of competition law as claims based on the law
of delicts. The chapter then analyses the central requirements for a damage claim
based on an infringement of competition law.
3.3.1 Distinction between a damage claim based on the law of
contracts and delicts
3.3.1.1 Distinction between voluntary and involuntary contractual
relationships by Aristotle
In addition to the principle of equality as justice mentioned in the last chapter,
the concept of corrective justice set out by Aristotle is based on the assumption
of a justice in relationships of reciprocal exchanges or contracts (synallagmatic
contract358). In relation to real life, it is clear that our common understanding of
a contract does not fit into any ‘reciprocal exchanges’ because Aristotle’s concept
includes voluntary (e.g. contracts about buying/selling, lending at or without interest
or letting for hire) and involuntary contractual relationships (e.g. theft, assault,
imprisonment, murder or slander). Therefore, the concept of corrective justice has
to be divided again into voluntary contractual justice (iustitia commutativa359) and
involuntary contractual justice.360
Iustitia commutativa is about voluntary acts of both parties to a contract. Due
to the fact that two or more people act voluntarily within their legal power, Aristotle
sees justice as a form of compensation in the event of an unlawful behaviour in that
‘business relationship’.361 Therefore, iustitia commutativa is for Aristotle the right of
proportional retaliation.362 Even taking into account the minor significance related
to the involuntary contractual aspects (it can be noted that it is not mentioned in
the final ‘definition’ in chapter IX363), the iustitia commutativa is sometimes called
a third division of particular justice alongside distributive and corrective justice.364
In contrast, involuntary contractual justice is the core scope of corrective,
compensatory or restorative justice. Aristotle describes this type of justice as one
that can be used to deal with the human urge of pleonexia. Even if these often involve
private transactions, the injured party can also be a public official365 or the state
358G Bien (n 167) 152.
359T St Aquinas (n 165).
360Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (n 161) 1131a1.
361G Bien (n 167) 150-1.
362Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (n 161) 1132b31-3.
363Ibid 1134a1 ff.
364FD Miller (n 175) 70.
365Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (n 161) 1132b23-30.
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itself.366 The aim of justice in this situation is to restore the gap between superfluity
and dearth.367 Aristotle describes the situation as follows:
Thus, the equal is a mean between the greater and the less, but profit and
loss are more and less in opposite ways, since more of good and less of evil
is a profit, and the opposite is a loss. And the equal, which we call just, is a
mean. Corrective justice is thus the mean between profit and loss.368
From this assumption, the task of a judge is to find a way to transfer the
advantage of the wrongdoer to the victim.369 Aristotle depicts the task of the judge
as a person who faces an unequal divided line, removes half of the longer part and
adds it to the smaller part.370 This ultimately provides a sort of numerical equality
between the parties.371 In contrast to Plato,372 Aristotle does not consider a criminal
penalty to punish the wrongdoer.373
As mentioned above, for Aristotle, humans are by nature political animals.374 In
particular, he sees human beings as uniquely endowed by nature with the ability to
create the concept of justice and hence with the capacity for political cooperation.375
Therefore, Aristotle argues that the lawgiver of a state is by nature a great benefactor
and the concept of justice needs to be administrated.376 In terms of practical politics,
Aristotle calls justice the ‘communal virtue’ of a state.377 Universal justice is the
promotion and protection of the community’s goods and particular justice is a
specific sort of action concerning the common advantage in its own, distinctive
way.378 As a consequence, Aristotle argues that the concept of justice has to be
implemented in the law of a just constitution.379 However, referring to the different
forms of government he identifies, he also argues that there is no unique way of
regulating the concept of justice legally beyond the so-called most extreme forms of
government – examples given by Aristotle are tyranny, dynasty (extreme oligarchy)
and extreme democracy.380
366Ibid 1138a12-14.
367G Bien (n 167) 153, 158.
368Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (n 161) 1132a14-19.
369FD Miller (n 175) 72.
370Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (n 161) 1132b18-22.
371Ibid 1131b27-1132a7; FD Miller (n 175) 71-2.
372Plato, Laws (RG Bury tr, Harvard University Press 1967) XI 933e10-934a1.
373RE Barnett, ‘Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice’ (1977) 87 Ethics 279;
RE Barnett, ‘The Justice of Restitution’ (1980) 25 AmJJuris 117; FD Miller (n 175) 73; therefor
criticised by WFR Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1980) 194-5.
374Aristotle, Politics (n 162) 1253a7-18.
375Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics (H Rackham tr, Harvard University Press 1961) 1241b14-15.
376Aristotle, Politics (n 162) 1253a31-9; FD Miller (n 175) 67.
377Aristotle, Politics (n 162) 1283a38-9.
378FD Miller (n 175) 69-70.
379Aristotle, Politics (n 162) 11290b38-91b1, 292a30-2 and 1328b5-19.
380Ibid 1292b5-10.
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To sum up, it can be said that the whole theoretical concept of justice outlined
by Aristotle is based on the idea of arithmetic equality, and the task for a judge
and the state is to establish mechanisms to ensure that unequal situations can be
corrected by compensation or restitution.381
3.3.1.2 Separation of claims ‘in rem’ and ‘in personam’ under Roman
law as basis for the modern classification of law
The modern distinction between the law of torts (or delicts) and contracts is mainly
based on the distinction between claims ‘in rem’ and ‘in personam’ under Roman law.
Although it is obvious that German law is largely influenced by Roman civil law,382
the modern division of the law of property, contracts, torts and unjust enrichment
of English law mainly refers to the early application of the Roman principles by
the judges Ranulf de Glanvill383 and Henry de Bracton384.385 However, there was a
massive reduction in referencing of Roman law after the time of Bracton. Even
though the referencing of Roman law has always been less than in continental
Europe,386 Roman law has still had some influence on common law, for example,
in the division of claims in ‘in rem’ and ‘in personam’387 and thus the fundament of
the modern division of the law of property, contracts, torts and unjust enrichment.388
Roman law can be described as the starting point in the history of all modern law
of restitution for wrongs.389
Even if a direct connection between the Greek philosophy of Aristotle and the
applied Roman law cannot be evidenced, Greek philosophy was an important part
of Roman education and thus Roman lawyers were well versed in the theories of
Aristotle and the other ancient Greek philosophers.390 Although Roman lawyers did
381N Jansen, Die Struktur des Haftungsrechts – Geschichte, Theorie und Dogmatik
außervertraglicher Anspru¨che auf Schadensersatz (Mohr Siebeck 2003) 78; JV Robert (n 178) 79.
382F Giglio (n 157) 127.
383R de Glanvill, The treatise on the laws and customs of the realm of England, commonly
called Glanvill (Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Angliae) (GDG Hall tr, Clarendon
Press 1993).
384H de Bracton, Bracton on the laws and customs of England (De Legibus et Consuetudinibus
Angliae) (GE Woodbine and SE Thorne trs, Harvard University Press 1968-1977); Bracton also
refers to the work of Glanvill as a primary source.
385U Ziegenbein, Die Unterscheidung von Real und Personal Actions im Common Law
(Duncker & Humblot 1971) 73; P Stein, ‘Continental Influences on English Legal thought,
1600-1900’ in P Stein (ed), The Character and Influence of the Roman Civil Law (Hambledon 1988)
223 ff.
386RC van Caenegem, The birth of the English common law (2nd edn, CUP 1988) 89 ff.;
P Stein (n 385) 223 ff.; U Ziegenbein (n 385) 73.
387Justinian, Justinian's Institutes (P Birks, G McLeod and K Paul trs, Duckworth 1987) 7
(introduction by P Birks and G McLeod); H de Bracton (n 384) 46 (introduction by GE Woodbine);
K Gu¨terbock, Bracton and his relation to the Roman law: a contribution to the history of the Roman
law in the middle ages (JB Lippincott 1866) 35-8.
388U Ziegenbein (n 385) 73; P Stein (n 385) 223 ff.
389F Goodwin, The XII tables (Stevens 1886) 5.
390F Giglio (n 157) 169.
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not cite philosophy in their legal opinions, they did use it to support their legal
based argumentation.391
The Rules of the XII Tables392 were the foundation and body of early Roman
law. Even though it perhaps does not pass for a fully developed and coherent legal
system, it is a crystallisation of existing customary law393 and can be seen as the
starting point of the history of law and the basis for many European legal systems.394
The basis for the damage regulations in the XII Tables are the rules of self-help
and the law of talion or retaliation (lex talionis395). Instead of an archaic right of
vengeance upon the body or property of the injuring party, the victim achieved a
right to claim monetary payment that was at once retribution (punishment) and
satisfaction (damages/restitution).396 Compensation for a personal wrong rather
than simply compensation for losses397 was a central notion in early Roman law.398
In consequence, there were also claims for damages in the XII Tables which were
independent of any concrete loss (e.g. table VIII, rules 3, 4, 11 and 25399) and the
victim could claim a fixed sum of money.400 Here, the aim was not the compensation
of damages but rather the punishment for a wrongdoing. On the other hand, the
XII Tables established a general claim for restitution.401 The key rule of restitution
and compensation is found in table VIII, rule 5: ‘A man who accidentally damages
391Ibid 168.
392Lex XII Tabularum, ca 450 BC.
393F Goodwin (n 389) 6.
394Ibid 5.
395The classic understanding of Lex Talionis was not only as a punishment in the
form of mirroring penalty. It was rather a concept of restitution of wrongdoings by the
tortfeaser or its relatives. N Jansen (n 381) 194 criticising T Mommsen, Ro¨misches Strafrecht
(Duncker & Humblot 1899) 496-7.
396M Kaser, Das Ro¨mische Privatrecht (2nd edn, CH Beck 1971) 611-2; R Zimmermann, Law of
Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Clarendon Press 1996) 918-9; F Parisi,
Liability for negligence and judicial discretion (2nd edn, University of California at Berkeley 1992)
39-40; W Kunkel, Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung des ro¨mischen Kriminalverfahrens in
vorsullanischer Zeit (Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1962) 43-4, 97 ff.;
A Vo¨lkl, Die Verfolgung von Ko¨rperverletzungen: Studien zum Verha¨ltnis von To¨tungsverbrechen
und Injuriendelikt (Bo¨hlau 1984) 49 ff.
397N Jansen (n 381) 194; M Kaser, ‘David Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, Cambridge, University
Press, 1947’ (1948) 66 ZSS 617 criticising D Daube, Studies in Biblical Law (Cambridge, University
Press 1947).
398E Genzmer, ‘Talion im klassischen und nachklassischen Recht?: Erwa¨gungen u¨ber Ursprung
und Grundgedanken des Edikts Quod quisque juris in alterum statuerit, ut ipse eodem jure
utatur’ (1942) 62 ZSS 122, 124; AHM Jones, The Criminal Courts of the Roman Republic
and Principate (Blackwell 1972) 38-9; D Liebs, ‘Damnum, damnare und damnas: Zur
Bedeutungsgeschichte einiger´ lateinischer Rechtswo¨rter’ (1968) 85 ZSS 173, 198 ff.; D Liebs, Die
Klagenkonkurrenz im ro¨mischen Recht (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1972) 22; W Kunkel (n 396),
136 ff.; M Weber, Max Weber on law in economy and society (Simon & Schuster 1954) 388 ff.
399See the translation by F Goodwin (n 389) T VIII fr 3, 4, 11, 25.
400F Giglio (n 157) 133.
401C Sell, Die actio de rupitiis sarciendis der XII Tafeln und ihre Aufhebung durch die Lex Aquilia
(Marcus 1877) 1, 10 ff.; different understanding by EI Bekker, Die Aktionen des Ro¨mischen
Privatrechts, vol 1 (Vahlen 1871) 184.
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property shall make compensation’.402 There was a clear distinction between the
response of accidental damages, which equated to compensation, and other (probably
scienter or negligent) caused damages, which equated to punishment.
More than 150 years later the Law of Aquilius403 was introduced, probably by
the Roman tribune of the plebs Aquilius.404 Presumably, due to numerous practical
shortcomings,405 the Law of Aquilius was adopted as a comprehensive regulation of
sanctions based on damages. With reference to the legal principle of lex posterior
derogat legi priori, the Law of Aquilius thus susperseded every older regulation about
damages, including the rules of the XII Tables.406 The damage claim of the Law of
Aquilius had a dual requirement: that the unlawful harm was causally based on a
positive action.407 Unlawful harm or damage (damnum iniuria datum) was originally
defined as any interference in property.408 Whilst the initial definition of the Law of
Aquilius concentrated on the damage to slaves (chapter 1) and objects (chapter 3),
Roman jurisprudence expanded the rule to cover all Roman citizens.409 This damage
had to be based on an unlawful action (culpa). Unlawful here means every conscious
action against law, customs and public order.410 Furthermore, this action had to
be causal – originally in the meaning of a direct effect of the physical action of a
wrongdoer.411
The Law of Aquilius was the first general normalisation of the principle of
restitution, and it is seen as the nucleus of the modern law of delicts (torts).412
Although the way to calculate the amount of the damage (highest value of the
last 30 days) has been used as an argument for a penalty character of the damage
claim,413 the choice of the period was supposed to allow an estimation of the value.414
402See the translation by F Goodwin (n 389) T VIII fr 5.
403Lex Aquilia, ca 286 BC.
404Detailed analysis of the damage claim in the Lex Aqulia by N Jansen (n 381) 202 ff.
405C Sell (n 401) 14 ff.
406JC Hasse, Die culpa des ro¨mischen Rechts: Eine civilistische Abhandlung (Marcus 1838) 17
with reference to Ulpianus, L.I.D. ad L. Aquil.
407C Sell (n 401); R Zimmermann (n 398) 957; BW Frier, A casebook on the Roman law of delict
(Scholars Press 1989).
408D Liebs, Die Klagenkonkurrenz im ro¨mischen Recht (n 398) 164; C Sell (n 401);
R Zimmermann (n 398) 957.
409H-P Beno¨hr, ‘Die Redaktion der Paragraphen 823 und 826 BGB’ in R Zimmermann (ed),
Rechtsgeschichte und Privatrechtsdogmatik (CF Mu¨ller 1999) 507; D Liebs, Lateinische Rechtsregeln
und Rechtssprichwo¨rter (7th edn, CH Beck 2007) 112.
410JC Hasse (n 406) 8 ff.
411N Jansen (n 381) 218; M Kaser and R Knu¨tel, Ro¨misches Privatrecht (19th edn,
CH Beck 2008).
412R Zimmermann (n 398) 961, 998 ff.; N Jansen (n 381) 202 ff.
413H-P Beno¨hr, ‘Die Redaktion der Paragraphen 823 und 826 BGB’ (n 409) 502.
414A Tuhr, Zur Scha¨tzung des Schadens in der lex Aquilia: Rudolf von Jhering zur Feier seines
fu¨nfzigja¨hrigen Doctorjubila¨ums am VI. August MDCCCXCII (Law Faculty of the University of
Basel 1892) 1 ff.
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Emperor Justinian used the Law of Aquilius to formulate his Corpus Iuris
Civilis.415 At the beginning of the digests (Institutes, Book I) the substantial
principle of justice is given:
The precepts of law are these: to live honestly, to injure no one, [and] to give to
each his own. (Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere,
suum cuique tribuere.)416
In addition, the Corpus Iuris Civilis was shaped by the principle of a separation
of punishment and restitution.417
In summary, it can be said that restitution or compensation has not always been
the main remedy of the Roman law of delicts.418 On the other hand, there were
no tort actions (actiones ex delicto) in Roman law. Although Roman law ascribed
responsibility for delicts (or torts), the damage claims have to be qualified as claims
of unjust enrichment.419 Even if it can be argued that the basis of a claim of unjust
enrichment is based on the claim of torts,420 the principle of Roman law is in fact
based on compensation rather than on punishment.421 Based on the philosophical
concept of restitutive justice, Roman law stated that if an asset unlawfully found its
way to another party then it had to be returned.422
3.3.1.3 Principle of the freedom of contracts
Based on the ancient distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary obligations,
legal philosophy began to establish the concept of freedom of contracts. This gave
the final shape to the modern distinction between the law of tort or delicts, dealing
with acting against the will of one of the involved parties, and the law of contract,
referring to the expression of the free will of the parties.
As a first step, Immanuel Kant transferred the jusnaturalistic approach of justice
of Aristotle to a notion of rationality. He argued that, ‘if Justice and Righteousness
perish, human life would no longer have any value in the world’.423
415N Jansen (n 381) 266.
416Institutes of Justinian, Book I, Title I, paragraph 3; See the translation in H Agylaeus, The
Civil law, including the Twelve tables : the Institutes of Gaius, the Rules of Ulpian, the Opinions of
Paulus, the Enactments of Justinian, and the Constitutions of Leo, vol 2 (SP Scott tr, The Central
Trust Company 1932) 5.
417N Jansen (n 381) 267.
418F Giglio (n 157) 127.
419W Pika, Ex causa furtiva condicere im klassischen ro¨mischen Recht (Duncker &
Humblot 1988) 26.
420M Kaser, Das Ro¨mische Privatrecht (n 396) 402, 627.
421F Giglio (n 157) 128; W Pika (n 419) 12 criticising the opinions of P Kru¨ger, ‘Ueber
dare actionem und actionem competere in der justinianischen Compilation’ (1895) 16 ZSS 1;
R von Mayr, Die condictio des ro¨mischen Privatrechts (Duncker & Humblot 1900) 145.
422H Hausmaninger and W Selb, Ro¨misches Privatrecht (9th edn, Bo¨hlau 2001); W Pika (n 419)
19 with further references.
423I Kant, The Philosophy of Law (n 199) 196.
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For Kant, the concept of practical reasoning, the autonomy of humans, was
based on human liberty. Liberty itself cannot be reasonably deduced from anything.
Human self-determination leads onto the principle that humans themselves are the
fundamental purpose of human acting. Therefore, it is a breach of that principle
to act against Kant’s categorical imperative to ‘act only according to the maxim
whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’,424
and also to act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person
or in the person of another always at the same time as an end and never simply as
a means.425
Furthermore, Kant argues that it is a principle of equality to respect the
personality and dignity of every human. In line with Aristotle, he argues that this
commitment is not only an internal obligation of a person but rather an obligation in
the relationship between different individuals.426 For Kant, the practical realisation
of this idea is the concept of free contractual realtionships. Concerning this, Kant
frames his categorical imperative of law as follows: ‘Right, therefore, comprehends
the whole of the conditions under which the voluntary actions of any one Person can
be harmonized in reality with the voluntary actions of every other Person, according
to a universal Law of Freedom.’427
This makes it clear that for Kant the idea of a voluntary contractual relationship
is based on the capacities for choice of two individuals to establish rights and duties
between them as an expression of their free wills.428 Therefore, the enforcement of
contracts is, in contrast to the later theories of legal promises, based on the concept of
a voluntary arrangement of individual obligations between people. The enforcement
of contractual law is therefore an expression of freedom itself.429 On the other hand,
it is clear that there can be no contractual relationship to harm third parties.430 It
can be concluded from this that the rights and duties that can be enforced through
conctractual law can only be based on the contract itself and do not establish any
metaphysical responsibility.431
With reference to the approach of Kant, modern legal philosophy developed a
concept of contracts based on the theory of the enforcement of binding promises.432
424I Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (3rd ed, JW Ellington tr, Hackett 1993) 421.
425Ibid 429.
426I Kant, On the old saw: that may be right in theory but it won't work in practice (EB Ashton tr,
University of Pennsylvania Press 1974) 289.
427I Kant, The Philosophy of Law (n 199) 45; O Ho¨ffe, ‘Kant's Principle of Justice as Categorical
Imperative of Law’ in Y Yovel (ed), Kant’s Practical Philosophy Reconsidered (Springer 1989)
149 ff.
428A Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard University
Press 2009) 109, 111.
429Ibid 112.
430Ibid 127.
431Ibid 128.
432See eg C Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligations (Harvard University
Press 1981); S Shiffrin, ‘The Divergence of Contracts and Promises’ (2007) 120 HarvLRev 708.
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In line with Kant, the Promise Theory requires voluntary agreements to establish
a promise and, thus, to establish binding contracs.433 Therefore, contractual
agreements are described by Lon L Fuller as an ‘autonomous way of regulating
future conduct’.434 Even though he argues that damages cannot be awarded in direct
correlation to the breached duty and hence as a ‘prophylaxis’ to deter contractual
breaches,435 the breach of a contractual agreed obligation is still the key point.436
With reference to this central requirement in establishing damages in contract
law, Patrick S Atiyah strengthened the distinction between voluntary obligations
and obligations imposed by law and thus the distinction between contract law and
the law of torts or delicts.437 According to this distinction, it is clear that damages
based on contract law can only be a remedy related to a breach of a contractual
obligation agreed between both parties.438 Every other wrongdoing is a matter of
tort or delicts. This is along the same lines as the Aristotelian tradition.439
3.3.1.4 Distinction between a damage claim based on the law of
contracts and delicts
German civil law is generally based on two historical law traditions: Roman law,
especially the Pandects, and ancient German law, especially the Salian Law.440
The Salian Law441 was written by order of the Merovingian King Clovis I, and is
one of the oldest preserved codified books of regulations. It is the first textualisation
of old oral conventions of law. As part of the Germanic tribunal laws (ancient German
laws), the Salian Law (named after the Frankish tribe of Salian Franks) constituted
the main part of the Frankish law governing the legal system of Frankia during the
Old Frankish Period (ca. 5th to 9th century). In consequence, it had a formative
influence on the modern German legal system (not only German law, see above).
Originally, the right of restitution or damage was based on the pure principle of
433TM Scanlon, ‘Promises and Contracts’ in P Benson (ed), The Theory of Contract Law
(CUP 2001).
434LL Fuller, ‘Consideration and Form’ (1941) 41 ColLRev 799, 806-10.
435LL Fuller and WR Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages’ (1936) 46 YaleLJ 52.
436PS Atiyah, ‘Fuller and the Theory of Contract’ in PS Atiyah (ed), Essays on Contract
(OUP 1990) 75-6.
437PS Atiyah, ‘Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations’ in PS Atiyah (ed), Essays on
Contract (OUP 1990).
438A Burrows, Understanding the Law of Obligations: Essays on Contract, Tort and Restitution
(Hart Pub 1998) 3-4.
439J Gordley, ‘Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition’ in P Benson (ed), The Theory of
Contract Law (OUP 2001) 327.
440H Honsell, ‘Einleitung zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch’ in H Roth (ed), J von Staudingers
Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einfu¨hrungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, vol 1
(Einleitung zum BGB) (Sellier/de Gruyter 2013) para 68 ff.; K Scha¨fer, ‘Unerlaubte Handlungen
§§ 823-835’ in G Beitzke et al (eds), J von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch
mit Einfu¨hrungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, vol 5/II (Schuldverha¨ltnisse §§ 823-835) (10th/11th edn,
J Schweitzer Verlag 1975) Vorbem, para 8 ff.
441Lex Salica or Pactus Legis Salicae, AD 507-511.
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restitutive justice of Aristotle. Over the years, the principle of making atonement
for a wrongdoing was added with reference to St Thomas Aquinas.442 Therefore, in
chapter C No 2 § 2 ff., the Salian Law distinguished between the restitution of harm
(dilatura443) and punishment for a wrongdoing444 although there was no general
clause of damages in the Salian Law (casuistic regulation).445
On the other hand, the authors of the German civil law were mainly shaped by
the science of the interpretation of the Pandects (broadly speaking, the Roman civil
law). Therefore, the Justinianic Corpus Iuris Civilis has been the main influence on
the codification of the law of delicts. The proponents of the natural law approach
argued for a general principle of liability for all culpably caused harm or damage.446
As a result of that interpretation of Roman law, German law differentiates between a
damage claim based on a breach of contract and a claim based on the law of delicts.
The central norm for a damage claim based on the breach of a contract is Sec 280
of the German Civil Code (BGB)447.448 The main distinction between the claim of
Sec 280 and a claim based on the law of delicts (e.g. Sec 823 BGB) is that Sec 280
requires a contract and the breach of a contractual obligation whereas the law of
delicts is based on a violation of a legally protected interest, good or right. The key
point for a claim based on the law of contracts is that the damage is based on a
breach of an obligation that arises from the agreed contractual duties.449 Therefore,
it is the contract that defines the obligations which can be breached.450 The focal
points are hence the central conditions about the performance of the contract451 and
the obligation not to injure the rights of the contracting parties by performing the
contract.452
442H Lange, Schadensersatz und Privatstrafe in der mittelalterlichen Rechtstheorie
(Bo¨hlau 1955) 111.
443See the original Latin version of the Lex Salica in KA Eckhardt, Lex Salica: 100 Titel-Text
(Bo¨hlaus 1953) No 12, 1.
444See the translation and commentations by H Geffcken, Lex Salica zum akademischen
Gebrauche (Veit&Comp 1898) 109 ff. and KA Eckhardt (n 443) pactus 2 § 4, 106-7.
445H-P Beno¨hr, ‘Die Redaktion der Paragraphen 823 und 826 BGB’ (n 409) 507.
446K Scha¨fer (n 440) Vorbem, para 4; G Wagner, ‘Unerlaubte Handlungen §§ 823-838’ in
M Habersack (ed), Mu¨nchener Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol 5 (§§ 705-853)
(6th edn, CH Beck 2013) Vorbemerkungen, para 4; H Lange (n 442) 10 ff., 69 ff.
447Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch (2002) BGBl, vol 1, 42, amdt (2002) BGBl, vol 1, 2909;
amdt (2003) BGBl, vol. 1, 738.
448S Lorenz, ‘§ 280 BGB’ in C Bamberger and H Roth (eds), Beck'scher Online-Kommentar BGB
(34th edn, CH Beck 2015) at para 1.
449German Federal Parliament (Bunedstag), Document 14/6040 at 133, 135; HP Westermann,
‘§ 280 BGB’ in HP Westermann (ed), Erman Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch (14th edn, Otto
Schmidt 2014) at para 5; J Alpmann, ‘§ 280 BGB’ in M Junker, RM Beckmann and
H Ru¨ßmann (eds), juris Praxiskommentar BGB, vol 2nd (7th edn, juris 2014) at para 2; S Lorenz,
‘BeckOK § 280 BGB’ (n 448) at paras 1, 3.
450German Federal Parliament (Bunedstag), Document 14/6040 at 134-135; R Schwarze,
‘§ 280 BGB’ in M Lo¨wisch (ed), J von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch,
vol §§ 255-304 (rev edn, Sellier/de Gruyter 2014) at para C 1.
451W Ernst, ‘§ 280 BGB’ in FJ Sa¨cker and R Rixecker (eds), Mu¨nchener Kommentar zum
Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol 2nd (6th edn, CH Beck 2012) at para 1.
452R Schwarze (n 450) at para C 22; J Alpmann (n 449) at para 24.
80
The modern German law of delicts is based on the precept of a general
compensation of damages after a wrongdoing; principally through restitution
in kind (Sec 249(1) BGB) but in practice monetary restitution (Sec 249(2),
251 BGB).453 Based on the casuistic structure of the Salian Law, German civil
law developed a general clause for damage claims out of the extended application of
the Salian rules.454
It seems to be clear that not all single harms that a legal subject suffered can
be compensated.455 Therefore, it is the task of the law of delicts to define the limits
between the principle of casum sentit dominus (liable is where the damage is) and the
liability of third persons, e.g., the perpetrator (damage externalisation or ‘property
rule’456).457 The main outcome of the damage externalisation is the compensation
of damages, less the prevention of prospective damages.458 On the one hand, some
commentators argue that this limit of liability cannot be defined as a manifestation
of the philosophical concept of corrective justice459 because a sole philosophical
justification is too vague and it cannot be assumed that everybody has a general will
of compensation.460 They see the law of delicts and the principle of liability simply as
a positive legal codification of the attribution of damages on the bases of culpability
and endangerment.461 However, as argued above, the principle of justice as well as
the concept of liability cannot be seen as the sole positive will of the lawgiver. It
is more rigorous to see the civil liability based on the principle of personal liability
for personal actions (as Kant)462 or largely influenced by the ancient concept of
453E Deutsch, Haftungsrecht (Heymann 1976) I para 17; K Larenz and C-W Canaris, Lehrbuch
des Schuldrechts, vol II/2 (CH Beck 1994) § 75 I 2 i, 354; N Jansen (n 381) 33 ff.
454H-P Beno¨hr, ‘Die Redaktion der Paragraphen 823 und 826 BGB’ (n 409) 503.
455G Wagner, ‘Haftung und Versicherung als Instrumente der Techniksteuerung’
[1999] VersR 1441, 1441-2; G Wagner, ‘Pra¨vention und Verhaltenssteuerung durch
Privatrecht – Anmaßung oder legitime Aufgabe?’ (2006) 206 AcP 352, 423 ff., 453 ff.; H Ko¨tz,
‘Ziele des Haftungsrechts’ in JF Baur (ed), Festschrift fu¨r Ernst Steindorff zum 70 Geburtstag
am 13 Ma¨rz 1990 (de Gruyter 1990) 643-5; H-B Scha¨fer and C Ott, Lehrbuch der o¨konomischen
Analyse des Zivilrechts (5th ed, Springer 2012) 114.
456G Bru¨ggemeier, ‘Judizielle Schutzpolitik de lega lata – Zur Rekonstruktion des
BGB-Deliktsrechts’ [1986] JZ 969, 970.
457G Wagner, ‘Unerlaubte Handlungen §§ 823-838’ Vorbemerkungen (n 446) para 38.
458K Larenz and C-W Canaris (n 453) vol 1, § 27 I; G Bru¨ggemeier, ‘Gesellschaftliche
Schadensverteilung und Deliktsrecht’ (1982) 182 AcP 385, 386.
459G Wagner, ‘Unerlaubte Handlungen §§ 823-838’ Vorbemerkungen (n 446) para 38; other
opinion: G Bru¨ggemeier, Haftungsrecht: Struktur, Prinzipien, Schutzbereich (Springer 2006) 9.
460J Schmidt, Schadensersatz und Strafe: Zur Rechtfertigung des Inhaltes von Schadensersatz
aus Verschuldenshaftung (H. Lang 1973) 26.
461K Larenz and C-W Canaris (n 453) § 75 I 2, S. 351 ff.
462H Stoll, ‘Fleming: The Law of Torts, 3. Aufl.’ (1966) 166 AcP 380, 383; H Ko¨tz, ‘Haftung fu¨r
besondere Gefahr’ (1970) 170 AcP 1, 3-4; K Larenz, Allgemeiner Teil des deutschen Bu¨rgerlichen
Rechts (7th edn, CH Beck 1989); JG Fleming, Fleming's The law of torts (10th edn, Thomson
Reuters 2011).
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corrective justice463 even though it is clear that single philosophical concepts cannot
define every single detail of the civil liability clauses.
Here, the law of delicts or damages is regulated in Sec 823 ff. BGB and, as a
special law for the breach of competition law, in Sec 33(3) GWB.
3.3.1.5 Damage claims of customers based on a breach of competition
law as a claim based on the law of delicts
To classify a damage claim based on a breach of competition law as a claim based
on contracts or delicts, it is necessary to focus on the analysed key differences.
As described above, the first requirement of a claim based on contracts is the
existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. Although it is difficult
to establish a contractual relationship between the customer and manufacturer
through a supply chain, it is clear that there is a direct contractual relationship
between the company breaching competition law and its purchasers. That contract
is also not void with reference to Art 101(2) TFEU because the regulation about
invalidity in Art 101(2) TFEU only refers to the cartel agreement, i.e. the contract
establishing the cartel.464
However, in focusing on the second key principle of a damage claim based on
Sec 280 BGB, i.e. that the breached obligation has to be based on the agreed duties
in the contract, it is clear that a member of a cartel usually has not breached any
contractual relationship but rather a statutory provision. Therefore, the damage
claim based on the breach of competition law has to be classified as a claim based
on the law of delicts.465 That is the reason why the German law-givers designed the
regulation in Sec 33 GWB to be analogous to Sec 823 BGB, the central provision of
the German law of delicts.
3.3.1.6 Conclusion
In summary, a damage claim based on an infringement of competition law can be
classified as a claim based on the law of delicts.
463H Coing, Die obersten Grundsa¨tze des Rechts: ein Versuch zur Neugru¨ndung des Naturrechts
(Schneider 1947) 29-30; See for non German law but within the German legal system:
R Feenstra, ‘Das Deliktsrecht bei Grotius’ in R Feenstra and R Zimmermann (eds), Das
ro¨misch-holla¨ndische Recht (Duncker & Humblot 1992) 429 ff.; K Oftinger and EW Stark,
Schweizerisches Haftpflichtrecht, vol 1 (5th edn, Schulthess 1995).
464See 319-82 Socie´te´ de Vente de Ciments et Be´tons de l'Est SA v Kerpen & Kerpen GmbH und
Co KG [1983] ECR 4173 at para 11; S Nagel, Schweizerisches Kartellprivatrecht im internationalen
Vergleich (Dike 2007) 37 with further references; H Weyer, ‘Zivilrechtsfolgen, Art 81 EG’ in
H Glassen et al (eds), Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht (80th (May 2014) edn, Dr Otto
Schmidt 2000 ff.) at para 142.
465V Emmerich, ‘§ 33 GWB, Unterlassungsanspruch, Schadensersatzpflicht’ in U Immenga and
E-J Mestma¨cker (eds), Wettbewerbsrecht, vol 2 (5th edn, CH Beck 2014) at para 47; E Rehbinder,
‘§ 33 GWB, Unterlassungsanspruch, Schadensersatzpflicht’ in U Loewenheim, KM Meessen and
A Riesenkampff (eds), Kartellrecht (2nd edn, 2009) at para 31.
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Based on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary contractual
relationships by Aristotle, Roman law first established a separation between claims
‘in rem’ and ‘in personam’. Although Roman law had no actions in tort (actiones
ex delicto), it put in place the main principle of restitution and in so doing created
the basis for the modern classification of damage law.
With reference to the Kantian principle of the freedom of contracts and Kant’s
idea of a voluntary contractual relationship based on the capacities for choice of two
individuals to establish rights and duties between them as an expression of their free
wills, modern law distinguishes between the law of contracts which deals with such
voluntary contracts and its performance and the law of delicts. The English legal
scholar Atiyah developed the idea and stated that damages based on contract law
can only be a remedy related to a breach of a contractual obligation agreed between
both parties and every other wrongdoing is a matter of tort or delicts. This is also
in the Aristotelian tradition.
Therefore, the key point for a claim based on the law of contracts in German
civil law is that the damage is based on an infringement of an obligation that
arises from the agreed contractual duties between free-willing parties. Therefore,
it is the contract that defines the obligations that can be breached. On the other
hand, a breach of Art 101 TFEU or some other competition law is not based
on an infringement of a contractual agreed obligation. On the contrary, it is the
performance of a contract with an illegal purpose to breach a statutory provision.
Consequently, damage claims based on an infringement of competition law must be
classified under German law as a claim based on the law of delicts.
3.3.2 Damage claims of customers based on a breach of competition
law as a claim based on the law of delicts
After classifying the civil damage claim for the breach of European competition
law as a claim based on the law of delicts, this chapter focuses on the specific
requirements for such a claim under German law.
Although Sec 33(3) GWB establishes a specific damage claim for the breach of
competition law, the central regulation for the German law of delicts is Sec 823 BGB.
In its paragraphs, the section regulates a breach of specific legal or personal goods
or interests (Sec 823(1)) and a breach of statutory duties (Sec 823(2)).466 Before
the reformation of the GWB in 2005, the old regulation did not consider breaches
of European competition law and, therefore, Sec 823 BGB was directly applicable.
466See G Spindler, ‘§ 823 BGB – Schadensersatzpflicht’ in HG Bamberger and H Roth (eds),
Beck'scher Online-Kommentar BGB (34th edn, CH Beck 2013) at para 1.
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Even if now Sec 33(3) GWB is lex specialis and hence replaces Sec 823 BGB,467 the
established legal practice is still applicable.468
In general, the requirements for a successful claim based on Sec 823 can be
separated into three parts: an illegal infringement of protected rights or interests
as well as a breach of statutory duties (3.3.2.1); damages causally based on the
infringement (3.3.2.2); and the culpability of the infringer (3.3.2.3).469
3.3.2.1 Illegal Infringement of protected rights or interests
The crucial point in a claim based on the law of delicts is the identifying of an
infringement of a scope of a legally protected interest/right or the breach of a
statutory duty.470
The legally protected rights and interests of Sec 823(1) BGB are life, body,
health, freedom, property and as a general clause another right of another person.471
The first possibly affected right is the property of the victims. Property is in
Sec 903 BGB legally defined as the comprehensive right of the owner of a thing to
deal with the thing at his discretion and to exclude others from every influence.
Therefore, the possible infringements of the property are (a) the withdrawal or
burden of property rights, (b) acting with a harmfull physical effect on the thing and
(c) disturbances of the usability of the thing.472 On the other hand, the definition
of Sec 903 BGB only involve physical things but not legal titles or other assets.473
Usually an infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU does not cause a physical
damage on the things of the victims. More often, the caused damages are pure
financial interests. However, those financial interests are not part of the property
definition of Sec 903 BGB and are, therefore, outside the scope of Sec 823(1) BGB.
467See P Stockenhuber, ‘Art 81 EGV / Art 101 AEUV’ in E Grabitz, M Hilf and
M Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europa¨ischen Union, vol 1 (53rd (May 2014) edn,
CH Beck 2010 ff.) at paras 242 ff.; W Jaeger, ‘Art. 81 EG’ in U Loewenheim, KM Meessen and
A Riesenkampff (eds), Kartellrecht (2nd edn, CH Beck 2005) at para 37; E Rehbinder (n 465) at
para 2.
468K Schmidt, ‘Anhang 2: Privatrechtliche Durchsetzung – Materielles Recht’ in U Immenga and
E-J Mestma¨cker (eds), EU-Wettbewerbsrecht, vol 1 (5th edn, CH Beck 2012) at para 15; DJ Zimmer
and H Logemann, ‘Unterliegen ”Altfa¨lle” der verscha¨rften Schadensersatzhaftung nach § 33 GWB?
Die versteckte Ru¨ckwirkung im Kartellprivatrecht’ [2006] WuW 982; E Rehbinder (n 465) at
para 31.
469See G Spindler (n 466) at para 2.
470G Wagner, ‘Unerlaubte Handlungen §§ 823-838’ (n 446) § 823 at para 52.
471See Sec 3 for the moral basis of the damage claim.
472G Wagner, ‘Unerlaubte Handlungen §§ 823-838’ (n 446) § 823 at para 164.
473Ibid § 823 at para 165; OLG Karlsruhe NJW 1996, 200 at 201; K Meier and
A Wehlau, ‘Die zivilrechtliche Haftung fu¨r Datenlo¨schung, Datenverlust und Datenzersto¨rung’
[1998] NJW 1585, 1588.
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On the other hand, Sec 823(2) BGB protects pure financial interests as part of
the assets of the victims.474 The regulation is on of the ways the BGB includeds the
valuations of other fields of law.475 It is therefore a way of private enforcement of
administrative regulations.476 The first requirement of Sec 823(2) BGB is the breach
of statutory duty that protects individual rights or interests.
As mentioned above, before the reformation of the GWB in 2005,
Sec 823(2) BGB was directly applicable in competition law cases. Since that
reform, Sec 33(3) GWB is lex speicales and replaces Sec 823(2) BGB. But the
central considerations of the principle and structure of Sec 33(3) GWB is based on
Sec 823(2) BGB.
The relevant statutory duty is a breach of Art 101 or 102 TFEU (or the
equivalent regulation of Sec 1 or Secs 19-21 GWB). Sec 33(3) GWB does not make
any considerations about the requirements of the infringement of competition law
and is therefore only applicable in conjunction with the requirements of Art 101 or
102 TFEU. Consequently, the requirements as well as the limits (e.g. the application
of the group exceptions or commission’s decisions) of Art 101 or 102 TFEU have to
be considered to assess if a damage claim can be successful.477
3.3.2.2 Damages causally based on the infringement
Besides an infringement of a protected right or interest, German law of delicts
requires damages which are causally based on the stated infringement. The issue
that needs to be determined is what can be qualified as damages in such a claim.
To do this, this section analyses the distinction between restitution in kind and in
money to find a common understanding of what damages are, how they can be
compensated under German law of delicts and how they are allocated. The section
then examines the specific problem of passing-on damages through a supply chain
and the legal concept of shared benefits behind this factual problem. Alongside the
damages directly suffered by the infringement, indirect damages can arise, especially
if a claim takes a long time. Therefore, the central problem of interest has to be
considered in the analysis of damages. Finally, the section deals with the problem
of evidence related to the amount of damages and its solution by the legal concept
of estimating the losses under German Civil Procedure Law.
474RGZ 91, 72 at 76; BGHZ 66, 388 at 390-1; BGHZ 125, 366 at 374; C-W Canaris,
‘Schutzgesetze – Verkehrspflichten – Schutzpflichten’ in C-W Canaris and U Diederichsen (eds),
Festschrift fu¨r Karl Larenz zum 80 Geburtstag am 23 April 1983 (CH Beck 1983) 58 ff.; K Larenz
and C-W Canaris (n 453) 431-2.
475BGHZ 122, 1 (Ballettschule) at 8; E Deutsch, ‘Entwicklung und Entwicklungsfunktion der
Deliktstatbesta¨nde. Ein Beitrag zur Abgrenzung der rechtsetzenden von der rechtsprechenden
Gewalt im Zivilrecht’ [1963] JZ 385, 389; G Bru¨ggemeier, Deliktsrecht – ein Hand- und Lehrbuch
(Nomos 1986) at para 791.
476G Wagner, ‘Unerlaubte Handlungen §§ 823-838’ (n 446) § 823 at para 384.
477K Schmidt, ‘Anhang 2: Privatrechtliche Durchsetzung’ (n 468) at para 16.
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3.3.2.2.1 Distinction between restitution in kind or money and the
allocation of damages
To build a common understanding of what can be compensated by the German law
of delicts, it is first necessary to highlight the main distinction between restitution
in kind and restitution in money based on the German law of delicts.
In contrast to English law,478 the general principle of restitution under German
law is restitution in kind (Sec 249(1) BGB). Only in three cases does German law
allow restitution in money. The first is regulated in Sec 249(2) BGB and covers the
restitution based on a violation of a person or an injury of a thing.479 However, in
a case based on an infringement of competition law, both variants are usually not
relevant. The second exception of the general rule is based on the general obligation
of the infringer to compensate the damage in kind. Sec 250 BGB states that if the
infringer is not able or willing to compensate the damage in kind after a deadline
set by the victim, the victim can claim directly damages from the infringer and does
not have to wait for a restitution in kind.
The most relevant exception in competition cases is Sec 251 BGB. The section
rules that a victim can claim money without setting a deadline if restitution in kind
is impossible, insufficient or disproportionally expensive. This is usually given in
cases based on an infringement on competition law. Whereas the old case law of
the German Federal Court of Justice recognised restitution in kind in cases of an
obligation to perform a contract,480 modern case law regards this obligation as part
of a positive injunctive relief481 and hence it is uncontroversial that restitution in
kind is obsolete in competition law cases.482 Therefore, the main kind of restitution
in German competition law is restitution in money.
To allocate the amount of damages, German courts use the difference hypothesis,
that is, the calculation of damages is done by comparing the financial situation
with and without the law infringement.483 The thinking behind this is to
compensate the actual loss suffered because of a price increase and possible losses
because of a reduction in the number of requests of customers.484 Therefore, the
German Civil Code distinguishes between material damages or financial losses
478See under 3.4.2.2.
479See e.g. C Schubert, ‘§ 249 Art und Umfang des Schadensersatzes’ in C Bamberger and
H Roth (eds), Beck'scher Online-Kommentar BGB (34th edn, CH Beck 2011) at para 188.
480See e.g. BGHZ 36, 91 (Gummistru¨mpfe) at 100; LG Karlsruhe NJW-RR 1986, 1250;
OLG Karlsruhe NJW-RR 1991, 944; H Oetker, ‘§ 249 BGB – Art und Umfang des
Schadensersatzes’ in FJ Sa¨cker and R Rixecker (eds), Mu¨nchener Kommentar zum
Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol 2 (6th edn, CH Beck 2012) at para 338; J Bornkamm,
‘§ 33 GWB – Unterlassungsanspruch, Schadensersatzpflicht’ in E Langen and H-J Bunte (eds),
Kartellrecht, vol 1 (12th edn, Lucherhand 2014) at para 100.
481E Rehbinder (n 465) at para 31.
482See e.g. Ibid at para 37.
483J Bornkamm, ‘§ 33 GWB’ (n 480) at para 99.
484E Rehbinder (n 465) at para 37 with reference to Sec 252 BGB.
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(Secs 249, 252 BGB) and immaterial damages (Sec 253 BGB). In so doing, the
German Civil Code in Sec 252 BGB accepts that the loss of profits, besides the
suffered financial harm, are part of financial losses.
3.3.2.2.2 Passing-on defence and the concept of shared benefits
One key problem in estimating the losses is the situation when the victim resells
the goods at an increased price and so “passes on” the price increase to its
own customers (the so-called passing-on defence). This defence is based on the
US Supreme Court decisions in Hanover Shoe485 and Illinois Brick 486 where it was
stated that it is not possible to argue in a case that the overcharge has been passed
on to indirect purchasers and these have no right to claim damages. Under German
law, a passing-on defence has been discussed and applied under the concepts of
benefit sharing and the difference hypothesis.487 After the 7th reform of the German
Competition Act, sentence 2 of Sec 33(3) GWB has been amended so that a claim
of a direct purchaser is not denied because it passed on the price increase to its
customers. However, this only affects the existence of damage and not its value.488
By defining the value of damage, German law applies a concept of benefit sharing.
Therefore, it is possible that the damage calculated in a pure differential hypothesis
will be reduced by the price increase of the plaintiff. The only fact that is not affected
is the reduction in customer demand.489
Although the German lawgivers did not ultimately come to the decision that
the principle of shared benefits was illegal, they assumed that the leading opinion
in case law and literature was that this principle was not compatible with the sense
485Hanover Shoe v United Shoe Machinery Corp [1968] 392 US 481.
486Illinois Brick Co v Illinois [1977] 431 US 720.
487OLG Karlsruhe NJW 2004, 2243 (Vitamin); J Beninca, ‘Schadensersatzanspru¨che von
Kunden eines Kartells?’ [2004] WuW 604; T Lu¨bbig, ‘Die zivilprozessuale Durchsetzung etwaiger
Schadensanspru¨che durch die Abnehmer eines kartellbefangenen Produktes’ [2004] WRP 1254;
M Schu¨tt, ‘Individualrechtsschutz nach der 7. GWB-Novelle. Anmerkung zum Regierungsentwurf
vom 12.08.2004’ [2004] WuW 1124, 1129; FW Bulst, ‘Internationale Zusta¨ndigkeit, anwendbares
Recht und Schadensberechnung im Kartelldeliktsrecht’ [2004] EWS 403; other opinion in
LG Dortmund WuW/E DE-R 2004, 1352 (Vitaminpreise in Dortmund) at 1353-4; H Ko¨hler,
‘Kartellverbot und Schadensersatz’ [2004] GRUR 99, 103; R Hempel, ‘Privater Rechtsschutz
im deutschen Kartellrecht nach der 7. GWB-Novelle’ [2004] WuW 362, 369; R Bechtold,
‘Grundlegende Umgestaltung des Kartellrechts: Zum Referentenentwurf der 7. GWB-Novelle’
[2004] DB 235, 239; T Lettl, ‘Der Schadensersatzanspruch gema¨ß § 823 Abs. 2 BGB i.V. mit Art. 81
Abs. 1 EG’ (2003) 167 ZHR 473, 487.
488LG Dortmund WuW/E DE-R 2004, 1352 (Vitaminpreise in Dortmund); E Rehbinder (n 465)
at para 39; FW Bulst, ‘Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung durch die Marktgegenseite: deutsche
Gerichte auf Kollisionskurs zum EuGH’ [2004] NJW 2201, 2201-2; GM Berrisch and M Burianski,
‘Kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzanspru¨che nach der 7. GWB-Novelle. Eine Einscha¨tzung der
Zukunft privater Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung mittels Schadensersatzklagen in Deutschland’
[2005] WuW 878, 885.
489Commission, ‘White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules’ 9;
M Schu¨tt (n 487) 1129; V Emmerich (n 465) at paras 58-9; FW Bulst, Schadensersatzanspru¨che
der Marktgegenseite im Kartellrecht (n 465) 126 ff., 321 ff., 345 ff.
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of Sec 33 GWB.490 The question that arises from this is that if damages have not
been passed on through a supply chain, the damages of the direct victims have to
be reduced with reference to Sec 254 BGB. This states that a victim is obliged to
reduce its own damages as far as reasonably possible. Therefore, the central question
is whether it is appropriate for a victim to pass on the suffered harm, i.e. a price
increase, to its own customers. The German Civil Code itself does not say anything
in detail and it is thus a matter for case law.491 The crucial ruling is the decision of
the Federal Court of Justice of Germany in ORWI.492 In that case, the court had to
decide about a damage claim by the printing company ORWI against a producer of
non-carbon paper. The defendant was part of a cartel of ten undertakings in Europe
between 1992 and 1995. In 2001, the European Commission uncovered the cartel and
imposed fines on the affected undertakings.493 The controversial point of the claim
was that ORWI was not a direct customer of the defendant. It was in fact a reseller
that had passed on the price increase of the defendant to ORWI, and ORWI thus
claimed that it suffered a harm based on the infringement of European competition
law. In its ruling, the Federal Court of Justice of Germany agreed that ORWI had the
right to claim damages from an indirect infringer. With reference to Sec 254(2) BGB,
the court stated that even if a victim was not obliged to engage in a specific behaviour
to reduce the damage, it was possible for an indirect purchaser to claim the right
to seek damages. On the other hand, the court said that benefit sharing was not
possible in a case when a victim was not obliged to act in a specific manner related
to Sec 254(2) BGB. It can be argued that this ruling implies that a victim is not
obliged to pass on the damage, i.e. price increase, to its own customers. However,
the court did not directly reject the concept of benefit sharing in competition law
and so left the door open concerning the question of an obligation in passing-on
damages.
Therefore, the general rulings of Sec 254(2) BGB are applicable. In general, it can
be said that the obligation of damage reduction should be analysed in each specific
case and it is not possible to make a general determination on it.494 On the one hand,
490Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: Entwurf eines Siebten Gesetzes zur A¨nderung des
Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschra¨nkungen [2004] BT-Drs 15/3640 at 35; Beschlussempfehlung
und Bericht des Ausschusses fu¨r Wirtschaft und Arbeit zu dem Gesetzentwurf der
Bundesregierung – Drucksache 15/3640 – Entwurf eines Siebten Gesetzes zur A¨nderung
des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschra¨nkungen [2005] BT-Drs 15/5049 at 48; J Bornkamm,
‘§ 33 GWB’ (n 480) at para 104; E Rehbinder (n 465) at para 39; criticised by M Lutz,
‘Schwerpunkte der 7 GWB-Novelle’ [2005] WuW 718, 728.
491G Schiemann, ‘BGB § 254 Mitverschulden’ in M Martinek (ed), Staudinger, Bu¨rgerliches
Gesetzbuch, vol 2 (Sellier/de Gruyter 2005) at 80.
492BGH NJW 2012, 928 (ORWI ).
493See Carbonless paper (COMP/E-1/36212) Commission Decision number 2004/337/EC
[2004] OJ L115/1; Joined cases C-322/07 P, C-327/07 P and C-338/07 P Papierfabrik August
Koehler AG (C-322/07 P), Bollore´ SA (C-327/07 P) and Distribuidora Vizca´ına de Papeles SL
(C-338/07 P) v Commission of the European Communities. [2009] OJ I-7191.
494BGHZ 62, 103 at 106-7.
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it is accepted that a victim of an uncompetitive foreclosure that wants to claim lost
profits has to show that it made a real effort to make profits in another market
or get into the market in another way.495 However, this cannot be transplanted to
the question of passing-on a price increase. An acceptance of benefit sharing is not
compatible with the intent and purpose of Sec 33 GWB and Art 101 TFEU.496 The
purpose of Art 101 TFEU is to prevent anticompetitive behaviour in the market but
an application of Sec 254(2) BGB would lead to the conclusion that a reseller could
pass the price increase on to its own customers and hence intensify the infringement
of competition law because more victims on different market levels were involved.
On the other hand, these indirect victims – usually consumers – are not in a position
to claim damages effectively because individually they only suffered a small sum of
damages and are not in the financial and structural position to collect and provide
enough evidence for a civil damage claim. Furthermore, a passing-on defence would
prevent resellers from claiming damages based on an infringement of competition
law and is thus not compatible with Sec 33 GWB.497
If ORWI is read with this understanding of the passing-on defence and shared
benefits in mind, the conclusion is that the German Federal Court of Justice would
support the inapplicability of the passing-on defence as well as the inapplicability of
Sec 254(2) BGB. However, Article 13 of European Directive 2014/104/EU requires
that the Member States shall ensure that the passing-on defence is applicable but
this is something that goes against the established German law and the mentioned
ruling of the German Federal Court of Justice. Consequently, it is necessary for the
German lawgivers to interact and to provide a statutory ruling that entertains the
possibility of the passing-on defence.
3.3.2.2.3 Regulations about interest
The second relevant part of damage calculations are indirect damages. This is
especially important if a claim takes a long time and so the question of interest arises.
However, it is debatable whether interest is a justifiable way to receive compensation
for a suffered damage or simply a means of enriching oneself at the expense of the
infringer.498 From the case law and literature, it is clear that interest is a valid
means of restitution of damages.499 Therefore, the best way of interpreting the aim
495H-W Kru¨ger, O¨ffentliche und private Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots gema¨ß
Art. 81 EG – eine rechtso¨konomische Analyse (Dt Univ-Verl 2007) 118.
496See as well J Mohr, ‘Normativer Schadensbegriff und Berechnung des Schadensersatzes ’ (2010)
32 JURA 645, 651.
497See as well J Topel, ‘§ 50 Zivilrechtliche Sanktionen’ in G Wiedemann (ed), Kartellrecht
(2nd edn, CH Beck 2008) at para 33.
498J Basedow, ‘Die Aufgabe der Verzugszinsen in Recht und Wirtschaft. Bemerkungen zu
§ 288 BGB und § 352 HGB’ (1979) 143 ZHR 317, 322-3; F Peters, ‘Der Zinssatz des § 288 I 1 BGB’
[1980] ZRP 90.
499BGH NJW 1979, 540; F Peters (n 498); J Basedow (n 498) 324; Bv Maydell, Geldschuld und
Geldwert – Die Bedeutung von A¨nderungen d. Geldwertes fu¨r d. Geldschulden (CH Beck 1974) 140.
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of interest is to consider that it provides both compensation for damages and a
means of enrichment.500 Although Sec 246 BGB, which is the central regulation on
interest in German civil law, does not regulate interest, it is, nevertheless, widely
accepted.501
The first issue that needs to be determined is the starting point for interest
calculation. The general regulation which addresses interest in German civil law is
Sec 288 BGB read in conjunction with Sec 286 BGB. It states that a debtor must
pay interest if he does not pay his debts by a deadline set by the creditor after a
reminder of the due date. It is important to state here that in the German law of
delicts an infringer has an obligation to pay damages even if the victim has not
requested it. Therefore, between the victim and infringer there is a relationship
based on an obligation which is that the infringer has to pay damages to the victim.
Naturally, there is no agreed due date to such an obligation relationship in the law
of delicts. Consequently, the general rule of Sec 271 BGB applies and the victim
can remind the infringer and set a deadline immediately. The only exception to this
rule in the BGB is Sec 291 which sets the starting point for the commencement of
proceedings. However, in competition law, sentence 4 and 5 of Sec 33(3) GWB shifts
the starting point of the calculation of interest to the point when the damage occurs.
This is so that the infringer should not have an incentive to delay the claim or the
fine proceeding.
The second central issue is how to fix the interest rate. In German civil law, many
divergent rules regulate interest rates between an inflexible 4% up to 8% over the base
interest rate. The central norm is Sec 246 BGB which sets out an inflexible interest
rate of 4%. This regulation is a lex generalis that is subsidiary to other regulations
of specific areas of law.502 The problem about the regulation in Sec 246 BGB is
that a fixed interest rate does not take account of the economic reality and rate of
inflation especially if the regulation has been unchanged since 1900 as is the case in
the BGB.503
The first and most important lex specialis for interest rates is Sec 288 BGB
which regulates the interest at the time of default. This correlates directly with
the regulation of default in Sec 271 BGB as mentioned above. With reference to
sentence 5 of Sec 33(3) GWB, Sec 288 BGB and therefore the regulation about
interest at the time of default is applicable to a damage claim based on an
500See as well S Grundmann, ‘§ 246 Gesetzlicher Zinssatz’ in FJ Sa¨cker and R Rixecker (eds),
Mu¨nchener Kommentar zum BGB, vol 2 (6th edn, CH Beck 2012) para 11.
501See Ibid paras 11 and 33.
502Ibid para 33.
503See F Peters (n 498) 91; A Roll, ‘Die Ho¨he der Verzugszinsen’ [1973] DRiZ 339,
341-2; P Kindler, Gesetzliche Zinsanspru¨che im Zivil- und Handelsrecht – Pla¨doyer fu¨r
einen kreditmarktorientierten Fa¨lligkeitszins (Mohr 1996) 205-8, 303-4; D Medicus, ‘Vorschla¨ge
zur U¨berarbeitung des Schuldrechts – Das allgemeine Recht der Leistungssto¨rungen’
[1992] NJW 2384, 2386.
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infringement of competition law with the difference that, as mentioned above, the
time of default begins with the infringement.504 Therefore, since the amendment
of the BGB in 2002,505 the interest rate at the time of default and hence for
damages based on Sec 33(3) GWB is 5%506 or if no consumer is involved in the
claim then 8%507 over the basic rate of interest.508 This basic rate of interest is
regulated in Sec 247(1) BGB and is a variable reference interest rate announced by
the German Federal Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) twice a year. The current basic
interest rate is 3.62% (1st January 2015). Therefore, the interest rate for damages
based on the infringement of competition law is 8.62%, respectively 11.62%.
Furthermore, Sec 248 BGB prohibits compound interest (usurae usurarum). The
aim of Sec 248 is not the limitation of the interest burden.509 On the contrary, the
only aim of the prohibition of compound interest is to allow the foreseeability of the
interest by the debtor and hence to provide legal clarity.510
3.3.2.2.4 Estimation of losses under German Civil Procedure Law
Due to the fact that calculation of damages is based on a comparison between the
situation with and without the infringement of competition law and because the
analysis of the situation without the infringement is purely hypothetical, German
law allows for an estimation of the suffered harm (Sec 33(3) s 3 and 4 GWB with
reference to Sec 287 ZPO511).512
Although Sec 287 ZPO allows for the estimation of every kind of damages,513
the estimation does not include the factual basis of the damage claim and the
causality between the acting and the breach of law.514 Furthermore, estimation with
reference to Sec 287 ZPO requires coherent presentation of evidence for the factual
504See sentence 4 and 5 of Sec 33(3) GWB.
505See S Grundmann, ‘§ 246 Gesetzlicher Zinssatz’ (n 500) paras 2, 33-8with further references;
S Grundmann, ‘§ 247 Basiszinssatz’ at para 3; German Federal Parliament (Bunedstag),
Document 14/6040 at 126.
506Sec 288(1) BGB.
507Sec 288(2) BGB.
508V Emmerich (n 465) at para 76.
509U Reifner, ‘Das Zinseszinsverbot im Verbraucherkredit’ [1992] NJW 337, 339;
Cf S Grundmann, ‘§ 248 Zinseszinsen’ at para 1.
510OLG Ko¨ln OLGZ 1992, 472; K Schmidt, ‘Das ”Zinseszinsverbot”. Sinnwandel, Geltungs-
anspruch und Geltungsgrenzen’ [1982] JZ 829, 831; S Schaub, ‘§ 248 BGB Zinseszinsen’ in
HP Westermann (ed), Erman Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch (14th edn, Otto Schmidt 2014);
Cf T Bezzenberger, ‘Das Verbot des Zinseszinses’ (2002) 32 WM 1617, 1621-2, 1626; C Gru¨neberg,
‘§ 248 Zinseszinsen’ in O Palandt (ed), Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch (74th edn, CH Beck 2015) at para 1.
511German Federal Parliament (Bunedstag), Document 14/6040 at p 126.
512Civil procedure code of Germany [2005] BGBl I-3202; See 6.4.2.
513BGHZ 29, 95 at 99-100; BGHZ 29, 217; I Saenger, Zivilprozessordnung (6th edn, Nomos 2015)
§ 287 at para 2; H Pru¨tting, ‘§ 287 Schadensermittlung; Ho¨he der Forderung’ in T Rauscher and
W Kru¨ger (eds), Mu¨nchener Kommentar zur ZPO, vol 1 (4th edn, CH Beck 2013) at para 5.
514H Pru¨tting (n 513) at para 14.
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basis of the estimation.515 However, with reference to the information asymmetry of
evidence in competition law cases, the courts do not impose high requirements on
the presentation of evidence.516 Therefore, Sec 287 ZPO requires a decision of the
court based on an overwhelming likelihood and not as in Sec 286 ZPO the complete
conviction of the judge.517 Usually, that estimation is based on average of its value.518
This estimation mechanism of German law is in line with the regulation in the
European Directive 2014/104/EU.519
3.3.2.3 Culpability of the infringer
Although culpability is meanly a legal term in German criminal law, German
civil law requires a specific link between the infringement and the perpetrator.520
Therefore, this section analyses the necessity and general principles of culpability
and the requirements of culpability under the German law of delicts.
3.3.2.3.1 Necessity and general principles of culpability
To understand the requirements of culpability under the German law of delicts, it
is first necessary to analyse the necessity and general principles of culpability. With
reference to the moral analyses of Aquinas,521 with damage claims having the task
of achieving restitution and punishment, it is necessary for there to be a personal
link between the infringement, i.e. the reason why a person should be punished, and
the infringer, the person that should be punished. Therefore, the German law of
delicts is based on the principle of culpability in order to establish such a link.522
Culpability is hence defined as an act of intention or negligence.523
515See e.g. BGH 1988, 3016; BGHZ 91, 243 at 256; BGH NJW 1987, 909 at 909-10; K Bacher,
‘§ 287 Schadensermittlung; Ho¨he der Forderung’ in V Vorwerk and C Wolf (eds), Beck'scher
Online-Kommentar ZPO (16th edn, CH Beck 2015) at para 17.
516BGH NJW 1992, 2753 (Tchibo/Rolex II); See in general BGH NJW 1998, 1633;
H Pru¨tting (n 513) 14.
517BGH NJW 2008, 2910 at para 18.
518K Bacher (n 515) at para 18.
519See Article 17(1) Directive 2014/104/EU.
520BGHZ 92, 357 at 358; BGHZ 127, 195; E Deutsch, Allgemeines Haftungsrecht (n 520) at
paras 439 ff.
521See above under 2.3.1.3.
522H-P Beno¨hr, ‘Die Entscheidung des BGB fu¨r das Verschuldensprinzip’ (1978) 46 TvR 1
with further references; See G Schiemann, ‘Vorbemerkung’ in HP Westermann (ed), Erman
Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch (14th edn, Otto Schmidt 2014) at para 4; E Deutsch, Allgemeines
Haftungsrecht (n 520) at paras 5 ff., 376; C Katzenmeier, ‘Vorbemerkung zu §§ 823 ff’ in
B Dauner-Lieb and W Langen (eds), BGB | Schuldrecht (2nd edn, Nomos 2012) at para 18, 20; See
as well the analysis of R v. Jhering, Das Schuldmoment im ro¨mischen Privatrecht (Bru¨hl 1867)
that builds the theoretical basis of the regulation of the BGB, Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines
bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuches fu¨r das deutsche Reich. Amtliche Ausgabe, vol 1 (J Guttentag 1888)
at 281.
523C Katzenmeier (n 522) at 18.
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In this way, the principle of culpability is an outflow of the concept of individual
responsibility for wilful, careless and damaging conduct.524 Furthermore, culpability
restricts the general liability of individuals for their behaviour.525 Because culpability
requires at least negligence, an individual that cannot, in all conscience, foresee the
damaging impact of their conduct is not liable for the damages. Otherwise, every
individual would face an unforeseeable amount of possible damages.526 In doing so,
the principle of culpability is also a result of the principle of general freedom of
action and the freedom of contracts as its specific outflow.527 That is based on the
idea of the autonomous personality and a corresponding social image in German
law.528
Consequently, the link between the amount of damages and the infringement of
a right, interest or statutory duty requires no culpability because the amount of
damages is not linked to the conduct of an individual.529 Therefore, the infringer
must ‘know’ that he infringed a right, interest or statutory duty but does not have
to know that damages arise and to what extent.530 The link between the damage
and the infringement is thus based on the principle of causation.531 In contrast to
German criminal law, civil law causation is not fully described by the legal phrase
conditio sine qua non.532 In addition, civil law causation requires adequacy. This
means that an outcome is only based causally on conduct if the conduct usually
and only under specific extremely singular or unlikely conditions submits to such an
outcome.533 Therefore, the conduct has to be adapted to this outcome534 or at least
significantly increase the probability of the outcome.535 Consequently, the criterion
of adequacy only excepts injuries completely outside the anticipatory process from
individual liability.536
3.3.2.3.2 Requirements of culpability under German law of delicts and
524E Deutsch, Allgemeines Haftungsrecht (n 520) at paras 5 ff., 376; S Meder, Schuld, Zufall,
Risiko – Untersuchungen struktureller Probleme privatrechtlicher Zurechnung (Klostermann 1993)
274 ff.
525C Katzenmeier (n 522) at 19.
526E Deutsch, Allgemeines Haftungsrecht (n 520) at para 368.
527D Medicus and S Lorenz, Schuldrecht I: Allgemeiner Teil; ein Studienbuch (20th edn,
CH Beck 2012) at para 357.
528R Schulze, ‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ in R Schulze (ed), Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch
(8th edn, CH Beck 2014) at para 2.
529BGHZ 75, 328 (Haareziehen) at 329; E Deutsch, Allgemeines Haftungsrecht (n 520) at
paras 47, 52.
530G Spindler (n 466) at para 2.
531C-W Canaris (n 474) at paras 27, 33.
532C Schubert (n 479) at paras 50-2.
533BGHZ 59, 139; BGH NJW 1976, 1143 at 1144; BGH NJW 2002, 2232 at 2233.
534BGHZ 26, 69 at 76; BGH NJW 1990, 2882 at 2883.
535BGHZ 57, 245 at 255.
536See e.g. BGH NJW 2002, 2232 at 2233; C Schubert (n 479) at para 51.
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German civil law in general
Transferred to the regulation of Sec 823 BGB, the infringement of a right
or interest (Sec 823(1) BGB) or the scope of a protection act, i.e. statutory
duty (Sec 823(2) BGB) is required. With regard to an infringement of a statutory
duty, Sec 823(2) BGB requires culpability even if the protection act itself does not.537
On the other hand, the lex specialis Sec 33 GWB is analogously formulated and
requires also a culpable conduct.
The requirements of culpability itself are regulated in Sec 276 BGB. The section
regulates the culpability consistently for the whole German Civil Code. Culpability
itself is not defined in the German Civil Code but its meaning can be ascertained by
reference to the legislative history538 and the structure of the law539 where culpability
is the generic term for both forms of conduct in sentence 1 of Sec 276(1) BGB:
intention and negligence.540 On the other hand, culpability is defined by legal scholars
as an unlegal conduct in breach of one's duty that is subjectively reproachable.541
Therefore, the first requirement is that the conduct is considered unlegal.542 This
is defined as any conduct that infringes legally protected rights or interests without
justification.543 This is implied by the legal infringement.
Secondly, it is necessary for the infringer to be legally sane and criminally
liable because the establishment of culpability is the imputation of an unlegal
conduct.544 With reference to sentence 2 of Sec 276(1) BGB, the rulings of Secs 827
and 828 BGB are applicable and, even without expressly naming it, Sec 829 BGB.545
In competition law cases, the legal debate over the applicability of Sec 829 BGB is
almost irrelevant and it is not necessary to analyse it in any depth.
After analysing the possibility of establishing a link based on the culpability of
the infringer, one of the kinds of culpability of sentence 1 of Sec 276(1) BGB has to
be proved. The law does not define the first possibility, that of intention.546 Legal
scholars and the case law have defined it for civil law as a sophisticated, i.e. with
537See e.g. BGH NJW 2008, 3565 (Clone-CD) at para 25.
538See , Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuches fu¨r das deutsche Reich.
Amtliche Ausgabe at 281.
539See German Federal Parliament (Bunedstag), Document 14/6040 at 131.
540R Schulze (n 528) at para 3; A Stadler, ‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ in
R Stu¨rner (ed), Jauernig, Kommentar zum BGB (14th edn, CH Beck 2014) at para 10.
541C Gru¨neberg, ‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ at para 5; A Stadler, ‘§ 276
Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ (n 540) at para 10.
542HP Westermann, ‘§ 276 BGB Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ at para 4; A Stadler, ‘§ 276
Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ (n 540) at para 13.
543R Schulze (n 528) at para 4.
544S Lorenz, ‘§ 276 BGB’ at para 5.
545R Schulze (n 528) at para 5 with reference to [1982] NJW 1150 (Federal Court of Justice of
Germany); S Grundmann, ‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ at para 166; C Gru¨neberg,
‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ (n 541) at para 6; Cf E Bo¨hmer, ‘Anwendung
von § 829 BGB bei außerdeliktischen Schadensersatzfa¨llen’ [1967] NJW 865; A Stadler, ‘§ 276
Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ (n 540) at para 12; S Lorenz, ‘§ 276 BGB’ (n 544) at para 5.
546R Schulze (n 528) at para 6.
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the knowledge of wrongdoing, and voluntative, i.e. the willingness of wrongdoing,
expression of free conduct to achieve the goal, i.e. the infringement of the law.547 At
least, this is given if the infringer foresees the infringement as possible and approves
it eventually (dolus eventualis).548 This awareness is missing if the infringer has
deluded itself based on a legal or factual basis, e.g. if the infringer does not know
all the necessary facts that lead to the infringement of the law or if the infringer
reasonably thinks that the infringement is legal.549
On the other hand, the more relevant idea of sentence 1 of Sec 276(1) BGB
is culpability based on negligence.550 Negligence in German civil law is defined in
Sec 276(2) BGB. A person acts negligently if he fails to exercise reasonable care. In
doing so, negligence requires foreseeability and preventability of the infringement.551
These criteria can also be described as a sophisticated, i.e. foreseeable, and
voluntative, i.e. preventable,552 element of negligence. The standard for negligence
is an objective care level of care,553 adjusted to the relevant sector of the public.554
What this all amounts to is that culpability requires at least negligence and hence
the foreseeability and preventability of an infringement based on a conduct that is
not justified.
3.3.2.4 Conclusion
In summary, it can be said that Sec 33(3) GWB is the central regulation about civil
damage claims based on an infringement of European as well as national competition
law under German law. Although Sec 33(3) GWB is lex specialis, the established
legal practice of Sec 823 BGB – the general norm on damage claims in the German
law of delicts – is still applicable. This is all the more so because Sec 823(2) BGB
was directly applicable to claims based on an infringement of European competition
law until 2005.
Besides an infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU (or the equivalent regulation
of Sec 1 or Secs 19-21 GWB), Sec 33(3) GWB requires the proof of damages to be
causally based on the infringement and the culpability of the infringer.
547BGHZ 115, 299; HP Westermann, ‘§ 276 BGB Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ (n 542) at
paras 8-9; R Schulze (n 528) at para 6; A Stadler, ‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ (n 540)
at para 15; See as well in detail S Grundmann, ‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ (n 545)
at paras 150-63.
548BGHZ 117, 363; A Stadler, ‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ (n 540) at paras 18, 24.
549R Schulze (n 528) at paras 7, 12.
550S Grundmann, ‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ (n 545) at para 50.
551R Schulze (n 528) at para 10.
552See e.g. BGHZ NJW-RR 1996, 981; F-C Schroeder, ‘Die Fahrla¨ssigkeit als Erkennbarkeit der
Tatbestandsverwirklichung’ (1989) 17 JZ 776.
553BGH NJW 2001, 1786; BGH NJW-RR 1996, 981.
554See e.g. BGHZ 92, 296 at 402; BGHZ 31, 367; S Grundmann, ‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des
Schuldners’ (n 545) at paras 57-9; R Schulze (n 528) at para 14.
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In contrast to English law, although the general principle of restitution under
German law is the restitution in kind, the main kind of restitution in German
competition law is the restitution in money. Furthermore, the general opinion in the
legal scholarship of Germany is that the principle of shared benefits by calculating
the amount of damages is illegal even if the German lawgivers did not come to a
final decision on this. Moreover, the ORWI decision of the Federal Court of Justice
of Germany leads to the conclusion that they would support the inapplicability of
the passing-on defence as well as the in-applicability of Sec 254(2) BGB. On the
other hand, Sec 287 ZPO allows the estimation of damages by the court and, with
reference to the information asymmetry of evidence in competition law cases, the
courts do not impose high requirements on the presentation of evidence as a basis
for the estimation.
In conclusion, the German law of delicts and hence Sec 33(3) GWB requires
the culpability, i.e. at least negligence and an unjustified conduct, of the infringer.
This is necessary because the principle of culpability is an outflow of the concept
of individual responsibility for wilful, careless and damaging conduct. In doing so,
culpability restricts the general liability of individuals for their behaviour.
Therefore, the link between the amount of damages and the infringement of
a right, interest or statutory duty requires no culpability because the amount of
damages is not linked to the conduct of an individual. The link between the damage
and the infringement is thus based on the principle of causation.
3.4 Classification of damage claims based on the
breach of competition law in English law and
its requirements
After analysing the legal requirements for a successful damage claim based on an
infringement of European competition law under the German law of delicts, this
section highlighted the corresponding regulations under English law.
Firstly, it examined the distinction between damage claims based on unjust
enrichment, the law of torts and the law of contracts. With reference to the concept
of contractual freedom and an underpinning concept of justice, the first section
showed, on the one hand, the legal and theoretical differences between the legal
concepts and, on the other hand, it defined the purpose of tort law as a central
mechanism of restitution under English law.
Secondly, the section argued in favour of a damage claim based on an
infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU as a claim based on the law of torts, especially
as a claim based on a breach of statutory duties. This was done by setting out the
requirements for a successful claim, especially the requirement of a liable breach
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of a statutory provision and the degree of fault in a tort law claim based on
an infringement of European competition law in contrast to a common tort law
claim. Finally, the section highlighted, in comparison with the German law, the
classification of damages and restitution under the English law of torts, and analysed
the principles of estimation of losses and presumption of damage as a shift in the
burden of proof to the defendant and as a different system to the estimation system
under German law.
3.4.1 Distinction between damage claims based on unjust
enrichment, torts and contract
In contrast to civil law, common law is characterised by no major codification555 and
no coherent system of damage claims.556 The whole legal system is shaped by case
law and deals more with practical considerations of justice in particular cases and
less with a coherent system of principles and mechanisms. Slightly different to the
normal principle of legal precedent, in tort law the courts are more easily content not
to refer to previous cases in only slightly different situations and establish a system
of chased claims.557
Just as with the civil law system, the common law system is not used consistently
across all common law countries.558 Therefore, it is also necessary to choose one
country as an object of analysis. English law, as the first common law country in the
world, seems particularly suited to this purpose. Based on the Norman conquest of
England in 1066,559 the English legal system has been delineated as a common law
system since 1189.560
Notwithstanding the advanced development of common law in the 12th and
13th centuries, the rediscovery of Roman law has had some influence on English law.
However, this has been much less so than in continental Europe.561 Early judges, such
as Ranulf de Glanvill (1112-1190)562 and Henry de Bracton (1210-1268),563 had been
educated in Roman law and especially in Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis (see 3.3.1
555K Schmidt, ‘Anhang 2’ in U Immenga and E-J Mestma¨cker (eds), Wettbewerbsrecht, vol 1
(5th edn, CH Beck 2012) at para 28.
556M Siems (n 356) 44 ff., 65; AWB Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law (Clarendon
Press 1996) 195 ff. with further references; N Jansen (n 381) 185; JG Fleming (n 462) 7-8; Approach
of a coherent system by R Zimmermann (n 398) 913-4; P Cane, The anatomy of tort law (n 556)
21-2.
557See the concept of liability things which escape from one’s land regardless of culpability that
is in contrast to the usual concept of liability under English law: S Deakin, A Johnston and
B Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law (7th edn, OUP 2012) 18 ff.; JG Fleming (n 462)
7-8; AWB Simpson (n 556) 195 ff.
558R Zimmermann (n 398) 913-4.
559M Siems (n 356) 43-4; 65, 202 ff.
560RC van Caenegem (n 386).
561Ibid 89 ff.; P Stein (n 385) 223 ff.
562U Ziegenbein (n 385) 73.
563R de Glanvill (n 383); Bracton also refers to the work of Glanvill as a primary source.
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at the end).564 Even if there was a massive reduction in the referencing of Roman
law after the time of Bracton, Roman law has still had some influence on common
law.565
Whereas unjust enrichment, tort and contracts are legal events, restitution is
the attached legal response.566 Therefore, restitution and unjust enrichment, torts
as well as contracts (restitution for wrongs) are not synonymous.567 In the law of
competition, a wrongdoing – where the law of contracts or law of torts regulates
the claim – is usually connected with an unjust enrichment. Therefore, it is not
uncommon that both claims – restitution for unjust enrichment and for contracts
or torts – are possible although contracts and torts have multiple, heterogenous
responses, for example, compensation, restitution and punishment.568 On the one
hand, the law of contracts regulates damages referring to the performance or
non-performance of a contractual agreement. Considering the concept of justice,
the law of contracts is rather a manifestation of the Roman principle of pacta
sunt servanda and a claim is related to the breach of this principle. Therefore, the
claim is rather linked to Aristotle’s concept of voluntary contractual justice (iustitia
commutativa) and is comparable with §§ 280 ff. of the German Civil Code. On
the other hand, the law of torts deals generally with the injury of rights and
interests – contractual as well as non-contractual – and is slightly comparable with
§§ 823 ff. of the German Civil Code.569 Although there is no general clause,570 the
law of torts can be linked to the whole concept of corrective justice with voluntary
as well as non-voluntary contractual justice as different approaches of corrective
justice.571
Moreover, with reference to the concept of contractual freedom, common law
lawyers in particular distinguish between contract law and law of torts in terms
of the voluntariness of the relevant obligations. Obligations imposed by law are
generally a matter of tort law whereas voluntarily agreed obligations constitute the
law of contract.572 In modern times, the law of torts is complemented by the law of
quasi-contracts or of restitution.
On the other hand, tort law concerns the freedom to act. It is argued that the
general aim of tort law is to find a balance between the freedom of the injurer to act
564H de Bracton (n 384); Justinian (n 387); H de Bracton (n 384) 46 (introduction by
GE Woodbine).
565K Gu¨terbock (n 387), 35-8; U Ziegenbein (n 385) 73.
566P Stein (n 385) 223 ff.
567P Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: an Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 UWAustlLRev 1,
17-20.
568F Giglio (n 157) 15 with further references.
569See above unter 3.3.2.
570P Birks (n 567) 17-20.
571See above under 3.1.2.
572J Lord Steyn (n 174) 4.
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and the freedom of the victim from the acting of an injurer.573 The claims are built up
around the principles of compensation for losses, disgorgement of gains, expression
of disapproval and punishment, and special and general deterrence.574 Given the
influence of Roman law, the question arises whether there is an underpinning concept
of justice in tort law to solve this task (based on Roman law and Greek philosophy):
Does the law of torts consist of a fundamental general principle that it is
wrongful to cause harm to other persons in the absence of some specific
ground of justification or excuse, or does it consist of a number of specific
rules prohibiting certain kinds of harmful activity, and leaving all the residue
outside the sphere of legal responsibility?575
After the decision of Donoghue v Stevenson576 it seems to be clear that tort law
adopts human ethical principles to organise and interpret social life:577
The liability for negligence . . . is no doubt based upon a general public
sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. But acts
or omissions, which any moral code would censure, cannot in the practical
world be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to
demand relief . . . The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in
law: You must not injure your neighbour . . . 578
The discussion is usually between the two extremes of essentialists, those who
say that the existence and concept of tort law can only be justified by the principle
that people should not wrong others by their actions,579 and those who see the
justification of tort law in a so-called ‘economic efficiency’ (defined as allocation of
scarce recources to their most productive use).580 It is unnecessary to rule on the
question of which approach is preferable because both opinions are based on the same
ethical principles of compensation, retribution and deterrence.581 Therefore, tort law
has two purposes: compensation of victims who have suffered loss as a result of civil
wrongs and control of wrongdoing and supplement to criminal law (the latter is
sometimes seen as the central function of tort law).582
573PS Atiyah, ‘Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations’ (n 437) 10.
574P Cane, The anatomy of tort law (n 556) 14-5.
575Ibid 206-7.
576[1932] AC 562.
577RFV Heuston and RA Buckley, Salmond and Heuston on the law of torts (21st edn,
Sweet & Maxwell 1996) 8-9.
578P Cane, The anatomy of tort law (n 556) 21-2, 24.
579Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 at 580 by Atkin LJ.
580E Weinrib (n 157) 4.
581P Cane, The anatomy of tort law (n 556) 210.
582B Chapman, ‘Ethical Issues in the Law of Tort’ in MD Bayles and B Chapman (eds), Justice,
Rights, and Tort Law (Reidel 1983) 13 ff.; J Lord Steyn (n 174) 3; McFarlane v Tayside Health
Board [2000] 2 AC 59 at 82 by Steyn LJ; Keren-Paz, Tsachi, Torts, egalitarianism, and distributive
justice (Ashgate 2007) p 5 ff.; Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52;
[2004] 1 AC 309; [2003] 3 WLR 1091; [2003] 4 All ER 987 at para 4; slightly critisied by J Gardner,
‘What is tort law for? Part 1: the place of corrective justice’ (2011) 30 Law Philos 1, 5 who sees
corrective and distributive justice equally and J Lord Steyn (n 174) 4-5.
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3.4.2 Competition damage claim as a tortious action related to a
breach of statutory duty
Notwithstanding that contractual as well as non-contractual based claims can arise
related to a breach of competition law, the key aspect of a civil damage claim based
in competition law is the breach of competition law. In Garden Cottage Foods Ltd
v Milk Marketing Board583 the House of Lords decided unambiguously that a claim
based on a breach of European competition law has to be characterised as a claim
based on torts and especially on a breach of statutory duty.
The statutory duty itself can be seen directly in Art 101 or 102 TFEU and with
reference to the case law of the ECJ which imposes direct effects of EU competition
law584 or in section 2(1) European Communities Act 1972 which regulates the direct
effect in the English legal system.
Different to the normal damage claim based on the breach of a statutory duty
under English tort law, the claim based on a breach of competition law (national
and European) can be brought before the High Court of Justice (Chancery
Division) and the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) which was established by
the Competition Act 1998. Since the amendments of the Competition Act 1998
by the Enterprise Act 2002, the CAT is entitled to award damages after the
English competition authority, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) or the European
Commission has declared an infringement.585
Therefore, this section analyses the requirements for a successful tort law claim
based on a breach of statutory duties. After highlighting the central provisions
about the breach of the statutory provision, the section classifies the damages
and the possibility of restitution under English law. After doing so, the section
analyses whether there is a provision about estimation of damages and culpability
in English civil procedure law and whether it is possible and necessary to transfer
the German provision into English law through the implementation of the European
Directive 2014/104/EU or if the proposed English law is more convincing.
3.4.2.1 Requirement of a liable breach of a statutory provision
In its decision X and Others v Bedfordshire County Council586 the House of Lords
held that a claim based on a breach of a statutory provision has to show that
the infringer is liable for the infringement. For that liability, the House of Lords
developed four categories of a breach of statutory provision: firstly, strict liability,
i.e. the liability for a breach irrespective of carelessness of the infringer; secondly, the
583[1984] 1 AC 130 by Diplock LJ. Before that decision, the natur of the claim was sometimes
suggested as being ‘unjust enrichment’.
584T Keren-Paz (n 582) 5 ff.; applied by BRT v SABAM ; Courage v Crehan.
585See Sec 47A Competition Act 1998.
586X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 AC 633.
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careless performance of a duty imposed by a statutory provision if there is no other
right of action; thirdly, the liability because of a duty of care in common law arising
from an imposition of duty by a statutory provision; and finally, liability because of
a misfeasance in public office.
Furthermore, the House of Lords decided that a private law cause of action
based on strict liability only arises when the relevant statutory provision protects
the particular class of claimant and provides a private remedy.587 It is necessary for
the provisions not only to confer a general public benefit but also to create individual
rights for the party.588
Such a statutory provision can be seen in Art 101 and 102 TFEU. Therefore, it
is necessary that the duty protects the plaintiff’s class of persons. With reference to
the interpretation of Art 101 and 102 TFEU by the European Court,589 Art 101 and
102 TFEU protects every individual because they create directly effective rights for
all individuals.590
3.4.2.2 Degree of fault in a tort law claim based on an infringement of
European competition law
As well as looking at the duty imposed by a statutory provision and the class
of protected individuals, it is necessary to analyse the degree of fault required to
establish a breach of the imposed duty. This has to be argued with reference to
the statutory provision. For this purpose, it is necessary to distinguish between
regulations imposing absolute duties and qualified duties.591 Absolute duties are
obligations which can be breached without any fault. It is, therefore, not necessary
for the infringer to act negligently or carelessly.592 On the other hand, qualified
duties require a fault similar to that of negligence.593
Transferred to European competition law, Art 101 TFEU requires no fault
of a breach.594 The wording of Art 101(1) TFEU requires that the act has the
infringement of the provision as its object or effect. Therefore, English tort law
587Island Records Ltd v Corkindale [1978] Ch 122.
588Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No. 2) [1982] AC 173; C Elliott and F Quinn, Tort law
(8th edn, Longman 2011) 196.
589See e.g. BRT v SABAM ; applied by Courage v Crehan; Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub Company
[2003] EWHC 1510 (Chancery Division).and above under 3.2.
590See Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130; Sec 2(1) European
Communities Act 1972; See Commission, Executive summary and overview of the national report
for the United Kingdom (<http://eceuropaeu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/
executive_summaries/united_kingdom_enpdf> accessed 01/03/2016).
591C Elliott and F Quinn, Tort law, 200.
592See Galashiels Gas Co Ltd v Millar [1949] AC 275.
593See McCarthy v Coldair [1951] 2 TLR 1226 (Court of Appeal).
594Case T-34/92 Fiatagri UK Ltd and New Holland Ford Ltd v Commission of the European
Communities [1994] ECR II-905 at para 49; IFTRA rules for producers of virgin aluminium
(IV/27000) Commission Decision number 75/497/EEC [1975] OJ L228/3 at 8.
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applies the strict liability of the infringer to the breach of Art 101 TFEU and requires
no additional fault.
On the other hand, the loss and damage of the claimant has to be covered
by the infringed statute.595 This general rule is suspended in a claim based on
the infringement of European competition law. The requirement to prove that the
damage is in the scope of Art 101 or 102 TFEU is against the concept of effet utile
and therefore against European law.596
Therefore, the English law on causation is applicable, and it is thus necessary
to prove a causal link between the infringement of the statutory provision and the
claimed damage.597 This is a significant simplification for the claimant in competition
law cases. Futhermore, the High Court decided that the causal link is given unless
there is evidence about an autonomous intervention of the claimant.598
3.4.2.3 Classification of damages and restitution under
English law of torts
Under the English law of torts, the main awarded remedies are damages, account of
profits as well as specific performance and rectification of contract. To quantify the
suffered harm, the courts apply the established common law rules. This is especially
if it requires remoteness, i.e. foreseeability of the suffered harm by the infringer.
Furthermore, the claim of actual loss, including the loss of profit as well as the
reduction in value of a business has to be supported by cogent expert evidence.599
Furthermore, the courts are entitled to grant interim remedies, especially interim
and freezing injunctions as well as preservation or search orders. The basic test for
these interim measures is whether the case has a real prospect of success and the
consideration between the situations where an injunction has been granted and the
claim failed and where an injunction has not been granted and the claim succeeded
in trial.600
On the other hand, in contrast to German law, it is not yet decided whether a
passing-on defence is permitted under the English law of torts or a part of the
595Gorris v Scott [1873-74] LR 9 Ex 125.
596See e.g. Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub Co (CPC) [2004] EWCA Civ 637 (on appeal to the House
of Lords).
597See in detail M Gray et al, EU competition law – procedures and remedies (OUP 2006) at
para 918 with further references.
598Yesheskel Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd & Others [2003] EuLR 287 (High Court) by Coleman J
(obiter); M Gray et al, EU competition law, at para 536.
599See e.g. the synopsis in Commission, Executive summary and overview of the national report
for the United Kingdom.
600Simon Carves v Ensus UK [2011] EWHC 657 (TCC) by Edward-Stuart J; American
Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd (No. 1) [1975] AC 396 by Diplock LJ.
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quantification of loss.601 Although the CAT marked this topic as a ‘novel and
important issue’,602 there is no established case law on it.603
3.4.2.4 Estimation of losses and presumption of damage as shifting the
burden of proof
Although damages can be fairly predictably calculated under English law based on
existing guidelines for pain and suffering,604 the lack of a rebuttable presumption
under English law of torts or the possibility of estimation of losses leads to a
disincentive for victims to litigate against cartelists.605
A regulation about a rebuttable presumption reduces the necessity of providing
extensive economic evidence about the suffered harm and hence reduces the cost
and time as well as encourages the possibility to provide the evidence, especially
for small and medium sized victims usually near the end of a distribution chain,
e.g. consumers.606 On the other hand, a presumption of damage shifts the burden
of proof to the defendant. That would be a logical consequence of the information
asymmetry mentioned above.607 It is also an interpretation of the burden of proof
itself. As mentioned above, it is a general principle in an adversary system that the
party has to prove the facts that are beneficial to its claim. However, this ruling
is built on the understanding that the claimant is in possession of the relevant
evidence.608 Therefore, in a case of information asymmetry it can be justified to
shift the burden of proof to the defendant.609
Whereas the German Civil Procedure Law relies on an estimation of damages
by the court,610 the English lawgivers endorse a presumption of damages.611 The
main distinction between the proposed English law and the German law is that
under German law the claimant has to provide evidence for the factual basis of the
601D Sheehan, ‘Passing On, Indirect Purchasers and Loss Allocation between Claimants’
[2012] LMCLQ 261.
602CL Old Co Ltd v Aventis SA (Security for Costs) [2005] CAT 2.
603The claim has been settled prior to the substantive hearing of the CAT and therefore
the CAT did not rule on it; See as well BIS, Private Actions in Competition Law: A Consultation
on Options for Reform (2012) 25 (<https://wwwgovuk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/31528/12-742-private-actions-in-competition-law-consultation
pdf> accessed 01/03/2016).
604See the overview in Commission, Executive summary and overview of the national report for
the United Kingdom.
605BIS 24.
606See Ibid.
607See above under 3.1.2.
608See above under 3.1.1.
609BIS 24.
610See above under 3.3.2.2.4.
611See BIS 24.
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damage and the court itself only estimates the value of the damage based on the
evidence and does not estimate the existence of the damage itself.612
The English lawgivers, on the other hand, want to introduce a rebuttable
presumption of loss. It is proposed that such a regulation could be a presumption
that a cartel had increased its prices by a fixed amount, e.g. 20%.613 Although it is
obvious that damage caused by an infringement of competition law varies from case
to case, the economic literature suggests that 20% is the average minimum price
increase based on a cartel.614
3.4.2.5 Conclusion
In summary, it can be said that a damage claim based on an infringement of Art 101
or 102 TFEU has to be classified as a claim based on the law of torts, especially on
a breach of statutory duties. With reference to the case law of the House of Lords, it
is clear that Art 101 and 102 TFEU are provisions that create individual rights and
are hence a possible basis for such a claim. Furthermore, Art 101 and 102 TFEU
protects every individual and, thus, every individual is entitled to bring a claim to
the court and to enforce European competition law through private litigations.
Although the requirement to provide a link between the infringement and the
damage is a significant simplification for the claimant in competition law cases, it
is still necessary to bring evidence about a causal link between the infringement of
Art 101 or 102 TFEU and the suffered damage. For the quantification of the damage,
the English lawgivers want to introduce a rebuttable presumption of loss based on a
presumption that a cartel had increased its prices by a fixed amount. With reference
to the Communication on the quantification of harm by the European Commission,
that solution could help to improve private enforcement of European competition
law.
3.5 Conclusion
It would seem that German and English law found a way to handle the information
asymmetry in competition law cases regarding the burden of proof in civil damage
claims based on an infringement of Art 101 and 102 TFEU. Although both
jurisdictions classify the claim as a tortious claim and so based on the German
612See Sec 287 ZPO; H Pru¨tting (n 513) at para 14; BGH NJW 1988, 3016; BGHZ 91, 243 at 256;
BGH NJW 1987, 909 at 909-10; K Bacher (n 515) at para 17.
613BIS 24.
614AP Komninos (ed) Quantifying antitrust damages – Towards non-binding guidance for courts
(Publications Office of the European Union 2009): increase between 20 and 35 per cent; JM Connor
and RH Lande, ‘The Size of Cartel Overcharges: Implications for US and EU Fining Policies’
(2006) 51 Antitrust Bull 983: increase between 28 and 54 per cent in the EU and 18 to 37 per cent
in the US.
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law of delicts or the English law of torts, the requirements for a successful damage
claim differ.
Firstly, the burden of proof itself as an expression of fair proceeding is a central
rule of German and English civil procedure. However, this adversarial system and
the chosen burden of proof is not an outcome of Art 6 ECHR but it is generally
accepted as a principle of fair proceeding that each party has the burden to prove
all facts that are the basis of that party’s case. That can be justified because it is
the claimant that is usually in possession of the relevant evidence.
One central problem of this burden of proof is the quantification of damage
and the need for evidence for it. Under German law, Sec 287 ZPO allows the
estimation of damages by the court. Moreover, with reference to the information
asymmetry of evidence in competition law cases, the courts do not impose high
requirements on the presentation of evidence as a basis for the estimation. On the
other hand, the ORWI decision of the Federal Court of Justice of Germany leads
to the conclusion that it would support the inapplicability of the passing-on defence
under German law. Whereas the first is compatible with the Directive 2014/104/EU
and also recognises the Communication and Practical Guide of the European
Commission on quantification of harm, the latter has to be amended with reference
to the adverse Art 13 or Directive 2014/104/EU which requires that the Member
States shall ensure that the passing-on defence is applicable.
Under English law, the claimant has to provide evidence for a causal link between
the infringement and the damage. For the quantification of the damage itself, the
English lawgivers want to introduce a rebuttable presumption of loss based on the
presumption that a cartel had increased its prices by a fixed amount. With reference
to the Communication on the quantification of harm by the European Commission,
that solution could help to improve private enforcement of European competition
law.
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4. Follow-on claims and access to files as
central mechanisms to fine-tune the
relationship between public and private
enforcement of competition law
The last chapter made it clear that burden of proof is the crucial element in
attempts to fine-tune the relationship between private and public enforcement of
European competition law. The success of a private claim based on an infringement
of European competition law depends directly on the capability of the claimant to
provide relevant evidence.615 Therefore, pre-action access to this evidence is the main
obstacle to establishing effective competition law enforcement.
With reference to this, the European Union has stressed the need to improve
the ability of claimants to gain access to relevant information. However, it is also
apprehensive about the negative effects, especially the possibility of overly-broad
and burdensome disclosure obligations, including the risk of abuse and interference
in the European leniency regime.616 Furthermore, as Stakheyeva argues, the law has
to consider the general principle of protection of confidential business information.617
Besides the possibility of gaining access to files in the possession of the defendant,
it should be considered that much evidence of an infringement of competition law
can be found in the files that underpin the infringement decision of the competition
authority. Therefore, a private claimant would benefit from gaining access to these
files to support its damages claim. However, the competition authorities have to
consider issues of confidentiality related to leniency applications in order to provide
an effective public enforcement of competition law.
With reference to the different legal evaluations and practicability, there are two
main categories of disclosure: the pre-action disclosure of files in the possession of
the defendant, and access to the files of the competition authorities.
It is possible to claim damages based on an infringement of competition law
either as a stand-alone or as a follow-on claim under both English and German law.
615See as well H Stakheyeva (n 152) 403.
616See European Commission, ‘White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust
rules’ COM(2008) 165 final at para 2.2.
617H Stakheyeva (n 152) 403.
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For a stand-alone claim, it is necessary for the claimant to prove an infringement
of competition law on its own because there has been no proceedings involving a
national competition authority or the European Commission.
Under English law, this claim can be brought before the High Court and from
October 2015 before the CAT. It can be mentioned that the High Court will look
to refer these cases to the CAT from 1st October 2015 to streamline actions. Under
German law, stand-alone cases are normal civil damage claims. The default rule is
that a civil damage claim has to be brought to the Amtsgericht or the Landgericht.
With reference to Section 23 GVG,618 the Amtsgericht is competent to hear damage
claims up to e5,000 if there is no special competence in one of the two courts.
Section 87 GWB rules that the Landgericht has the exclusive jurisdiction to decide
on all civil claims based on an infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU or the national
competition regulations without any restriction on the amount of the dispute.
However, if a national competition authority or the Commission has already
proved an infringement of competition law (follow-on claim), the claimant is able to
use this finding for its own civil damage claim. This relates to the question of the
effect of competition authorities’ decisions in follow-on claims. If it has a binding
effect, there is no need for the claimant to prove again an infringement of competition
law – something which is quite attractive to claimants and produces a lower adverse
costs risk. Under English law, the case can be brought before the High Court or
the CAT and under German law before the Landgericht. However, in both types of
cases, the claimant has to prove the loss and causation.
This chapter will show that no direct, applicable European law exists that
regulates access to files that are in the possession of the defendant and that only
the accessibility of files in the possession of the European Commission is regulated
by European law. As such, this chapter deals with the access to documents of
the European Commission of the preliminary public proceeding by referring to
Art 27(2) Regulation (EC) 1/2003,619 Art 15 Regulation (EC) 773/2004620 and
Regulation (EC) 1049/2001,621 as well as the impact of Directive 2014/104/EU on
national laws about access to files of the competition authorities.
One aim of this section is to show that parties to the administrative action have
access to documents under Regulation (EC) 1/2003 and Regulation (EC) 773/2004
but not victims and, thus, plaintiffs in civil damage claims. In addition, there is no
right to access documents about business secrets or other confidential information.
Another aim is to analyse the provisions in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. These allow
618Courts Constitution Act 1975 (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [1975] BGBl I-1077).
619Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1.
620Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty [2004] OJ L123/18.
621Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [2001] OJ L145/43.
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every EU citizen to access documents of the European institutions and illustrate the
exceptions of the general provision in Art 4(2) Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.
Another crucial point in examining the scope of access to Commission files is
to determine whether the files of a leniency application are accessible for plaintiffs
or if they fall under an exception. To do this, the section critically examines the
position of the Commission which is that public access to leniency applications
compromises public and private interests, e.g. the protection and purpose of
dawn raids. Furthermore, the chapter outlines the recent decisions of the ECJ in
Commission v EnBW 622 in relation to access to documents in the Commission’s
leniency regime.623
Furthermore, the chapter will consider the fact that, on a national level, German
and English law place different emphases on access to files in the possession of the
competition authority and the defendant. Whereas German law focuses on follow-on
claims and the access to files in the possession of the competition authorities, English
law focuses on access to files in the possession of the defendant. However, the chapter
will highlight that Directive 2014/104/EU requires the implementation of national
regulations to both forms of gaining access to files. Therefore, the chapter will argue
that both jurisdictions have to change their national regulations to implement the
ruling of Directive 2014/104/EU.
In addition, the section deals with the question of protecting leniency
applicants and the fine-tuning of an effective relationship between private and
public enforcement of European competition law. In doing so, it specifically
deals with the decisions of the ECJ in Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt624 and
Bundeswettbewerbsbeho¨rde v Donau Chemie625 which established a balancing
test that is also applicable in relation to files in the possession of the European
Commission (4.3.1) and in the possession of the defendant (4.1).
Based on the approach in Directive 2014/104/EU and the existing national
regulations in Section 47A(7) and (8) of the Competition Act 1998 which was
subsequently amended by the Enterprise Act 2002 and the corresponding German
regulation in Section 33(4) GWB, the first section outlines the benefits of follow-on
claims and highlights the principles of the binding effect of decisions of public
authorities on civil claims. After defining follow-on claims and their impact on the
effectiveness of private enforcement, the section considers the decision of the ECJ in
622Case C-365/12 P European Commission v EnBW Energie Baden-Wu¨rttemberg AG [2014] 4
CMLR 30 (ECJ).
623Case T-181/10 Reagens SpA v European Commission [2014] 4 CMLR 28 (EGC); Case
T-534/11 Schenker AG v European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2014:854; Case C-280/11 Council
of the European Union v Access Info Europe [2014] 2 CMLR 6 (ECJ).
624Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161.
625Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbeho¨rde v Donau Chemie AG and Others [2013] 5
CMLR 19 (ECJ).
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Masterfoods v HB626 and its impact on the topic. In addition, the first part highlights
the cooperation mechanism of Art 15 and 16 of the EU Regulation 1/2003 and the
provisions in Directive 2014/104/EU. The section will also analyse the influences
of European human rights on the topic as well as the European regulations on the
implementation of Directive 2014/104/EU into national law.
After defining the European requirements in the first section, the second and
third sections will analyse the implementation under English and German law. Both
sections will highlight the different emphases that English and German law place
on gaining access to files in the possession of the defendant (English law) and the
competition authority (German law).627 In the end, each section demonstrates the
need to implement a general right of access to files in the possession of a national
competition authority and a general rule of pre-action disclosure of files in the
possession of the defendant under national law de lege ferenda.
Finally, the chapter argues that follow-on claims can be seen as the most effective
approach to civil proceedings and that there is a need to strengthen the effectiveness
and the implementation of Directive 2014/104/EU into national law.
4.1 European Regulations
4.1.1 Access to files of the competition authorities
4.1.1.1 Access to documents in the possession of the European
Commission and the protection of applicants of the
European leniency programme
Although a claimant in a civil damage claim based on an infringement of Art 101
or 102 TFEU can obviously use whatever information the European Commission
makes public and the published version of the infringement decision may provide
useful information, it often needs further information about the infringement and the
parties.628 This is because the Commission only publishes non-confidential versions
of its decisions as it has to consider ‘the legitimate interest of undertakings in the
protection of their business secrets’.629 In addition to the confidential version of the
infringement decision, the European Commission is usually in possession of many
documents that can support a claimant in a private civil damage claim.
4.1.1.1.1 Access to files of the European Commission under
626Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369.
627See the overview by H Stakheyeva (n 152) 403.
628See N Dunleavy (n 56) 704 at para 3.
629Article 30(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1.
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Regulation (EC) 773/2004
One way of gaining access to the files of the Commission is to receive a
non-confidential version of the Statement of Objections and other files under Art 6(1)
and 15(1) of Regulation (EC) 773/2004. However, this is only possible for claimants
that have been a party in the Commission’s case and neither is the claimant able
to access business secrets or confidential information of third parties.630 Having said
this, with reference to Art 8 and 15(4) of Regulation (EC) 773/2004, the received
document can be used as evidence in a civil damage claim based on an infringement
of Art 101 or 102 TFEU.
4.1.1.1.2 Access to files of the European Commission under
Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 (Transparency Regulation)
An application to gain access to files of the European Commission can be based on
Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, the so-called Transparency Regulation. This regulation
provides the rules that govern the right of every EU citizen to gain access to
documents in the possession of EU institutions. Although the main objective is
to enable public access to documents,631 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 provides a
number of exceptions for when the application can be refused. In Art 4(2), the
Regulation rules that an institution, e.g. the European Commission, can refuse an
application if commercial interests of a natural or legal person; court proceedings
or legal advice; or the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits would be
jeopardised. Furthermore, the case law of the ECJ has established that it is not
sufficient for refusal of access to documents to be based on the fact that the document
is part of the proceedings mentioned in Art 4(2). It is necessary for the Commission
or any other European institution to show the impairment of the protected interests
of Art 4(2) in concrete terms.632
The possibility to refuse an application by referring to commercial interests is
mostly relevant in competition cases because the definition of commercial interest
is wider than the concept of business secrets, which the European Commission
is not entitled to disclose.633 However, in Verein fu¨r Konsumenteninformation
630European Commission, ‘Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in
cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement
and Council regulation (EC) No 139/2004’ [2005] OJ C325/7, para 31; N Dunleavy (n 56) 704 at
para 4.
631Joined cases T-391/03 and T-70/04 Yves Franchet and Daniel Byk v Commission of the
European Communities [2006] ECR II-2023 at para 83; See as well N Dunleavy (n 56) 704 at
para 5.
632See Case C-612/13 P ClientEarth v European Commission [2015] NVwZ 1273 with further
references.
633See Case T-353/94 Postbank v Commission [1996] ECR II-921, [1997] 4 CMLR 33; See
N Dunleavy (n 56) 704 at para 6.
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v Commission634, the General Court (EGC) stated that the exceptions ruled in
Art 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001 have to be applied restrictively and the European
Commission has to consider for each requested document whether a specific and
foreseeable risk to jeopardise a legally protected interest of Art 4(2) would occur if it
was disclosed635 and whether it is possible to allow partial access to the applicant.636
The case centred on a request based on Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 by a
consumer organisation that was pursuing a civil damage claim against members
of the Austrian Banks Cartel in order to gain access to the files in the possession
of the European Commission. The Commission had refused the application because
as far as it was concerned it would be disproportionate for them to be required to
examine each individual document, overall about 47,000 pages. However, the EGC
annulled the decision because the Commission erred in law.
Based upon this, the EGC clarified in E´ditions Odile Jacob SAS v Commission637
that it was necessary to provide a concrete and individual examination of each
requested document before refusing the application.638 On the other hand, in the case
of a third-party document, the Commission must consult the relevant third party
to determine whether the document should be disclosed or not.639 The applicant,
E´ditions Odile Jacob SAS, asked the Commission, pursuant to the Transparency
Regulation, for access to a number of documents related to the administrative
procedure, and this led to the adoption of a merger decision of the Commission to
support its own merger action which was pending before the EGC. The Commission
partly refused the application because of the general possibility that it would
jeopardise an administrative proceeding if documents of a merger control proceeding
were disclosed.640
On this point, the ECJ decided in Sweden v MyTravel and Commission641 that
the European Commission had to explain in detail why a document jeopardised
its decision-making or administrative proceeding. Subsequently, in Commission
v Agrofert Holding642 the ECJ stated that there is a general presumption that the
634Case T-2/03 Verein fu¨r Konsumenteninformation v Commission [2005] ECR II-1121.
635See Joined cases T-391/03 and T-70/04 Yves Franchet and Daniel Byk v Commission
of the European Communities [2006] ECR II-2023; Case T-36/04 Association de la presse
internationale ASBL (API) v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-3201.
636Case T-2/03 Verein fu¨r Konsumenteninformation v Commission [2005] ECR II-1121 at
para 92.
637Case T-237/05 E´ditions Odile Jacob SAS v Commission [2010] ECR II-2245 (on appeal,
Case C-404/10 P Commission v E´ditions Jacob [2012] 5 CMLR 8 (ECJ)).
638Case T-237/05 E´ditions Odile Jacob SAS v Commission [2010] ECR II-2245 at para 123;
See as Case C-365/12 P European Commission v EnBW Energie Baden-Wu¨rttemberg AG [2014] 4
CMLR 30 (ECJ) at para 93; De Stefano G, ‘Access of damage claimants to evidence arising out
of EU cartel investigations: a fast evolving scenario’ [2012] 5(3) GCLR 95 [97-8].
639Case T-237/05 E´ditions Odile Jacob SAS v Commission [2010] ECR II-2245 at para 126.
640See Case T-237/05 E´ditions Odile Jacob SAS v Commission [2010] ECR II-2245 at para 8.
641Case C-506/08 P Kingdom of Sweden v European Commission and MyTravel Group plc
[2011] ECR I-6237.
642Case C-477/10 P European Commission v Agrofert Holding a.s. [2012] 5 CMLR 9.
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scheme instituted by the European merger control regime would be undermined if
persons other than those authorised to access the file by the merger control legislation
gained access based on Regulation 1049/2001.643 Furthermore, those exceptions in
the Transparency Regulation apply for a minimum period of 30 years.644 However,
this presumption does not exclude the possiblilty of demonstrating that a specific
document is not covered by it or that there is a higher public interest of disclosure.645
In Strack v Commission646 the ECJ refined its position by stating that the party
applying for disclosure must prove this higher public interest.647 However, it is not
enough for the Commission to explain that a document is in connection to a specific
administrative proceeding. In ClientEarth v Commission,648 the ECJ stated that
the Commission has to show how the given document jeopardises that specific
proceeding.
Furthermore, if the European Commission refused an application which sought
access to documents on one of the exceptions under Regulation 1049/2001, the
applicant can appeal before the EGC and the ECJ under Art 263 TFEU.649 However,
even if this is a way to request documents in the possession of the European
Commission, the Commission has shown a reluctance to provide documents to a
potential claimant under this provision.650
4.1.1.1.3 Access to files of the European Commission under
Regulation (EC) 1/2003
A national civil court has the right to ask the European Commission for documents
under Art 15 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003. The regulation rules that any national
court, not only a civil court, can request documents in the possession of the European
Commission.651 The ECJ clarified that this includes details of the status of a pending
case as well as all ‘economic and legal information’.652 However, this possibility does
not avoid any reference being made to Art 267 AEUV which entitles a national
court that is also a competition authority to request relevant information from
643Case C-477/10 P European Commission v Agrofert Holding a.s. [2012] 5 CMLR 9 at paras 63-4;
Case C-139/07 P European Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH [2010] ECR I-5885
at para 61.
644Case C-477/10 P European Commission v Agrofert Holding a.s. [2012] 5 CMLR 9 at para 67.
645Case C-477/10 P European Commission v Agrofert Holding a.s. [2012] 5 CMLR 9 at para 68;
C-139/07 P European Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH [2010] ECR I-5885 at
para 62.
646Case C-127/13 P Guido Strack v European Commission [2015] 1 WLR 2649 (ECJ).
647Case C-127/13 P Guido Strack v European Commission [2015] 1 WLR 2649 (ECJ) at para 128.
648Case C-612/13 P ClientEarth v European Commission [2015] NVwZ 1273.
649N Dunleavy (n 56) 704 at para 9.
650N Dunleavy (n 56) 703.
651Art 15(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1.
652Joined cases C-319/93, 40/94 and 224/94 Dijkstra v Friesland (Frico Domo) Coo¨peratie BA
[1995] ECR I-4471 at para 34.
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the Commission.653 This is especially relevant for the CAT in the UK which is a
competition authority and a court that deals with civil damage claims.
However, there have only been a small number of cases where a national
court of a Member State requested files from the Commission under Art 15(1)
of Regulation (EC) 1/2003. In the annual Reports on Competition Policy, the
European Commission has recorded the requests under Art 15(1). Since enacting
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 in May 2004, the Commission has received 13 applications
by national courts requesting information in its possession.654
Figure: 6: Requests under Art 15(1) Regulation (EC) 1/2003 between 2004 and 2014
653D Dalheimer, ‘Art. 15 Zusammenarbeit mit Gerichten der Mitgliedstaaten’ in E Grabitz,
M Hilf and M Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europa¨ischen Union (40th edn, CH Beck 2009) at
para 3.
654European Commission, XXXIV th Report on Competition Policy, 2004, vol. 1 (Brussels/
Luxembourg, 2005) at para 112; European Commission, XXXV th Report on Competition
Policy (n 110) at para 219; European Commission, XXXVI th Report on Competition Policy,
2006 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2007) at para 70; European Commission, XXXVII th Report
on Competition Policy, 2007 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2008) at para 90; European
Commission, XXXVIII th Report on Competition Policy, 2008 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2009)
at para 115; European Commission, XXXIX th Report on Competition Policy, 2009
(Brussels/Luxembourg, 2010) at para 162; European Commission, XXXX th Report on
Competition Policy, 2010 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2011) at para 146; as well as European
Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Report from the Commission
on Competition Policy 2010’ COM(2011) 328 final at para 401; European Commission, ‘Commission
Staff Working Paper accompanying the Report from the Commission on Competition Policy 2011’
COM(2012) 253 final at 17-8; European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper
accompanying the Report from the Commission on Competition Policy 2012’ COM(2013) 257
final at 15-6; European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the
document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee for the Regions on Competition Policy 2013’
COM(2014) 249 final at 24; European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document
accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee for the Regions on
Competition Policy 2014’ COM(2015) 247 final at 29.
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At least 10 of the 13 applications were made by the courts of three countries:
Spain, Belgium and the United Kingdom.655 These include all applications
in 2010, 2013 and 2014. It can be noted that the Commission did not publish
the countries of the courts that applied the three times in 2005.656
With reference to the small number of applications, the Ombudsman of the EU
argued in favour of allowing the parties in the national court proceedings to apply
directly for access to the Commission’s files under Art 15(1) Regulation (EC) 1/2003
in civil damage claims.657 However, it is doubtful whether a claimant can apply
directly under this regulation for access to documents.658 The ruling about
cooperation between the national courts and the European Commission only applies
to matters of public interests and does not produce individual rights.659 Therefore,
the ruling is only applicable between courts and the corresponding competition
authorities, the European Commission or national competition authorities of
the Member States. Art 15(1) Regulation (EC) 1/2003 does not provide any
possibility for direct application by the parties in a national proceeding. However,
it is an expression of the principle of effectiveness in enforcing Art 101 and
102 TFEU that the national courts have to at least closely consider using
Art 15(1) Regulation (EC) 1/2003 to request files in the possession of the European
Commission to aid a claimant in exercising its rights under Art 101 or 102 TFEU.660
In addition, the court has to consider the right of the defendant to protect its
professional and business secrecy and the defendant could have a right to oppose
the application.661 Therefore, the next issue is what files or information must the
Commission disclose to the national court. Although the Commission is obliged to
cooperate with national courts by handing over files related to an administrative
investigation under Art 4 TEU,662 it has to ensure that the confidentiality of
655European Commission, XXXX th Report on Competition Policy (n 654) at para 146; as well
as European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Report from the
Commission on Competition Policy 2010’ COM(2011) 328 final at para 401; European Commission,
‘Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Report from the Commission on Competition
Policy 2011’ COM(2012) 253 final at 17-8; European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working
Document accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee for the Regions on
Competition Policy 2013’ COM(2014) 249 final at 24; European Commission, ‘Commission Staff
Working Document accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee for
the Regions on Competition Policy 2014’ COM(2015) 247 final at 29.
656See European Commission, XXXV th Report on Competition Policy (n 110) at para 219.
657See Decision of the European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaints 3699/2006/ELB
against the European Commission (6 April 2010).
658See N Dunleavy (n 56) 703.
659See Becker R, ‘VO (EG) 1/2003 Artikel 15 Zusammenarbeit mit Gerichten der Mitglied-
staaten’ in H von der Groeben, J Schwarze and A Hatje (eds), Europa¨isches Unionsrecht (7th edn,
CH Beck 2015) at para 20.
660N Dunleavy (n 56) 706 at para 12.
661See Case T-353/94 Postbank v Commission [1996] ECR II-921 at para 89.
662Case C-2/88 Imm J. J. Zwartveld and Others [1990] ECR I-3365 at paras 22-5; Case T-353/94
Postbank v Commission [1996] ECR II-921 at para 75.
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business and professional secrets is respected according to Art 339 TFEU.663 The
Commission is caught between encouraging private enforcement on the one hand,
and not jeopardising public enforcement by undermining the public leniency regime
on the other. Although a national court would usually never order the discovery of
leniency corporate statements and settlement submissions,664 court statistics show
that some courts use the mechanism of gaining access to files in the possession of the
Commission to use in their national cases. In this situation, the Commission has to
use the balancing test established by the ECJ in Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt.665
This case deals with the question of gaining access to files of national competition
authorities and is discussed under 4.3.2.1. However, in its Cooperation Notice related
to this, the European Commission stated that it would only disclose files of leniency
proceedings with the permission of the leniency applicant.666 Furthermore, the
Commission has to establish that the national court has the capacity and is willing
to protect the security of the given information.667
4.1.1.1.4 Conclusion
In summary, it can be said that a claimant in a civil damage claim based on an
infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU has, besides the usage of public information
of the European Commission, only limited rights to gaining access to files in the
possession of the Commission.
Under Art 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003, the claimant is not entitled to apply
directly for discovery of files in the possession of the Commission. The ruling is
only applicable between courts and the corresponding competition authorities, the
European Commission or national competition authorities of the Member States.
Although it is an expression of the principle of effectiveness in enforcing Art 101
and 102 TFEU that the national courts have at least to closely consider using
Art 15(1) Regulation (EC) 1/2003 to request files in the possession of the European
Commission to aid a claimant in exercising its rights under Art 101 or 102 TFEU,
there have only been a number of cases where a national court of a Member State
requested files from the Commission under Art 15(1) of Regulation (EC) 1/2003. The
Commission received 13 applications from national courts requesting information in
the possession of the European Commission.
An application by the parties in a national proceeding can only be based on rights
set out under Regulation (EC) 773/2004 or Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 (so-called
663Commission Cooperation Notice [2004] OJ C101/54 at para 25; See as well Case T-353/94
Postbank v Commission [1996] ECR II-921 at paras 86-7 and 90-3; G Miersch (n 66) at para 12.
664See F Murphy, ‘EU Commission proposes new measures re private actions for damages and
collective actions’ (2014) 35(5) ECLR 223, 224-5.
665Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161.
666Commission Cooperation Notice [2004] OJ C101/54 at para 26.
667Commission Cooperation Notice [2004] OJ C101/54 at para 25 with further references.
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Transparency Regulation). It is only possible for claimants that have been a party
in the Commission’s case to apply for discovery under Regulation (EC) 773/2004. In
addition, these claimants are unable to get access to business secrets or confidential
information of third parties. An application under Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 can
be refused as it provides a number of exceptions. Although the EGC clarified that
the European Commission has to provide a concrete and individual examination for
each requested document before refusing the application, the Commission has shown
reluctance to provide documents to claimants under this provision.
4.1.1.2 European regulations about access to files of national
competition authorities under Directive 2014/104/EU and the
protection of leniency applicants
Before Directive 2014/104/EU came into force, there had been no European
regulation and only a few European cases about access to files of national
competition authorities.
One of these cases was the landmark decision in Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt668
where the ECJ was asked for the first time to determine the balance between
public enforcement which supported the policy of the European Commission on
incentivising cartelists and the protection of leniency applicants and to ensure the
effectiveness of private enforcement and the ability of victims to claim compensation
for harm based on an infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU.669 The case was about
the refusal by the German national competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt,
to allow a claimant access to leniency related files for the possibility to litigate for
damages based on the findings of the Bundeskartellamt. The ECJ, i.e. the Grand
Chamber of the court, stated that in the absence of relevant EU legislation – which
was the situation before Directive 2014/104/EU came into force – national courts of
Member States are generally entitled to even request leniency files and the Member
States have to ensure that they implement mechanisms for securing access to the
relevant documentation. It is also a matter of national law to draft the procedural
regulations,670 and these must recognise the principle of effectiveness and ensure the
general possibility of private enforcement as well as not undermining the effective
public enforcement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU on a case-by-case basis. In this test, the
national court has to balance the interests of third party claimants, i.e. claimants
not involved in the infringement, who are seeking damages against the need to
protect the effectiveness of the leniency regime. As a core outcome, the ECJ stated
668Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161.
669See A Wood, ‘The disclosure of leniency related materials supplied during competition
enforcement proceedings: battle lines drawn by the ECJ’ (2013) 18(1) CovLJ 112, 114.
670See I Vandenborre and T Goetz, ‘EU Competition Law Procedural Issues’ (2013) 4(6)
JECL&P 506, 507.
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that there is no pre-determined hierarchy of importance between public and private
enforcement.
The national courts therefore have to conduct a ‘weighing exercise’ where they
have to weigh the ‘respective interests in favour of disclosure of the information and
in favour of the protection of that information provided voluntarily by the applicant
for leniency’.671
With reference to the possibility that leniency applicants could become easy
targets for civil damage claims because it is easier to get access to the relevant
files, the Commission was concerned that the effectiveness of the leniency regimes
would be undermined because national courts in different Member States might act
unpredictably when applying the balancing test.672
Based upon this, the ECJ ruled in Bundeswettbewerbsbeho¨rde v Donau Chemie673
that national law has to allow national courts in general to exercise the balancing
test on a case-by-case basis.674 This case was based in Austria and the Austrian
Law on Cartels (Kartellgesetz) stated that national courts were not entitled
to order a disclosure of cartel proceeding files including any leniency materials
without the permission of the parties subject to those proceedings. The Verband
Druck & Medientechnik (VDMT), a potential claimant for damages not involved
in the infringement of competition law, applied for access to files used in
the administrative proceedings for its potential civil damage claim against the
cartelists. Based on the ruling in the Law on Cartels and the missing permission
of the cartelists, the Austrian Cartel Court at the Higher Regional Court of
Vienna (Kartellgericht beim Oberlandesgericht Wien) should have refused the
application. However, it doubted its compatibility with European lawand given the
decision in Pfleiderer it and sought a preliminary ruling under Art 267 TFEU.
Based upon this case law, Directive 2014/104/EU states in Art 6(1) that the
disclosure rule which is laid down in Art 5(1) is applicable for files in the possession
of the national competition authority. Therefore:
Member States shall ensure that in proceedings relating to an action for
damages in the Union, upon request of a claimant who has presented
a reasoned justification containing reasonably available facts and evidence
sufficient to support the plausibility of its claim for damages, national courts
are able to order [a competition authority] to disclose relevant evidence
which lies in [its] control, subject to the conditions set out in this Chapter.
671Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161 at paras 30-1.
672See A Wood (n 669) 114.
673Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbeho¨rde v Donau Chemie AG and Others [2013] 5
CMLR 19 (ECJ).
674Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161 at paras 23;
See I Vandenborre and T Goetz (n 670) 506.
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Member States shall ensure that national courts are able, upon request of the
defendant, to order [a competition authority] to disclose relevant evidence.675
Art 6 of Directive 2014/104/EU is based on the informal trilogy negotiaions
between the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament.676 Although
the ruling for disclosure of files in the possession of a competition authority refers
to the disclosure of files in the possession of the defendant or other third party, the
rules in Art 6 are stricter. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the priority for
disclosure are for those files in the possession of the involved undertakings.677
This means that the national court has to apply the balancing test laid down
in Art 5(3) of Directive 2014/104/EU, which is a codification of the balancing test
based on the case law of the European courts. The central distinction between Art 5
and Art 6 is the protection of files mentioned on the Grey List in Art 6(5) and the
Black List in Art 6(6). Whereas the protection of disclosure of the files on the Grey
List only applies when the proceedings of the competition authorities are pending,
the protection of the Black List is much more stringent. Therefore, it is possible
to gain access to files drawn up by natural or legal persons or by the competition
authority specifically for administrative proceedings and settlement submissions that
have been withdrawn.678 On the other hand, disclosure is generally prohibited for
leniency statements and settlement submissions.679
With regard to the ruling of the ECJ in Bundeswettbewerbsbeho¨rde v Donau
Chemie, it is doubtful whether this protection of the Black List is compatible with
the effective enforcement of European competition law. Some authors argue that the
provision in Art 6(6) of Directive 2014/104/EU contradicts this ruling of the ECJ.680
However, the ECJ only decided under the permission that no uniform European
regulation is in force. A harmonised European system of disclosure is generally valid
675Art 5(1) in the meaning of Art 6(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU.
676Proposal for a Directive on actions for damages for infringements of competition law, Analysis
of the final compromise text, March 24, 2014, 8088/14, p. 5; Weidt CF, ‘The Directive on actions
for antitrust damages after passing the European Parliament’ (2014) 35(9) ECLR 438, 439.
677Weidt CF (n 676) 439.
678Art 6(5) of Directive 2014/104/EU.
679Art 6(6) of Directive 2014/104/EU.
680T Kapp, ‘Grundsatz der Einzelabwa¨gung sticht Gesetzgebungskompetenz aus’ [2013]
BB 1556; K Kersting, ‘Kronzeugenregelung und Akteneinsicht Dritter im Kartellverfahren’
[2013] JZ 737, 739; H Schweitzer, ‘Die Richtlinie zur privaten Durchsetzung von
Schadensersatzanspru¨chen aus Wettbewerbsversto¨ßen’, Speech on International Forum on
EU Competition Law (Brussels, April 2014) <https://www.studienvereinigung-kartell
recht.de/downloads/forum-kartellrecht/2014_prof-dr-heike-schweitzer.pdf> accessed
01/03/2016; S Dworschak and L Maritzen, ‘Einsicht – der erste Schritt zur Besserung?
Zur Akteneinsicht in Kronzeugendokumente nach dem Donau Chemie-Urteil des EuGH’
[2013] WuW 839; P Gussone and L Maritzen, ‘Anmerkung zur Entscheidung des EuGH vom
6.6.2013 (C-536/11, EWS 2013, 288) – Zum Akteneinsichtsrecht Dritter im Kartellverfahren’
[2013] EWS 292, 293; R Hempel, ‘Anmerkung zur Entscheidung des EuGH vom 06.06.2013
(C-536/11; EuZW 2013, 586) – Zur Frage des Akteneinsichtsrechts durch Schadenersatzkla¨ger
im kartellrechtlichen Verfahren’ [2013] EuZW 589, 590.
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for all Member States.681 Therefore, the European legislators used the invitation of
the ECJ to produce a unified European regulation.682
It can therefore be said that the Member States have to provide a national
regulation about disclosure which entitles national courts to order a disclosure of
files in the possession of the national competition authority on a case-by-case basis
and by applying a balancing test. In addition, the Member States must ensure that
leniency statements and settlement submissions are protected from disclosure.
4.1.1.3 Binding effect of competition authorities’ decisions in
follow-on claims
The binding effect of competition authorities’ decisions are an outcome of the
problem that in a civil damage claim the claimant has to prove the existence of an
infringement of European or national competition law.683 Civil damage proceedings
would benefit from any kind of binding effect as it would save resources684 and
strengthen the effectiveness of the claim.685 On the other hand, it is established
European law that a decision of the European Courts concerning the interpretation
of Community law is binding on the courts of all Member States and that Community
law has primacy over national law. In the UK, this is explicitly set out in Sections 2(1)
and 3(1) and (2) of the European Communities Act 1971.686 However, this only
relates to matter of laws in order to avoid different interpretations of European
regulations. In competition law cases, the problem is often a matter of facts and
it is necessary to establish a binding effect on these in order to avoid conflicting
decisions.687
With reference to the different legal regulation, it is necessary to differentiate
between the question of a binding effect of national competition authorities and
the European Commission. Whereas the binding effect of infringement decisions of
the European Commission is established through case law and EU Regulations, the
European Directive 2014/104/EU was the first to establish a European regulation
on the binding effect of infringement decisions of national competition authorities.
681Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161 at paras 20-3;
L Fiedler (n 337) 2184; C Palzer, ‘Unvereinbarkeit der o¨sterreichischen Regelung zur Akteneinsicht
Kartellgescha¨digter mit EU-Recht‘ [2013] NZKart 324, 326; C Vollrath, ‘Das Maßnahmepaket
der Kommission zum wettbewerbsrechtlichen Schadenersatzrecht’ [2013] NZKart 434, 446;
CF Weidt (n 676) 439-40.
682L Fiedler (n 337) 2184; C Palzer (n 681) 326; C Vollrath (n 681) 446; CF Weidt (n 676) 439-40.
683See H Ko¨hler, ‘EU-Kartellgeldbußen gegen Mutter- und Tochtergesellschaft: Gesamtschuld-
nerische Haftung und Ausgleich im Innenverha¨ltnis’ [2011] WRP 277, 279.
684See M Brealey and N Green, Competition Litigation, UK Practice and Procedure (OUP 2010)
at para 11.05.
685See M Brealey and N Green (n 684) at para 11.04.
686Case 61-79 Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Denkavit italiana Srl [1980] ECR 1205
at para 16; See as well M Brealey and N Green (n 684) at paras 11.15-7.
687See M Brealey and N Green (n 684) at para 11.03.
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4.1.1.3.1 Binding effect of infringement decisions of the European Commission
Under European law, based on its decision in Delmitis v Henninger Bra¨u,688 the ECJ
developed the principle that a decision of a national civil court must not run contrary
to a legal evaluation of the European Commission.689 Since the decision of the ECJ
in Masterfoods v HB690, it is also obvious that an existing decision of a national civil
court can be reversed by a formal infringement decision of the European Commission.
In Masterfoods v HB, the ECJ had to rule on a decision based on a submission
regarding Art 267 TFEU of the Irish Supreme Court. The Irish Supreme Court
asked the ECJ whether a decision of the High Court had to be overruled because
the High Court had denied there was an infringement of European competition law
but the European Commission affirmed an infringement in a positive infringement
decision691 after the decision of the High Court had been published. Based on this,
the ECJ ruled that:
. . . in order to fulfil the role assigned to it by the Treaty, the Commission
cannot be bound by a decision given by a national court in application of
Articles 85(1) and 86 of the Treaty. The Commission is therefore entitled to
adopt at any time individual decisions under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty,
even where an agreement or practice has already been the subject of a decision
by a national court and the decision contemplated by the Commission conflicts
with that national court's decision.692
With this, the ECJ stated clearly the hierarchy between the European level,
represented by the European Commission as European competition authority, and
the national level, represented by the civil courts of the Member States. It is therefore
just a logical step to say that national institutions are not allowed to interfere in
decisions of the European institutions. The ECJ also stated that:
[it] is also clear from the case-law of the Court that the Member States' duty
under Article 5 of the EC Treaty to take all appropriate measures, whether
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising from
Community law and to abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the
attainment of the objectives of the Treaty is binding on all the authorities of
Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts.693
In IP v Brosana694, the ECJ also ruled that a decision of the European
Commission is absolutely binding for national competition authorities and civil
688Case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bra¨u AG [1991] I-935.
689V Milutinovic´ (n 287) 243 at para 47.
690Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369.
691Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission of the European Communities
[2003] ECR II-4653.
692Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369 at para 48.
693Ibid at para 49.
694Case C-2/97 Societa` italiana petroli SpA (IP) v Borsana Srl [1998] ECR I-8597 at para 26.
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courts. It makes no difference, therefore, if the decision of the European Commission
had been approved by the European courts or not as long as the decision had
been officially published. As a consequence, national civil courts are bound by
infringement decisions of the European Commission and it can even overrule valid
decisions of national courts.695
In this respect, Art 16(1) Regulation (EC) 1/2003 is consistent with this as
it standardises the general principle of the ECJ case law on the binding effect
of Commission decisions696 on the one hand, and extends this binding effect to
proceedings of the Commission in which no decision has yet been issued on the
other.697 In doing so, Art 16(1) EU Regulation 1/2003 states that the national
proceeding has to be stayed until the Commission comes to a decision.
When Art 16(1) Regulation (EC) 1/2003 speaks about Decisions of the
Commission, it is not clear which formal decisions of the Commission are meant
and hence which are binding for the national civil courts. There is no problem
with this in cases of positive infringement decisions of the European Commission
with reference to Art 7 Regulation (EC) 1/2003698 (Positive Binding Effect). On
the other hand, a transfer of the binding effect to interim injunctions according to
Art 8 Regulation (EC) 1/2003 has to be refused. With reference to the necessary time
limitation of the measure under Art 8(2) Regulation (EC) 1/2003 and the possibility
of interim injunctions only based on serious doubts about the comparability of
a company’s acting with the competition law,699 even if a summary examination
does not confirm the infringement of competition law,700 the establishment of a
binding effect of interim injunctions is not appropriate. However, on the other hand,
interim injunctions exercise a kind of Negative Binding Effect on national civil courts
because the courts of the Member States are not entitled to issue decisions that can
jeopardise measures of the European Commission. However, this is, for example,
given if a contract potentially infringes European competition law and the European
Commission issued an interim injunction to suspend the contract and, on the other
hand, a national civil court decided to perform the contract or pay damages because
of the non-performance of the contract.701 In the reverse case, the national civil
695See V Milutinovic´ (n 287) 252.
696Ibid, 254.
697See already C Gaitanides, ‘Art 220 EGV [Aufgabe]’ in H von der Groeben und J Schwarze,
Kommentar zum Vertrag u¨ber die Europa¨ische Union und zur Gru¨ndung der Europa¨ischen
Gemeinschaft (6th edn, 2003) at para 21.
698See Arts 7, 8 and 10 Regulation (EC) 1/2003; R Wainwright, ‘The Relationship between
the national judge and the European Commission in applying articles 81 and 82 of the EC
treaty’ (2005) 5(1) ERA Forum 84, 88; Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd
[2000] ECR I-11369 at para 49.
699Case T-23/90 Automobiles Peugeot SA and Peugeot SA v Commission of the European
Communities [1991] ECR II-653 at para 63.
700See Case T-44/90 La Cinq SA v Commission of the European Communities [1992] ECR II-1
at paras 61-1.
701See V Milutinovic´ (n 287) 257-8.
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court is not inhibited from issuing interim injunctions itself even if the European
Commission stopped short of issuing such a measure.702
Furthermore, Commitments under Art 9(1) Regulation (EC) 1/2003 are also
formal decisions of the European Commission.703 However, in the recitals of
Regulation (EC) 1/2003, the Council of the European Union704 set out that those
decisions under Art 9(1) (Commitments) are explicitly not binding for national civil
courts and competition authorities.705 This is consequent because acceptance of a
Commitment is not a decision about whether a company’s action is an infringement
of European competition law or not. On the contrary, Commitments prevent
prophylactically an infringement of competition law.706 In fact, the requirement
for the acceptance of a Commitment is that the European Commission at least
intended to issue a decision under Art 7 Regulation (EC) 1/2003. Therefore, it could
be read that the acceptance of a Commitment indirectly implies that the European
Commission assumes an infringement of European competition law.707 Nevertheless,
the concerns of the European Commission are only based on a preliminary evaluation
and the Commitment can go beyond what is necessary to act in accordance with
the regulations of European competition law.708 As a consequence, it is not possible
to extrapolate from a Commitment an infringement of European competition law709
even though the observance of an accepted Commitment clarifies that there is no
infringement of European competition law710 and is thus binding for the national
civil courts in the way that there is no infringement of the law (Negative Binding
Effect). Such a Negative Binding Effect leads to the consequence that in a civil
damage claim, a court of a Member State is not entitled to assume an infringement
702KL Ritter, ‘Art. 16. Einheitliche Anwendung des gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Wettbewerbsrechts’
in U Immenga and E-J Mestma¨cker, Wettbewerbsrecht, vol 1 (5th edn, CH Beck 2012) at para 3.
703See E De Smijter and A Sinclair (eds), The Enforcement System under Regulation 1/2003
(3rd edn, OUP 2014) at paras 2.116-7.
704Legal basis for Regulation (EC) 1/2003 is article 203 TFEU (ex-article 83 EC), which rules that
the Regulation was decided by the Council and only in consultation of the European Parliament.
705Recital 22 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003.
706See e.g. Coca-Cola (Case COMP/A.39.116/B2) Commission Decision number 2005/670/EG
[2005] OJ L253/21.
707So e.g. F Montag and A Rosenfeld, ‘A solution to the problems? Regulation 1/2003 and the
Modernization of competition procedure’ [2003] ZWeR 107, 132.
708KL Ritter (n 702) at para 3.
709Also the view of M Busse and A Leopold, ‘Entscheidungen u¨ber Verpflichtungszusagen
nach Art. 9 VO (EG) Nr. 1/2003’ [2005] WuW 146, 151; K Schmidt, ‘Umdenken im
Kartellverfahrensrecht! Gedanken zur Europa¨ischen VO Nr. 1/2003’ [2003] BB 1237, 1242;
TT Hennig, Settlements im Europa¨ischen Kartellverfahren – Eine rechtsvergleichende
Untersuchung konsensualer Verfahrensbeendigungsmechanismen unter besonderer Beru¨cksichtigung
der Verpflichtungszusageentscheidung (Nomos 2010) 263; D Dalheimer, ‘Art. 16 Einheitliche
Anwendung des gemeinschaftlichen Wettbewerbsrechts’ in E Grabitz, M Hilf and
M Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europa¨ischen Union (40th edn, CH Beck 2009) at
para 7; A Zuber, ‘VO 1/2003/EG Art. 16 Einheitliche Anwendung des gemeinschaftlichen
Wettbewerbsrechts’ in U Loewenheim, KM Meessen and A Riesenkampff, Kartellrecht (2nd edn,
CH Beck 2009) at para 8; KL Ritter (n 702) at para 3.
710Recital 13 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003; Left open by E De Smijter and A Sinclair (eds) (n 703)
at paras 2.118-9.
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of European competition law. Rather, it is obliged to deny an infringement and to
refuse the civil damage claim.
Moreover, decisions of the European Commission about the Inapplicability of
European competition law in accordance with Art 10 Regulation (EC) 1/2003
express such a Negative Binding Effect.711 Some voices in the legal literature
express that such a Negative Binding Effect is against the direct applicability of
Art 101 and 102 TFEU because a company’s action that is not an infringement
of Art 101 and 102 TFEU is, in fact, not immediately legal. Negative Decisions of
the European Commission are hence no more than Negative Tests in the sense
of Regulation (EC) 17/1962.712 However, these opinions do not consider that
the binding effect of the Commission’s decisions only covers the infringement of
European competition law, especially an infringement of Art 101 and 102 TFEU
and that there is no binding effect for infringements of other legal regulations.
Therefore, it is still possible for a national civil court to establish a case
based on legal regulation other than European competition law if the European
Commission rejects an infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU. On the other hand,
as mentioned above, a denial of a Negative Binding Effect would allow national
civil courts to jeopardise decisions of the European Commission which would be
against the regulations in Regulation (EC) 1/2003 and European case law.713
Therefore, also the representatives of a equalisation with Negative Tests according
to Regulation (EC) 17/1962 assume a factual binding effect of Negative Decisions
of the European Commission.714 Such a factual binding effect is also assumed
in cases where the Finding of Inapplicability by the Commission under Art 10
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 could lead to a Positive Binding Effect. This is the case
when a decision of the European Commission finds an infringement of competition
but no breach of Art 101 or 102 TFEU only because there is a lack of an inter-state
clause. It is argued that even if there is no legal binding effect, it is still possible for
the decision of the Commission to have a factual binding effect on a national damage
claim based on infringements other than European competition law (e.g. national
711See V Milutinovic´ (n 287) 259.
712A Ro¨hling, ‘Die Zukunft des Kartellverbots in Deutschland nach In-Kraft-Treten der neuen
EU-Verfahrensrechtsordnung’ [2003] GRUR 1019 (1023); Doubting K Schmidt, ‘Umdenken im
Kartellverfahrensrecht’ (n 709) 1242.
713Also the view of E De Smijter and A Sinclair (eds) (n 703) at paras 2.145 ff.;
A Zuber, ‘VO 1/2003/EG Art. 16 Einheitliche Anwendung des gemeinschaftlichen
Wettbewerbsrechts’ (n 709) at para 9; D Dalheimer, ‘Art. 16 Einheitliche Anwendung des
gemeinschaftlichen Wettbewerbsrechts’ (n 709) at para 7; Hossenfelder S and Lutz M, ‘Die neue
Durchfu¨hrungsverordnung zu den Artikeln 81 und 82 EG-Vertrag’ [2003] WuW 118, 123;
Hirsch G, ‘Anwendung der Kartellverfahrensordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 durch nationale
Gerichte’ [2003] ZWeR 233, 251; Doubting K Schmidt, K Schmidt, ‘Umdenken im
Kartellverfahrensrecht’ (n 709) 1242.
714A Ro¨hling (n 712) 1023; K Schmidt, ‘Umdenken im Kartellverfahrensrecht’ (n 709) 1242; For
the binding effect of negative clearance, see Case C-250/92 Gøttrup-Klim e.a. Grovvareforeninger
v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab AmbA [1994] ECR I-5641 at paras 57-8.
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competition law). However, it is misguided to subsume it under the term of a binding
effect because it is, rather, a question of access to files of the European Commission.
The individual finding of an infringement of the law by the national civil courts
cannot be avoided by establishing a factual Positive Binding Effect.715
Furthermore, it is widely accepted that the part of the Commission's decision
is binding that infringes716 or protects717 the interests of the parties.718 This part
is usually the operative part of the judgment which directly refers to the facts of
the case.719 Therefore, the operative part of the judgment only establishes a binding
effect if the national civil damage claim is based on the same facts as the infringement
decision of the European Commission. There is therefore no binding effect if the
civil damage claim and the infringement decision refer to different periods,720 acts
of infringement or different actors. However, if the facts of the cases are congruent,
the national civil court is bound by the factual as well as legal evaluation of the case
by the infringement decision of the European Commission.
With reference to the binding effect of the legal evaluation of the infringement
decision of the European Commission, and whether the facts of the case
are an infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU, sentence 4 of Art 16(1)
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 rules that in accordance with Art 243 EC (now
Art 267 TFEU), a national civil court is not barred from asking the ECJ for
an interpretation of European law.721 However, this is only relevant for decisions
that have not already been reviewed by the ECJ. In addition to this, a national
civil proceeding has to be put on hold until the pending case at the ECJ has been
decided.722 In TWD v Bundesrepublik Deutschland723, the ECJ stated further that
the national court was not entitled to call the ECJ when the injured parties of the
infringement decision of the European Commission had not appealed to the EGC
within the deadline.724 On the other hand, it is not automatically against Art 16(1)
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 if a national court dismisses a civil damage claim even if
715See Case T-138/89 Nederlandse Bankiersvereniging and Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken
v Commission of the European Communities [1992] ECR II-2181 at para 33; Criticised by
V Milutinovic´ (n 287) 260-1.
716Decisions based on Art 7 EU Regulation 1/2003.
717Decisions based on Art 10 EU Regulation 1/2003.
718See V Milutinovic´ (n 287) 262.
719See A Zuber, ‘VO 1/2003/EG Art. 16 Einheitliche Anwendung des gemeinschaftlichen
Wettbewerbsrechts’ (n 709) at para 13 with reference to the Commission's reasoning to article 16
of Regulation (EC) 1/2003.
720Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369, Opinion of
AG Cosmas, paras 17-8.
721See A Zuber, ‘VO 1/2003/EG Art. 16 Einheitliche Anwendung des gemeinschaftlichen
Wettbewerbsrechts’ (n 709) at para 16.
722See e.g. D Dalheimer, ‘Art. 16 Einheitliche Anwendung des gemeinschaftlichen Wettbewerbs-
rechts’ (n 709) at para 10.
723Case C-188/92 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1994]
ECR I-833.
724Ibid; See GM Berrisch and M Burianski (n 488) 882.
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the European Commission proved an infringement of European competition law725
because the infringement of competition law is only one part of a civil damage claim
and the binding effect is limited to that infringement.726
4.1.1.3.2 Binding effect of infringement decisions of
national competition authorities
There was no European regulation about the binding effect of infringement
decisions of the national competition authorities prior to Directive 2014/104/EU.
However, there had been some scattered regulations in national competition
laws (e.g. Sec 33(4) GWB). The Rapporteur for the European Parliament for the
directive, Mr Andreas Schwab, outlined the intention of European lawgivers to
extend the harmonisation and to strengthen follow-on claims to safeguard them
from the feared negative influences of US private competition law enforcement,
e.g. through extending class actions.727
Whereas the Commission’s draft of the Directive provided a general binding effect
for decisions of national competition authorities, the adopted version fundamentally
distinguishes in Art 9 between decisions of the competition authority of the same
country in which the civil proceeding takes place and decisions of competition
authorities of other Member States. The reason for this differentiation are the
three-way negotiations between the Commission, the European Council and the
European Parliament.728
The central regulation that gives binding effect to the infringement decisions
of the national competition authorities in the same Member State in which the
civil proceeding is placed is Art 9(1) Directive 2014/104/EU. This regulation
lays down the principle of the Commission’s draft that infringement decisions
of national competition authorities have an irrefutable binding effect. This is
because, in contrast to the reason for the binding effect of Commission decisions in
Regulation (EC) 1/2003, it is not possible to argue with reference to the principle of
the pro-European behaviour and the principle of effectiveness; the Directive stated in
recital 34 that harmonisation of binding effects of infringement decisions of national
725See LG Mainz, NJW-RR 2004, 478, 479; Bornkamm J, ‘Die Masterfoods-Entscheidung
des EuGH: Bindung der Zivilgerichte an Kommissionsentscheidungen. Lehren fu¨r das neue
Kartellverfahren?’ [2003] ZWeR 75, 83; Zuber A, Die EG-Kommission als amicus curiae – Die
Zusammenarbeit der Kommission und der Zivilgerichte der Mitgliedstaaten bei der Anwendung der
Wettbewerbsregeln des EG-Vertrages (Heymann 2001) 67-8.
726See European Commission, ‘Commission staff working paper accompanying the White
paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules SEC’ (2008) 404 at 46-7;
LG Mannheim, GRUR 2004, 182, 183 – Vitaminkartell ; Ko¨hler H, ‘Kartellverbot und
Schadensersatz’ [2004] GRUR 99 (100-1); A Zuber, ‘VO 1/2003/EG Art. 16 Einheitliche
Anwendung des gemeinschaftlichen Wettbewerbsrechts’ (n 709) at par 17.
727European Parliament, ‘Protocol of the debates of the plenary session 16th to 17th April 2014
in Strasbourg‘ PE 533.923, P7 TA(2014)0451, CRE 16/04/2014-19.
728European Council, Document 8088/14 RC 6 JUSTCIV 76 CODEC 885 (24th March 2014)
at 7-8.
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competition authorities across Europe is in the interests of legal certainty and to
avoid inconsistencies in the application of Art 101 and 102 TFEU. In addition, the
regulation raises the issue of procedural efficiency of civil damage claims and the
functioning of the Common Market.
The wording of Art 9(1) Directive 2014/104/EU seems to be ambiguous because
it mentions Art 101 and 102 TFEU as well as national competition law as possible
objects of the infringement decision. However, such an extension of the binding
effect on national competition law in general would be a transgression of the area
of competence of European law-givers. The wording ‘national competition law’ in
Art 9(1) has to be read in conjunction with the legal definition of Art 2 fig 3 of the
Directive:
‘national competition law’ means provisions of national law that
predominantly pursue the same objective as Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and
that are applied to the same case and in parallel to Union competition law
pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, excluding provisions
of national law which impose criminal penalties on natural persons, except to
the extent that such criminal penalties are the means whereby competition
rules applying to undertakings are enforced.
Therefore, Art 2 fig 3 regulates that only this national competition law is relevant
as it is congruent with Art 101 and 102 TFEU. This reference leads to the conclusion
that harmonisation only applies if national competition law is applicable because
of an applicability of European competition law and both regulations lead to the
same result.729 Consequently, it is not possible to apply a binding effect (based on
European law) of infringement decisions of national competition authorities merely
based on pure national competition law (e.g. because of a lack of influence on the
Common Market). In addition, the ruling of Directive 2014/104/EU establishes
only binding effect for positive infringement decisions730 and excludes pending
proceedings731.
With regard to the scope of the binding effect, the Directive refers in recital 34
to the established standards of Regulation (EC) 1/2003 where it states that the
binding effect captures the factual, personal, temporal and local dimensions of the
infringement decisions.
Conclusively, Art 9(3) Directive 2014/104/EU rules that: ‘[this] Article is without
prejudice to the rights and obligations of national courts under Article 267 TFEU’.
729See A Zuber, ‘VO 1/2003/EG Art. 3 Verha¨ltnis zwischen den Artikeln 81 und 82 des Vertrags
und dem einzelstaatlichen Wettbewerbsrecht’ (n 709) at paras 3-4; D Dalheimer, ‘Art. 3 Verha¨ltnis
zwischen den Artikeln 81 und 82 des Vertrags und dem einzelstaatlichen Wettbewerbsrecht’ in
E Grabitz, M Hilf and M Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europa¨ischen Union (40th edn, CH Beck
2009) at paras 3 ff.; See as well recital 34 of Directive 2014/104/EU.
730See legal definition in Art 2 fig 11 Directive 2014/104/EU.
731See legal definition in Art 2 fig 12 Directive 2014/104/EU.
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With regard to the recitals of the Directive, it is doubtful whether this
reference contains infringement decisions of the competition authority of the Member
State in which the civil proceeding is pending. On the one hand, Art 9(3)
Directive 2014/104/EU rules that ‘this Article’ is without prejudice and therefore
involves paragraph 1 as well as paragraph 2 as it includes the binding effect of
infringement decisions of foreign national competition authorities. However, on the
other hand, the capacity to proceed before the European Courts is only mentioned
in recital 35 as it contains only the binding effect of infringement decisions of the
competition authority of the Member State in which the civil proceeding is pending.
In the corresponding recital 34 for the binding effect of infringement decisions of
foreign national competition authorities, the ruling of Art 9(3) is not mentioned.
However, as mentioned above, the Commission did not distinguish in its draft
between the two kinds of infringement decisions and hence the recital 25 of the
Commission’s draft732 refers to Art 267 TFEU and contains therefore both types
of infringement decisions. Although, the wording of recital 25 of the draft has
been adopted unchanged despite the distinction in the adopted version, it seems
to be a mere editorial mistake. The wording of Art 9(3) Directive 2014/104/EU
itself supports this view because it refers unambiguously to the whole of Article 9.
Therefore, also in cases of Art 9(1) the binding effect is without prejudice to the
rights and obligations of national courts under Article 267 TFEU.
In contradistinction to the infringement decisions of the competition authority
of the Member State in which the civil proceeding is pending, decisions of foreign
national competition authorities only work as prima facie evidence in a civil
proceeding according to Art 9(2) Directive 2014/104/EU. As mentioned above,
this distinction is based on the three-way negotiations between the Council,
Commission and European Parliament.733 Regarding the scope of the binding
effect, there is no difference to Art 9(1) Directive 2014/104/EU. This is especially
the case as this includes that only infringement decisions of national competition
authorities are binding which apply national competition law parallel to Art 101 or
102 TFEU, according to Art 3(1) Regulation (EC) 1/2003.734 However, the wording
of recital 35 of Directive 2014/104/EU states that the infringement decisions of
foreign national competition authorities has to be used ‘at least’ as prima facie
evidence. This suggests that Art 9(2) is only a minimal harmonisation and it is
possible for the national law-giver, by implementing the Directive in national law,
to choose a wider binding effect. This is especially relevant for German law where
732European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of
the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union’ COM(2013) 404
final.
733See European Council, Document 8088/14 RC 6 JUSTCIV 76 CODEC 885 (24th March 2014)
at 7-8.
734See Art 2 fig 3 Directive 2014/104/EU.
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Sec 33(4) GWB contains a full binding effect for infringement decisions of foreign
national competition authorities.
4.1.1.3.3 Binding effect and contradictory procedure rule of Art 6 ECHR
The assumption of such a binding effect of infringement decisions of national
competition authorities or the European Commission could challenge the
fundamental judicial principles and human rights of Art 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Arts 47-50 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (CFR).
The ECHR is an international contract in which the signatory countries agree to
satisfy the adopted fundamental rights and freedoms and submit to the established
safety mechanisms in judicial proceedings, i.e. the European Court of Human
Rights.735 In the manner of any other international contract, the ECHR only takes
effect on the signatory countries (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt).736 Although
all Member States of the European Union ratified the ECHR, the EU itself as a
legal entity did not despite the fact that Art 6(2) TEU provides the possibility to
ratify the ECHR. The most recent attempt to join the ECHR was in December 2014
but this was rejected by the ECJ with its Opinion 2/13.737 The deciding reason for
refusing was the lack of certainty of the scope of European law738 and the requirement
to harmonise with Art 53 ECHR and Art 53 CFR.739 The ECJ stated especially that
a ratification of the ECHR by the EU must not lead to the situation that organs
of the ECHR (e.g. European Court of Human Rights) are entitled to decide on
binding internal mechanisms of competence of the European Union.740 The ECJ
735See M Herdegen (n 246) § 49 at paras 3-4.
736See E Klein (n 247); C Tomuschat, H Neuhold and J Kropholler (n 247) 9 ff.;
M Herdegen (n 246) § 15 at para 19.
737Opinion 2/13, Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU – Draft international agreement –
Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms – Compatibility of the draft agreement with the EU and FEU Treaties
[2015] 2 CMLR 21 (ECJ).
738Ibid at para 186.
739Ibid at paras 187 ff.
740Ibid at para 185 with reference to Opinion 1/91, Opinion delivered pursuant to the second
subparagraph of Article 228 (1) of the Treaty – Draft agreement between the Community,
on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other,
relating to the creation of the European Economic Area [1991] ECR I-6079 at paras 30 ff. and
Opinion 1/00, Opinion pursuant to Article 300(6) EC – Proposed agreement between the European
Community and non-Member States on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area
[2002] ECR I-3493 at para 13.
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clarified that it is legally possible for the European Courts to be bound by external
decisions, especially if this is designated in the Treaties.741
However, even without a ratification of the ECHR by the EU, Art 6(3) TFEU
stated that the fundamental rights of the ECHR are, as general principles, part of
European law. This is also underlined by the constant case law of the ECJ.742 Such
self-commitment by a third country to an international treaty does not contradict
with the principles of international law.743 On the other hand, all Member States of
the European Union – which have all ratified the ECHR as mentioned above – are
committed to the fundamental rights of the ECHR and do so by transposing
European law (especially Directives) into national law.744
Regarding the binding effect of infringement decisions of the European
Commission and other national competition authorities of the Member States,
especially the right of a fair proceeding in front of an independent and impartial
civil court according to the first alternative of the first sentence of Art 6(1) ECHR,
the binding of a national civil court on an administrative infringement decision of
a competition authority could breach this fundamental right. The crucial criterion
of Art 6(1) ECHR is whether the parties of a proceeding have their own rights to
influence the proceeding.745 Furthermore, especially as the adversarial proceeding
is protected, what allows the parties to take a stand on the evidence of the other
party.746 In particular, this is not given if a court is absolutely bound by a foreign
administrative decision on a matter of facts. On the other hand, the possibility of
741Opinion 2/13, Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU – Draft international
agreement – Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – Compatibility of the draft agreement with
the EU and FEU Treaties [2015] 2 CMLR 21 (ECJ) at para 182 with reference to
Opinion 1/91, Opinion delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228 (1) of
the Treaty – Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of
the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European
Economic Area [1991] ECR I-6079 at paras 40, 70 and Opinion 1/00, Opinion pursuant to
Article 300(6) EC – Proposed agreement between the European Community and non-Member States
on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area [2002] ECR I-3493 at para 13.
742See Case 11-70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fu¨r
Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125 at para 4; Case 4-73 J Nold, Kohlen- und
Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities [1974] ECR 491 at para 41;
Case 3-73 Hessische Mehlindustrie Karl Scho¨ttler KG v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fu¨r Getreide
und Futtermittel [1973] ECR 745 at para 13; Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tile´orassi AE
and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios
Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others [1991] ECR I-2925 at para 41; Joined cases C-402/05 P
and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the
European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-6351 at para 283;
Case C-571/10 Servet Kamberaj v Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di
Bolzano (IPES) and Others [2012] 2 CMLR 43 (ECJ) at para 60; Case C-617/10 A˚klagaren v
Hans A˚kerberg Fransson [2013] 2 CMLR 46 at para 44.
743See Art 35-6 VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties from 23 th May 1969 );
E Klein (n 247); C Tomuschat, H Neuhold and J Kropholler (n 247) 9 ff.
744M Lorenz (n 213) 35.
745See BVerfGE 64, 133 at 145; BVerfGE 107, 395 at 408; BVerfG NJW 2007, 204 at 205.
746Ruiz-Mateos v Spain [1993] 16 EHRR 505.
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using an infringement decision of a competition authority as prima facie evidence is
not a point of Art 6(1) ECHR.
To begin with, Art 6(1) ECHR requires that a decision in a civil proceeding
is made by an independent court, i.e. a court that is not bound by instructions
of the parties or the executive branch.747 The binding effect of other acts of the
judicial branch is, however, extraneous because the principle of legal certainty as
a characteristic of Art 6(1) ECHR requires the acceptance of the legal effect of
a judgment.748 As long as there are no valid reasons for a reconsideration of the
case, the enforceable decision of a court in administrative fine proceedings has to be
accepted and shall not be jeopradised by a different interpretation of the matter of
facts by a civil court that reconsiders the case.749
The principle of procedural fairness of Art 6(1) ECHR requires parties to a legal
proceeding to have the right to express themselves to the evidence.750 However, the
ECHR does not predetermine what can be used and what is necessary as evidence
or how the burden of proof has to be defined.751 The European Court of Human
Rights only evaluates the whole proceeding in general, including the regulations
about evidence.752
Although the European Commission and the national competition authorities
are part of the executive branch, there is no absolute binding effect of decisions
of this branch, even if there is a binding effect on decisions of the competition
authorities. This is because the decisions of the European Commission and the
national competition authorities are still reviewable by the European Courts and
only the view on the matter of law of the ECJ and EGC is binding for the national
civil courts. With regard to the matter of facts, the binding effect falls under the
privilege of the signatory countries to define the proceeding about evidence explained
above. Furthermore, the civil courts are entitled and sometimes obliged to ask
the ECJ as judicial instance. Whereas the mere failure to comply with the duty
to ask the ECJ according to Art 267 TFEU is not a violation of Art 6(1) ECHR,
the deliberate refusal of a ask to the ECJ is an infringement of the principle of
procedural fairness.753 Even if the European Court of Human Rights is not entitled
to control the proceedings of the ECJ, the Court assumes that the European Courts
protect the same rights as adopted in the ECHR.754
747J Meyer-Ladewig (n 258) Art 6 at para 68.
748Ibid Art 6 at paras 90 and 164.
749See Pravednaya v Russia (Application No 69529/01) (ECtHR) at paras 25-31; Nikitin v Russia
[2005] 41 EHRR 10 at para 56 with reference to J Meyer-Ladewig (n 258) Art 6 at para 165.
750J Meyer-Ladewig (n 258) Art 6 at paras 102-3; Goktepe v Belgium (Application No 50372/99)
(ECtHR) at para 25.
751See Colak v Germany [2009] 49 EHRR 45 at para 41.
752Volkmer and Petersen v Germany [2002] NJW 3087 (ECtHR) at para 4; J Meyer-Ladewig
(n 258) Art 6 at para 141.
753John v Germany [2007] 45 EHRR SE4; Herma v Germany [2010] NJW 3207 (ECtHR).
754Cooperative Produzentenorganisatie v Netherlands [2010] NJOZ 1914 (ECtHR).
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In contradiction of this, the CFR is put on the level of European primary law
by Art 6(1) TEU. The corresponding Art 47 CFR is therefore also applicable to
infringement proceedings of the European Commission and the European Courts.755
On the other hand, the systematics and the clear wording of Art 6 ECHR and
Arts 47-50 CFR imply that the presumption of innocence of Art 6(2) ECHR and
Art 48 CFR is not applicable in civil proceedings.756 In summary it can be said
that the binding effect adopted in Directive 2014/104/EU is in conformity with
Art 6(1) ECHR and Art 47 CFR.
4.1.1.3.4 Conclusion
Follow-on claims are an effective way of harmonising cooperation between public
and private enforcement of European competition law. The central element of the
effectiveness of follow-on claims and its advantage over stand-alone cases is the
binding effect of the administrative decisions of the competition authorities and the
cessation of the burden to prove that infringement.
However, even if Art 16(1) Regulation (EC) 1/2003 stated that decisions of
the European Commission have a binding effect for national civil courts, not all
possible decisions in Regulation (EC) 1/2003 establish this binding effect. A Positive
Binding Effect is only given by positive infringement decisions of the Commission
with reference to Art 7 Regulation (EC) 1/2003.
Furthermore, Negative Binding Effects are established by the acceptance of
Commitments under Art 9(1) and decisions of the European Commission about
the Inapplicability of European competition law in accordance with Art 10
Regulation (EC) 1/2003. Such a Negative Binding Effect leads to the consequence
that in a civil damage claim, a national civil court is not entitled to assume an
infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU. It is, rather, obliged to deny an infringement
and to refuse the civil damage claim.
With reference to Art 267 TEU, sentence 4 of Art 16(1) Regulation 1/2003
rules that a national civil court is not prevented from requesting from the ECJ
an interpretation of European law, even if it is bound by the legal evaluation
of the infringement decision of the European Commission, on whether the facts
of the case are an infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU. However, this is not
applicable if the ECJ has had the possibility to uphold the infringement decisions
in an administrative review proceeding.
On the other hand, prior to Directive 2014/104/EU there was no regulation about
the binding effect of infringement decisions of national competition authorities of the
Member States. With reference to the ruling in Directive 2014/104/EU, this question
755See M Lorenz (n 213) 35.
756J Meyer-Ladewig (n 258) Art 6 at para 211; H-J Blanke (n 261), Das Verfassungsrecht der
Europa¨ischen Union mit Europa¨ischer Grundrechtecharta (4th edn, CH Beck 2011) at para 1.
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has to be distinguished in decisions of the competition authority in the same Member
State in which the civil proceeding is placed and national competition authorities of
other Member States. The central regulation for the binding effect of infringement
decisions of the national competition authorities in the same Member State in which
the civil proceeding is placed is Art 9(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU. That regulation
lays down the principle of the Commission’s draft that infringement decisions of
national competition authorities have an irrefutable binding effect. However, Art 2
fig 3 of Directive 2014/104/EU regulates that only a national competition law is
relevant which is congruent with Art 101 and 102 TFEU. This reference leads to the
conclusion that harmonisation only applies if national competition law is applicable
because of an applicability of European Competition law and both regulations lead
to the same result. Consequently, it is not possible to apply a binding effect (based on
European law) of infringement decisions of national competition authorities merely
based on pure national competition law (e.g. because of a lack of influence on
the Common Market). On the other hand, the ruling of Directive 2014/104/EU
establishes only a binding effect of positive infringement decisions and excludes
pending proceedings.
In contradistinction to the infringement decisions of the competition authority
of the Member State in which the civil proceeding is pending, decisions of foreign
national competition authorities only work as prima facie evidence in a civil
proceeding as per Art 9(2) Directive 2014/104/EU. However, the wording of
recital 35 of the Directive 2014/104/EU which states that the infringement decisions
of foreign national competition authorities have to be used ‘at least’ as prima
facie evidence, this suggests that Art 9(2) only sets out a minimal amount of
harmonisation and it is possible for the national law-giver, by implementing the
Directive in national law, to choose a wider binding effect. This is especially relevant
for German law where Sec 33(4) GWB contains a full binding effect for infringement
decisions of foreign national competition authorities.
Furthermore, only the part of the Commission's decision is binding which
infringes or protects the interests of the parties. This part is usually the operative
part of the judgment which directly refers to the facts of the case. Therefore, the
operative part of the judgment only establishes a binding effect if the national civil
damage claim is based on the same facts as the infringement decision of the European
Commission or national competition authority. There is, therefore, no binding effect
if the civil damage claim and the infringement decision refer to different periods, acts
of infringement or different actors. On the other hand, if the facts of the cases are
congruent, the national civil court is bound by the factual as well as legal evaluation
of the case. However, it is not automatically an infringement of the binding effect if
a national court dismisses a civil damage claim even if the European Commission or
a national competition authority proved an infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU.
132
This is because the infringement of competition law is only one part of a civil damage
claim and the binding effect is limited to that infringement. This binding effect is,
therefore, in conformity with Art 6(1) ECHR and Art 47 CFR and the underpinning
fundamental judicial principles and human rights.
4.1.1.4 Conclusion
Even if follow-on claims are an effective way of harmonising cooperation between
public and private enforcement of European competition law, there are only limited
rights to gaining access to files in the possession of the Commission for a claimant
in a civil damage claim on an infringement of Art 101 or 102 TFEU.
The key element of the effectiveness of follow-on claims and its advantage
over stand-alone cases is the binding effect of the administrative decisions of the
competition authorities and the cessation of the burden to prove that infringement.
Decisions of the European Commission first bind national civil courts with reference
to Art 16 of Regulation 1/2003. However, there was no regulation about the
binding effect of infringement decisions of national competition authorities of
the Member States before Directive 2014/104/EU. Moreover, with reference to
its ruling, infringement decisions of national competition authorities of the same
Member States in which the civil proceeding is located have an irrefutable binding
effect according to Art 9(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU. In addition, infringement
decisions of other Member States just work as prima facie evidence in a civil
proceeding according to Art 9(2) of Directive 2014/104/EU. However, the regulation
only sets out a minimal amount of harmonisation and it is possible for the
Member States to choose a wider binding effect (see e.g. Sec 33(4) of the German
Competition Act, GWB).
Claimants only have the right to gain access to documents in the
possession of the European Commission based on the so-called Transparency
Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. Even if the main principle is to gain public access
to documents, Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 provides a number of exceptions for
when the application can be refused. Although the EGC clarified that the European
Commission has to provide a concrete and individual examination for each requested
document before refusing the application, the Commission has shown reluctance
to provide documents for a possible claimant under this provision. Furthermore,
Member States have to provide a national regulation about disclosure where the
national courts shall be entitled to order a disclosure of files in the possession
of the national competition authority on a case-by-case basis and by applying a
balancing test according to Directive 2014/104/EU. However, the Member States
have to ensure that leniency statements and settlement submissions are secured for
disclosure.
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4.1.2 Disclosure of files in the possession of the defendant
4.1.2.1 Regulations of Directive 2014/104/EU
Before the adoption of Directive 2014/104/EU, there had been no European
regulations about disclosure in the case law of the European courts. In Art 5,
Directive 2014/104/EU rules on general rules of disclosure of evidence in civil damage
proceedings based on an infringement of European competition law. It states that,
in general, a victim of a cartel can gain access to files that are relevant as evidence in
his claim. This requires that facts sufficient to support the plausibility of the claim
are reasonably available, that it is possible to pinpoint or narrow the evidence, and
that a court considers the application of disclosure as proportionate to the expense
of the obliged party.757
Regarding the individual conditions, the requirement of Plausibility seems to
be the most complex. Although it will be an essential part for national courts to
decide on an application, the Directive itself does not provide any specification or
example. However, it can be argued that the presumption of harm in Art 16(2)(a)
Directive 2014/104/EU leads to the view that a purchaser of a product influenced
by a price cartel has a sufficient amount of plausibility to make a claim.758 However,
a final infringement decision of the European Commission or another national
competition authority of a Member State is required to create plausibility for a claim
a claim. The proceedings of a competition authority or parallel behaviour alone
are insufficient.759 Furthermore, the fact that damage claims are already possible
before a final infringement decision of a competition authority does not lead to the
conclusion that a proceeding is sufficient because the right to claim is independent
of the right to apply for discovery. If a claimant is able to provide evidence about
an infringement and harm before an infringement decision, it is still entitled to file
a lawsuit but is not entitled to apply for discovery.760
Although the description of the sought files has to be as precise as possible
in the application, the national civil courts of the Member States shall interpret
the formulation ‘as precise as possible’ in a way that a private litigant shall not
demand a detailed description and requires only a minimum description, e.g. as ‘sales
documents’.761 This is because of the problems private litigants have in narrowing
down the definition of the files that they are looking for.762
757CF Weidt (n 676) 438.
758Similar RM Babirad, ‘The Commission’s proposal for a Directive on damages for
anti-competitive infringements: an increase in evidentiary accessibility, disclosure and legal
certainty for private litigants’ [2013] GCLR 155, 156; CF Weidt (n 676) 438.
759CF Weidt (n 676) 439.
760See under 4.2.1 for the distinction between follow-on and stand-alone damage claims.
761CF Weidt (n 676) 439.
762RM Babirad (n 758) 157.
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Finally, the question of limitation of the scope of disclosure is up to the national
courts and is not regulated in Directive 2014/104/EU. The courts have to decide with
reference to the proportionality of the application and consider the interests of all
parties. That has to be in a formal hearing process according to Art 5(5)(a). Even
if Art 5(4) Directive 2014/104/EU states directly that the mere interest to avoid
private actions for damages is not legally protected, the court has to consider the
financial aspects and burdens of disclosure. Furthermore, the court has to consider
the protection of confidential information. In Art 5(4), the Directive rules that files
are disclosable even if they contain confidential information and the national civil
court has the duty to protect the legal interest of those involved or third parties,
e.g. by blacking parts of the files not relevant to the case.763
4.1.2.2 Conclusion: Implementation of a general right of disclosure
under national law de lege ferenda
In concluding the outcomes of the last chapter, Directive 2014/104/EU requires
the implementation of a general right of disclosure of files in the possession of the
defendant or other party to the proceeding in national law.
Recent EU law requires the implementation of a disclosure proceeding based on
the principles of plausibility and proportionality. In effect, this requires that facts
that are sufficient to support the plausibility of the claim are reasonably available,
that it is possible to pinpoint or narrow the evidence and that a court considers
the application of disclosure as proportionate to the expense of the obliged party.
However, Directive 2014/104/EU and other EU law do not regulate the question of
a limitation of the scope of disclosure. This is, therefore, up to the national courts
and law-givers. In Art 5(4), the Directive rules that files are disclosable even if they
contain confidential information and the national civil court has the duty to protect
the legal interests of the involved or third parties, e.g. by blacking parts of the files
not relevant for the case.
4.1.3 Conclusion
What this all amounts to is that member states must improve claimants’ access to
files in the possession of competition authorities as well as the defendant.
The target is that a claimant shall have the right to get all needed information
for a successful damage claim and, even if, the national civil courts are bound by
the infringement decisions of the European Commission and national competition
authorities (or use foreign decisions as prima facie evidence), the claimants have
to prove further points, e.g. the suffered harm. Therefore, Directive 2014/104/EU
obliges the Member States to implement regulations about access to files in the
763Similar CF Weidt (n 676) 439.
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possession of the national competition authority as well as in the possession of the
defendant. Thus, national courts are entitled to order the disclosure of files in the
possession of the national competition authority on a case-by-case basis and apply
a balancing test according to Directive 2014/104/EU.
Furthermore, this recent EU law requires the implementation of a disclosure
proceeding based on the principles of plausibility and proportionality. This requires
that facts sufficient to support the plausibility of the claim be made reasonably
available, that it is possible to pinpoint or narrow the evidence and that a court
considers the application of disclosure as proportionate to the expense of the obliged
party. Furthermore, Art 5(4) of Directive 2014/104/EU rules that files are disclosable
even if they contain confidential information and the national civil court has the duty
to protect the legal interests of the involved or third parties, e.g. by blacking parts
of the files not relevant for the case.
4.2 English Law
4.2.1 Disclosure of files in the possession of the defendant
English law, as an example of common law, uses codified law and established case law
for pre-action disclosure in civil proceedings. Reference should be made to part 31
Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) where a separate proceeding of disclosure is regulated.
The section indicates the general legal duty to reveal all documents relevant for
the trial after substantiating the pleading of the plaintiff.764 It also mentions the
obligation to search for documents to a reasonable extent765 and the possibility of
interviews as part of a deposition.766
4.2.1.1 General rule of pre-action disclosure in civil proceedings
In contrast to disclosure at the conclusion of a contract,767 English law provides
wide-ranging information and disclosure rights in civil proceedings. The standard
regulation about disclosure under English law is Rule 31.6 CPR. This standard rule
applies in civil damage claims based on an infringement of competition law in the
High Court and covers the disclosure proceedings of files on which a party (usually
764Rule 16.4(1)(a) and 18.1-2 CPR; Brophy v Dunphys Chartered Surveyors [1998] All ER (D) 85;
[1998] EG 37 (CS); (1998) 95(16) LSG 23; (1998) 142 SJLB 109, CA (Civ Div).
765Rule 31.7(1) CPR; Rondel v Worsley [1967] 1 QB 443; [1966] 3 WLR 950; [1966] 3 All ER 657;
(1966) 110 SJ 810; I Grainger, M Fealy and M Spencer, The Civil Procedure Rules in Action
(2nd edn, Cavendish 2000) 89.
766Rule 34.8-12 CPR.
767See Bell v Lever Bros [1932] UKHL 2; [1932] AC 161; Norwich Union Life Insurance Co Ltd
v Quershi; Aldrich v Norwich Union Life Insurance Co Ltd [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 707;
[1999] CLC 1963, CA (Civ Div); Clarion Ltd v National Provident Institution [2000] 2 All ER 265;
[2000] 1 WLR 1888 (Ch), at para 1905.
136
the claimant) relies and that have an adverse effect on the case.768 The Competition
Appeal Tribunal (CAT) also has the power to order a disclosure but that is regulated
in its own procedural law.
The first provisions about pre-action disclosure were based on the landmark case
by the Court of Appeal in Compagnie Financie`re du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano
Company.769 A passage that is often referred to in this is where Brett LJ stated
that a party has to disclose the existence of any document in a civil proceeding even
if they were of the most peripheral apparent relevance for the claim.770 Brett LJ
defined this as documents that it was reasonable to suppose contained:
. . . information which may enable the party [applying for discovery] either to
advance his own case or to damage that of his adversary, if it is a document
which may fairly lead him to a train of enquiry which may have either of these
two consequences.771
Therefore, if there is a document that could undermine the case, it has to be
disclosed to the other party. In doing so, it is not relevant if the document can
be used itself as evidence to prove any fact. It is sufficient that the documents
can lead the opposing party on a fruitful track.772 Disclosure or discovery means a
three-stage process of disclosure in a narrow sense, and inspection and production
of documents. Disclosure in a narrow sense is the service on the other party of a list
that indicates the relevant documents and inspection the possibility of the opposing
party to inspect the documents. In the last step, the possessor has to produce the
documents to the other party or the court.773
By introducing disclosure proceedings as a statutory provision – derived from
section 33(2) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 which became part of the modern
Civil Procedure Rules in 1999 especially Rule 31.16 – the codified law refers to
the established case law.774 The landmark case on the requirements of pre-action
disclosure under the CPR Rules is Black v Sumitomo.775 The case was an appeal
about an ordered pre-action disclosure. Regarding a heavy prospective litigation
concerning a possible claim for unlawful conspiracy of market manipulation, the
prospective claimant of a damage claim, Mr Black, applied for pre-action disclosure
against the defendant Sumitomo. Rix LJ stated that the wording ‘likely to be a
party’ of the CPR means ‘may well’ and that the purpose of this wording is to
768See N Dunleavy (n 56) 689, 694.
769(1882) 11 QBD 55.
770Compagnie Financie`re du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Company (1882) 11 QBD 55 at
para 62-3.
771Compagnie Financie`re du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Company (1882) 11 QBD 55 at para 63.
772C Foster, T Wynn and N Ainley, Disclosure and Confidentiality: A Practitioner’s Guide
(1st edn, Pearson 1996) 4.
773C Foster, T Wynn and N Ainley (n 772) 237.
774See M Brealey and N Green (n 684) at para 9.04.
775[2001] EWCA Civ 1819, [2002] 1 WLR 1562.
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contrast ‘party’ with ‘witness’. Usually, such an application for disclosure is made
after the close of pleadings.776
4.2.1.2 Application for pre-action disclosure in competition law
Especially for civil damage claims based on an infringement of competition law, the
High Court decided in Hutchison 3G UK Ltd v O2 (UK) Ltd777 in favour of the
applicability of pre-action disclosure proceedings. In this case, the claimant was a
mobile phone network provider which applied for a wide-ranging pre-action discovery
against its competitors O2, Vodafone, Orange and T-Mobile because it assumed
an infringement of Art 101 and 102 TFEU due to significant barriers established
by the Mobile Number Portability system (MNP) in operation in the UK.778 The
High Court refused the disclosure because the application by Hutchison 3G was too
wide-ranging and it was not possible for the claimant to identify specific documents
or groups or classes of documents. Steel J stated that the claimant had to show
that the documents it sought were within the scope of the standard disclosure
rules.779 Therefore, even though the request failed because of a lack of specificity, it
is important that the Court accepted the application of standard disclosure rules in
competition law cases.780
However, even if an applicant is successful in claiming a pre-action disclosure, it
is merely a costly procedural mechanism because the applicant has to pay the costs
of the respondent.781 For example, in the H3G case, one reason for refusal was the
cost of approximately £1 million.782
On the other hand, the rules of the CAT state that the CAT can give directions
‘for the disclosure between, or the production by, the parties of documents or
classes of documents’.783 However, the CAT had up until that point usually issued
a disclosure in regulatory appeals or judicial review proceedings784 rather than in
private actions, especially actions seeking damages for a breach of competition law.785
776M Brealey and N Green (n 684) at para 9.03.
777[2008] EWHC 55 (Comm), [2008] UKCLR 83.
778N Dunleavy (n 56) 695.
779Hutchison 3G UK Ltd v O2 (UK) Ltd [2008] EWHC 55 (Comm), [2008] UKCLR 83, para 44.
780See N Dunleavy (n 56) 695; The Directive itself does not provide any specification or example
forthat a court considers the application as proportionate.
781When considering costs in applications for pre-action disclosure under CPR, r 31.16, the court
must have regard to CPR, r 48.1 which provides that the party against whom the application is
made will normally be entitled to its costs of the application and the costs of complying with any
order made on the application (CPR r 48(1)(2)). CPR r 38(1)(3) provides, however, that the court
may make a different order having regard to all the circumstances including: (a) the extent to which
it was reasonable for the person against whom the order was sought to oppose the application; and
(b) whether the parties to the application have complied with any relevant pre-action protocol.
See, eg, SES Contracting Ltd and ors v UK Coal plc and ors [2007] EWCA Civ 791.
782See M Brealey and N Green (n 684) at para 9.08.
783Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2003, SI 2003/1372, r 19(2)(k).
784See e.g., Durkan Holdings v Office of Fair Trading [2010] CAT 12.
785N Dunleavy (n 56) 696.
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Although the rules of disclosure of the High Court and the CAT are basically
the same, the practice of the CAT is slightly different.786 Even so, in Argos and
Littlewoods v OFT 787 the CAT stated that:
. . . the general presumption before the Tribunal is in favour of disclosure
unless the contrary is shown788
This general approach is codified in Rule 19(2)(k) of the CAT Rules789 which
states that:
[the] Tribunal may give directions for the disclosure between, or the production
by, the parties of documents or classes of documents.
This regulation seems to be quite brief and non-specific regarding the regulation
of the High Court. This lack of specificity can be explained by the fact that
proceedings in front of the CAT are mostly appellate or judicial review proceedings
and the duty of disclosure has to be applied differently to civil damage claims.790
It therefore gives the CAT more flexibility to react to the different types of legal
proceedings. Although there is no specific section in the CAT Guide that deals
with disclosure, the case law of the CAT shows the importance of disclosure
proceedings.791
Based on this case law, for a successful disclosure application the CAT
requires that the requested documents are clearly identified792 and the sought
after information must be necessary, relevant and proportionate to determine the
issues.793 This is especially the case where the information concerned is commercially
confidential and belongs to a direct competitor of the party seeking access to it.794 On
the other hand, the CAT has to ask whether the disclosure would cause significant
harm to the undertaking to which it relates and if the interests that are trying to
be protected are legitimate.795
On the question of significant harm and legitimate business interest, the CAT
ruled that, as a presumption,796 market shares, revenues, costs and information
786M Brealey and N Green (n 684) at para 9.02.
787[2004] CAT 5.
788Argos and Littlewoods v OFT [2004] CAT 5 at para 67.
789The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2003 (SI 2003/1372). Both the CAT Rules and the
CAT Guide are available on the CAT website <http://www.catribunal.org.uk>.
790M Brealey and N Green (n 684) at para 9.39-40.
791See e.g. Umbro Holdings ltd v OFT [2003] CAT 26, [2004] Comp AR 217 at para 33.
792Albion Water v OFWAT [2008] CAT 3 at para 41.
793Claymore Dairies v OFT [2004] CAT 16 at paras 108, 113; Cityhook v OFT [2006] CAT 32
at para 25.
794Claymore Dairies v OFT [2004] CAT 16 at paras 108, 114.
795Aberdeen Journals v DGFT [2003] CAT 14 at para 3.
796Umbro Holdings Ltd v OFT [2004] CAT 3 at para 33.
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regarding yields of various kinds which were over three years old;797 turnover figures
that were more than two years old;798 and other commercial information that was
two and a half years old799 should not be regarded as causing significant harm or
being contrary to legitimate interests.
4.2.1.3 Protection of whistle-blowers in pre-action disclosure in civil
proceedings based on a breach of European competition law
Regarding civil proceedings based on a breach of competition law, one highly
coveted document is the confidential version of the infringement decision of the
European Commission (or any other national competition authority of a Member
State) because this version of the infringement decision includes, in contrast to the
published version, extracts of the leniency application.800
This was the case in the landmark decision of the High Court in National
Grid Electricity Transmissions v ABB Ltd.801 The claimant, National Grid, claimed
damages against members of a cartel of gas-insulated switchgears (GIS) and
applied for disclosure of the confidential infringement decision by the Commission802
from ABB. The High Court decided that the principles of the ECJ’s decision in
Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt,803 which dealt with access to leniency documents in
the possession of the Commission, had to be applied in a case of disclosure between
two private parties. Therefore, the court has to take a decision on a case-by-case basis
to protect the legally protected interests of the leniency applicants. But, on the other
hand, it refuses a general refusal of a disclosure application if a leniency applicant is
involved. Here, the High Court decided that it was not proportionate for National
Grid to acquire the information from somewhere else. Instead, the court examined
the relevance of the documents for the proceeding by inspecting each document by
the judges of the court.804
4.2.1.4 Conclusion
In summary, it can be stated that in contrast to disclosure at the conclusion of a
contract, English law provides wide-ranging information and disclosure rights in civil
proceedings. The standard regulation about disclosure under English law applies in
civil damage claims based on an infringement of competition law in the High Court
797Aberdeen Journals v DGFT [2003] CAT 14 at para 4.
798Umbro President’s order of 18 November 2003 at para 20.
799Argos and Littlewoods Ltd v OFT [2004] CAT 5 at para 61.
800S Peyer, ‘Die private Durchsetzung von kartellrechtlichen Anspru¨chen – Status Quo in
Eng-land und Wales’ [2012] EuZW 617, 619.
801[2012] EWHC 869 (Ch).
802Gas Insulated Switchgear (Case COMP/38.899) Commission Decision number C(2006) 6762
final [2008] OJ C5/7.
803Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161.
804See S Peyer, ‘Die private Durchsetzung von kartellrechtlichen Anspru¨chen’ (n 800) 619.
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and covers the disclosure proceeding of files on which a party (usually the claimant)
relies and that have an adverse effect on the case. On the other hand, the CAT also
has the power to order a disclosure but that is regulated in its own procedural law.
However, even though an applicant is successful in claiming pre-action disclosure,
it is nothing more than a costly procedural mechanism because the applicant has to
pay the costs of the respondent.
Finally, the English courts have accepted the need to protect whistle-blowers
and apply the European Regluations set out in the landmark decision of the ECJ in
Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt. Due to this, the courts have to take a decision on a
case-by-case basis to protect the legally protected interests of the leniency applicants.
4.2.2 Access to files of the competition authorities
4.2.2.1 Regulations of English law about access to files in the
possession of the Competition and Markets Authority and the
Competition Appeal Tribunal
Under English law, the regulations that are applicable to the gaining of access to
files of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and the Competition Appeal
Tribunal (CAT) are generally the same that are applicable to disclosure of files in the
possession of the other parties. Therefore, for proceedings in front of the High Court,
the usual CPR disclosure rules apply.805
Even for the CAT, the general disclosure rules apply. However, it is unclear
how the CAT will exercise its broad power to order disclosure. In Umbro
Holdings Ltd v OFT (2004),806 the CAT decided that it is possible to order disclosure
of files withheld in an administrative procedure. The test is whether the disclosure
would or might harm the legitimate business interests of the affected party; whether
the information is relevant to the appeal; and whether any harm that might be
caused to the affected party is outweighed by the interests of justice.807 Consequently,
the disclosure request has to be relevant, proportionate and necessary in order to
be granted.808 In general, requests for internal CMA materials do not fulfil these
criteria.809 Whereas the disclosure of unredacted witness statements as part of
the leniency application and related documents submitted by the OFT can be
considered necessary to allow appellants to exercise their right of appeal,810 it is
usually not necessary to disclose underlying documents.811 Furthermore, the CAT
doubted whether a defendant has a legitimate interest to protect confidentiality
805See above under 4.1.2.
806[2004] CAT 3 at paras 5-55.
807Umbro Holdings Ltd v OFT [2004] CAT 3 at para 34.
808See Claymore Dairies v OFT [2003] CAT 12 at 7.
809Cityhook v OFT [2006] CAT 32 at para 26.
810Claymore Dairies v OFT [2003] CAT 12 at 5.
811Claymore Dairies v OFT [2003] CAT 12 at 7.
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of a note of meeting where it was admitted that an illegal price fixing agreement
was made.812 Also, it is doubtful whether the affected undertaking has a legitimate
interest in maintaining confidentiality over files of a failed leniency application.813
However, based on the mentioned decision of the High Court in National Grid
Electricity Transmission v ABB Ltd,814 it seems to be that the CAT also has to
apply the balancing test of the ECJ in Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt815 and the
rules based on Directive 2014/104/EU.
4.2.2.2 Conclusion: Implementation of a general right of access to files
in the possession of a national competition authority under
national law de lege ferenda
Under English law, the regulations that are applicable in order to gain access to the
files of the CMA and the CAT are generally the same as are applicable for disclosure
of files in the possession of the other parties. Therefore, reference will be made to
the conclusion of chapter 4.1 and the potential need to produce a direct ruling of
the refusal grounds even if it is not doubtful that the English courts will use the
regulation in Directive 2014/104/EU as a means of interpreting the given disclosure
regulation according to case law practice.
4.3 German Law
4.3.1 Access to files of the competition authorities
4.3.1.1 Regulations under German Law about access to files in the
possession of the Bundeskartellamt
Under German law, it might be possible to get access to files of the national
competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt, under Sections 142 to 144 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) and/or Section 406E of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (StPO).
The ruling under Sections 142 to 144 ZPO refers to the general possibility of
access to files in the possession of the defendant or another third party. As mentioned
above, under 4.1.1, the case law of the German courts ruled very clearly that
Sections 142 to 144 ZPO are not a matter of discovery and this only restricts the
burden of proof. The claimant has to refer directly to a document in the possession
of the defendant. Therefore, the claimant has to know about the existence of the
document and not just that it is in its possession, and it is not possible to interpret
812Umbro Holdings Ltd v OFT [2004] CAT 3 at para 35.
813Umbro Holdings Ltd v OFT [2003] CAT 26 at para 41.
814National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd and others [2012] EWHC 869 (Ch).
815Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161.
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the regulations of Sections 142 to 144 ZPO in the sense of a right of discovery or a
general pre-action discovery proceeding. On the other hand, an analogous application
of Sections 142 to 144 ZPO fails because the legal gap of a missing pre-action
discovery proceeding is not contrary to the intention of the German legislator and
hence it is not possible to establish a regulation of pre-action discovery based on the
principle of Good Faith under Section 242 BGB. Furthermore, for access to files in
the possession of a third party, e.g. the Bundeskartellamt, Section 142(2) ZPO rules
a specific right to refuse to give evidence. However, Section 142(2) ZPO only refers
to the rights; they are specifically mentioned in Sections 383 and 384 ZPO. Firstly,
Section 383(1) No 6 ZPO allows a witness to refuse to testify if it is a person:
. . . to whom facts are entrusted, by virtue of [its] office, profession or status,
the nature of which mandates [its] confidentiality, or the confidentiality of
which is mandated by law, where [its] testimony would concern facts to which
the confidentiality obligation refers.
With reference to this, the witness has to be obliged by law to keep information
and files secret that it receives, especially by virtue of his office. Such an obligation
can arise out of Section 203 of the Criminal Code (StGB).816 Here, public officials are
specifically mentioned in Section 203(2) No 1 StGB as persons who are obliged under
threat of punishment to hold information secret. With reference to Section 11(1)
No 2 StGB, public officials are civil servants or judges or persons who otherwise
carry out public functions or who have otherwise been appointed to serve with
a public authority or other agency or have been commissioned to perform public
administrative services regardless of the organisational form chosen to fulfil such
duties. The members of the Bundeskartellamt are at least civil servants and carry
out public functions. Therefore, they are public officials and hence obliged to protect
secrets, especially business secrets.817 Although Section 384 No 3 ZPO protects
secrets as well, the Bundeskartellamt would not usually be able to base a refusal
upon this because Section 384 No 3 ZPO is not applicable regarding secrets of the
proceeding parties.818 It can be concluded, therefore, that the regulations found
in Sections 142 to 144 ZPO are not suitable for gaining access to the files of the
Bundeskartellamt.
Secondly, a claim to gain access to files of the Bundeskartellamt can be based
on Section 406E stop (in conjunction with Sec 46 OWiG819). A public proceeding
816See J Damrau, ‘ZPO § 383 Zeugnisverweigerung aus perso¨nlichen Gru¨nden’ in T Rauscher and
W Kru¨ger (eds), Mu¨nchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung mit Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz
und Nebengesetzen, vol 2 (4th edn, CH Beck 2013) at para 31; S Scheuch, ‘§ 383 Zeugnisverweigerung
aus perso¨nlichen Gru¨nden’ in V Vorwerk and C Wolf, Beck’scher Online-Kommentar ZPO
(19th edn CH Beck 2015) at para 21.1.
817See e.g. BVerfGE 115, 205 at 230; BGH GRUR 2003, 356 at 358 – Pra¨zisionsmessgera¨te;
BGH GRUR 2009, 603 at para 13 – Versicherungsuntervertreter.
818J Damrau (n 816) at para 13.
819Law on misdemeanours, Gesetzes u¨ber Ordnungswidrigkeiten (OWiG).
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in front of a competition authority constitutes a criminal case in its wider sense.
As a consequence, the regulations of the StPO come into effect. According to
Section 406E(1) StPO, the aggrieved party of the cartel has a right of access to the
documents of the competition authority as long as he is able to claim a legitimate
interest. For example, that could arise from Section 33(3) GWB.
However, Section 406E(2) StPO regulates a right to refuse the claim. In its first
two sentences, the paragraph states that:
Inspection of the files shall be refused if overriding interests worthy of
protection, either of the accused or of other persons, constitute an obstacle
thereto. It may be refused if the purpose of the investigation, also in another
criminal proceeding, appears to be jeopardised.
Therefore, a claim can be refused if another criminal proceeding, here especially,
an investigation or infringement proceeding of the Bundeskartellamt, appears to
be jeopardised.820 Furthermore, it is possible to allow partial access to files.821
In its decision in Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt II,822 the Regional Court of
Bonn (Amtsgericht Bonn) stated that the right of a victim to get access to the
information to examine its chances of success in a proceeding does not mean that
the claimant has to have the right to gain access to all files.823 Even here, it is
necessary to find a balance between the interests of information of the victim and
the rights of the defendant to protect its own secrets and especially the right to data
protection.824 In particular, the optional mentions in the leniency application which
are produced by and incriminate the leniency applicant.825 Also, with reference to
the privilege against self-incrimination (nemo tenetur principle) and the reliance on
the confidentiality of the submitted files, it will only be possible to allow access to
files other than the files of leniency applications.826 Furthermore, in its balancing
test, the Regional Court of Bonn decided that it was necessary to protect the files of
the leniency application in order to uphold the attractiveness and acceptance of the
leniency programme. Therefore, the court refused the application to disclose leniency
files, referred to the refusal-clause of sentence 2 of Sec 406e(2) StPO and put the
wording into the concrete terms of a risk of interference in the fact-finding.827
820See H Du¨ck, A Eufinger and M Schultes, ‘Das Spannungsverha¨ltnis zwischen kartellrechtlicher
Kronzeugenregelung und Akteneinsichtsanspruch nach § 406e StPO’ [2012] EuZW 418, 420.
821H Du¨ck, A Eufinger and M Schultes (n 820) 420; A Zabeck, ‘stopp § 406e [Akteneinsicht]’ in
R Hannich, Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung (7th edn, CH Beck 2013) at para 2.
822AG Bonn, NJW 2012, 937 – Pfleiderer II.
823Ibid.
824Esp. AG Bonn, NJW 2012, 937 – Pfleiderer II ; See as well A Zabeck (n 821) at para 6.
825AG Bonn, NJW 2012, 937 – Pfleiderer II.
826So auch H Du¨ck, A Eufinger and M Schultes (n 820) (420-1) und AG Bonn,
GRUR-RR 2012, 178 – Pfleiderer.
827AG Bonn, GRUR-RR 2012, 178 – Pfleiderer ; C Seitz, ‘Public over Private Enforcement of
Competition Law?’ (n 95) 138.
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According to the wording of Section 406e(1) StPO as a facultative provision (shall
be refused, not has to be refused), the competition authority has to decide about an
application to gain access to files on dutifully discretion.828 This opinion is reflected
by the ruling of Directive 2014/2014/EU. Therefore, it is not necessary to find a
different solution or regulation on the possibility of gaining access to files in the
possession of the national competition authority. However, with reference to the
principle of effectiveness, it would be recommended to specify the reasons for a
refusal in competition law cases based on the regulations in Directive 2014/104/EU.
However, even if it will not be regulated, the wording of Section 406e(1) StPO has
to be read in relation to Directive 2014/104/EU, and it is therefore necessary to
uphold the decision of Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt II and the refusal of access to
leniency files.
4.3.1.2 Conclusion: Implementation of a general right of access to files
in the possession of a national competition authority under
national law de lege ferenda
Under German law, the wording of Section 406e(1) StPO allows an application
under the scope of Directive 2014/104/EU. Therefore, it is not necessary to find
a different solution or regulation on the possibility of gaining access to files in the
possession of the national competition authority. However, with reference to the
principle of effectiveness, it would be recommended to specify the reasons for a
refusal in competition law cases based on the regulations in Directive 2014/104/EU.
However, even if it will not be regulated, the wording of Section 406e(1) StPO has
to be read in relation to Directive 2014/104/EU, and it is therefore necessary to
uphold the decision of Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt II and the refusal of access to
leniency files.
4.3.2 Pre-action disclosure of files in the possession of the defendant
under German law
4.3.2.1 No general rule of pre-action disclosure of files in the
possession of the defendant
In general, there is no regulation on pre-trial discovery under German law.829
Only in special law regulations are claimants entitled to gain access to files in the
possession of the defendant or other third parties. That includes regulations, e.g. in
828A Zabeck (n 821) at para 5.
829W-H Roth, ‘Private Enforcement of European Competition Law – Recommendations Flowing
from the German Experience’ in J Basedow (ed), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law
(Kluwer 2007) 77-8 with reference to Sec 20(5) GWB; C-180/95 Nils Draehmpaehl v Urania
Immobilienservice OHG [1997] ECR I-2195 para 29; H Weyer, ‘Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Vergaben
fu¨r das nationale Zivilverfahren’ [2000] EuR 145.
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copyright law (Sec 101a UrhG830), trademark law (Sec 19 MarkenG831) and patent
law (Sec 140b PatG832) as well as property law (Sec 809 BGB). However, there is
no regulation about pre-action disclosure for competition law cases.
Nevertheless, it could be possible to establish a regulation of pre-action discovery
based on the principle of good faith under Section 242 BGB by applying the given
regulations by analogy on civil proceedings based on an infringement of competition
law. This requires that a gap in the regulation is present and that this legal gap is
against the intention of the law-giver. A legal gap exists where there is no explicit
regulation or an existing regulation cannot be interpreted as applicable to the given
case. On the one hand, there is no explicit or interpretable regulation in the German
competition law regulation, the GWB.833 On the other hand, the general regulations
about civil proceedings and access to files of the other party in court and during
civil proceedings, Sections 142 to 144 ZPO,834 could be interpreted as extending the
right of access to files and discovery in court and pre-action.835
Section 142(1) ZPO states that:
[the] court may direct one of the parties or a third party to produce records
or documents, as well as any other material, that are in its possession and to
which one of the parties has made reference. The court may set a deadline
in this regard and may direct that the material so produced remain with the
court registry for a period to be determined by the court.
In addition to this, Section 144(1) ZPO says that:
[the] court may direct that visual evidence is to be taken on site, and may also
direct that experts are to prepare a report. For this purpose, it may direct that
a party to the proceedings or a third party produce an object in its possession,
and may set a corresponding deadline therefor. The court may also direct that
a party is to tolerate a measure taken under the first sentence hereof, unless
this measure concerns a residence.
Both regulations together can be read as a distinct disclosure regulation for
civil proceedings that directly apply to applications for disclosure during a trial.
Only referencing to the wording of both sections, it is not clear whether the
830German Copyright Act, Gesetz u¨ber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte
(Urheberrechtsgesetz – UrhG).
831German Trade Mark Act, Gesetz u¨ber den Schutz von Marken und sonstigen Kennzeichen
(Markengesetz – MarkenG).
832German Patents Act, Patentgesetz (PatG).
833German Act Against Restraints of Competition, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschra¨nkungen
(GWB).
834Civil procedure code of Germany, Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO).
835GM Beckhaus, Die Bewa¨ltigung von Informationsdefiziten bei der Sachverhaltsaufkla¨rung –
Die Enforcement-Richtlinie als Ausgangspunkt fu¨r die Einfu¨hrung einer allgemeinen Informations-
leistungspflicht in das deutsche Zivilrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2010).
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regulations about producing evidence by the defendant under Section 142 ZPO (and
Section 143 ZPO) and the possibility of assessment of evidence by the claimant or
third parties under Section 144 ZPO are solely applicable to applications in trial and
not pre-action. However, the case law of the German courts ruled very clearly that
Sections 142 to 144 ZPO are not a matter of discovery and only restrict the burden
of proof.836 It is still necessary for the claimant to substantiate its pleading.837 The
court itself has to choose whether it believes the claimant or whether it wants to
see further documents about the pleading of the claimant from the defendant. The
claimant has the right to order the production of evidence by the defendant.838
Furthermore, the claimant has to refer directly to a document in the possession
of the defendant.839 Therefore, the claimant has to know about the existence of
the document and not just that it is in its possession. Therefore, it is not possible
to interpret the regulations of Sections 142 to 144 ZPO in the sense of a right of
discovery or a general pre-action discovery proceeding.
This indicates that there is a legal gap because there is no explicit regulation
about pre-action disclosure under the German law of civil proceedings or competition
law in particular, and existing regulations about in-trial disclosure cannot be applied
to a pre-trial action. Furthermore, an analogous application requires that the legal
gap is contrary to the concept adopted by the law-giver and, thus, the law-giver
would regulate the issue in the proposed manner.
With reference to the existing regulations in copyright law (Sec 101a UrhG),
trademark law (Sec 19 MarkenG), patent law (Sec 140b PatG) and property
law (Sec 809 BGB), the lawgiver has recognised the lack of regulation and has shown
836Clearly expressed by BGH NJW 2007, 2989 at 2992 as well as BGH WM 2010, 1448
at 1451; G Ru¨hl, ‘Die Begrenzung des § 142 ZPO durch das Anwaltsprivileg’ [2012] ZZP
25, 33; See e.g. BGH WM 1995, 341; BGH NJW 2007, 155; BGH NJW-RR 2007, 1393;
BGH WM 2014, 1379; OLG Stuttgart NJW 2007, 2989 at 2991.; I Saenger, ‘Grundfragen und
aktuelle Probleme des Beweisrechts aus deutscher Sicht’ (2008) 121 ZZP 139, 146 ff.; J Zekoll
and J Bolt, ‘Die Pflicht zur Vorlage von Urkunden im Zivilprozeß – Amerikanische Verha¨ltnisse in
Deutschland?’ [2002] NJW 3129, 3130; R Greger, ‘Ein Beitrag des Prozessrechts zur Versachlichung
der fiktiven Reparaturkostenabrechnung’ [2002] NJW 1477, 1478; G Wagner, ‘Urkundenedition
durch Prozeßparteien – Auskunftspflicht und Weigerungsrechte’ [2007] JZ 706, 712; A Stadler,
‘ZPO § 142 Anordnung der Urkundenvorlegung’ in H-J Musielak and W Voit, Zivilprozessordnung,
Kommentar (12th edn, Vahlen 2015) at para 1; Cf Steuer S, ‘Justizreform – von außen
betrachtet’ [2000] WM 1889; Oberheim R, ‘ZPO-Reform Update 1: Grundzu¨ge’ [2002] JA 408, 412;
Konrad S, ‘Der Schutz der Vertrauensspha¨re zwischen Rechtsanwalt und Mandant im Zivilprozess’
[2004] NJW 710; Kraayvanger J and Hilgard MC, ‘Urkundenvorlegung im Zivilprozess. Anna¨herung
an das amerikanische ”discovery”-Verfahren?’ [2003] NJ 572, 573.
837BGH NJW 2007, 2989; BGH WM 2014, 1379; BGH WM 2010, 1448; BGH WM 1995, 341;
H Wo¨stmann, ‘ZPO § 144 Augenschein; Sachversta¨ndige’ in I Saenger, Zivilprozessordnung (n 513)
at para 1-2.
838BGH NJW 2007, 155; H Wo¨stmann, ‘ZPO § 142 Anordnung der Urkundenvorlegung’ in
I Saenger, Zivilprozessordnung (n 513) at para 1.
839A Stadler, ‘ZPO § 142 Anordnung der Urkundenvorlegung’ (n 836) in H-J Musielak and
W Voit, Zivilprozessordnung, Kommentar (12th edn, Vahlen 2015) at para 4; Reichold K,
‘§ 142 Anordnung der Urkundenvorlegung’ in H Thomas and H Putzo, Zivilprozessordnung,
Kommentar (36th edn, CH Beck 2015) at para 1; H Wo¨stmann, ‘ZPO § 142 Anordnung der
Urkundenvorlegung’ (n 838) at para 4.
147
a willingness to regulate the matter of disclosure. Further, there is no indication that
the lawgiver has not recognised the matter in competition law. It seems more likely
that the lawgiver did not want to regulate disclosure in competition law as it is
regulated in the mentioned laws.
Therefore, the analogous application of the pre-action discovery rules fails
because the legal gap is not contrary to the intention of the German legislator and
hence it is not possible to establish a regulation of pre-action discovery based on the
principle of good faith under Section 242+BGB.
4.3.2.2 Conclusion
Under German law, the requirement to transpose the European ruling in
Directive 2014/104/EU is made more difficulty because, as mentioned above,
there is no possibility of pre-trial disclosure de lege lata. Therefore, it is necessary to
implement the ruling of Art 5 Directive 2014/104/EU in the national competition
regulation in the GWB. Regarding the existing regulations of pre-trial disclosure
in copyright law (Sec 101a UrhG), trade-mark law (Sec 19 MarkenG), patent
law (Sec 140b PatG) and property law (Sec 809 BGB), it is necessary to provide
a detailed regulation about pre-trial disclosure for civil damage claims based on
an infringement of European competition law. Therefore, the German law-giver
should produce a regulation like Section 89B GWB under the chapter Civil Claims
of the title Proceedings where it rules a pre-trial disclosure regulation according to
Directive 2014/104/EU.
4.4 Conclusion: Follow-on claims as the most
effective approach to civil proceedings and the
implementation of Directive 2014/104/EU
into national law
Considering the problems in establishing a general law of disclosure to get access to
information or documents in the possession of the defendant, it is possible that a
proceeding or decisions of the European Commission or other national competition
authorities of the Member States have the effect of a civil damage proceeding. Based
on the approach in Regulation 1/2003, these claims are known as follow-on claims in
contrast to stand-alone cases without any proceeding of the competition authorities.
In summary, it can be stated that the effectiveness of private enforcement of
European competition law is based on effective access to pre-trial information and
the possibility to use files in the possession of the defendant or the competition
authority to establish a case. Regarding this, European law stresses the necessity
148
to improve the possibility for claimants to gain access to relevant files. However, on
the other hand, it is apprehensive about negative effects, especially the possibility of
overly-broad and burdensome disclosure obligations, including the risk of abuse and
interference in the European leniency regime. Furthermore, the law has to consider
the general principle of protection of confidential business information.
Regarding the possibility of pre-action disclosure and access to files in
the possession of the defendant, European law, and especially the recent
Directive 2014/104/EU, requires the implementation of a general right of disclosure
of files in the possession of the defendant or other party of the proceeding in national
law. Although this proceeding has to be based on the principles of plausibility and
proportionality, EU law does not regulate the question of limitation of the scope
of disclosure. The Directive rules that files are disclosable even if they contain
confidential information and the national civil court has the duty to protect the
legal interest of the involved or third parties, e.g. by blacking parts of the files not
relevant for the case. Under English law, the transposition is quite easy because
the law in force allows a wide pre-trial disclosure and recognises the EU case
law. However, with reference to the principle of effectiveness it is recommended to
specify the reasons for a refusal in competition law cases based on the regulations
in Directive 2014/104/EU. Under German law, it is necessary to create a new
regulation about pre-trial disclosure in the GWB that is analogous to copyright law,
trademark law, patent law and property law.
In addition, the chapter showed that follow-on claims seem to be the most efficient
way of claiming damages based on an infringement of competition law because it is
not necessary to prove an infringement if a national competition authority or the
European Commission already adopted an infringement decision. The focal point
is the binding effect of the infringement decision. Since Directive 2014/104/EU not
only decisions of the European Commission are binding, but also decisions of the
national competition authority in which the civil damage claim proceeds. However,
infringement decisions of the competition authority of the Member State in which the
civil proceeding is pending and decisions of foreign national competition authorities
only work as prima facie evidence.
However, the national civil courts are only bound in the question of an
infringement of competition law, not for damages or causality. Therefore, it is still
necessary for the claimant to get access to files relevant to prove these points.
The law in force rules on access to documents in the possession of the European
Commission and the protection of applicants of the European leniency programme
under EU secondary law. Besides the possibility of the claimant using the public
information of the Commission, the claimant is also entitled to apply for pre-trial
discovery mainly under Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 (Transparency Regulation). This
regulation provides the rules that govern the rights of every EU citizen to gain access
149
to documents in the possession of any EU institution. Although the main principle is
to gain public access to documents, Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 provides a number
of exceptions when the application can be refused. Although the ECJ clarified that
the European Commission has to provide a concrete and individual examination for
each requested document before refusing the application, the Commission has shown
a reluctance to provide documents for a possible claimant under this provision.
However, the ruling of European law under Directive 2014/104/EU states
that the Member States have to provide a national regulation about disclosure
of files in the possession of the national competition authority. Here, the courts
have to decide on a case-by-case basis and apply a balancing test. The Member
States have to ensure that leniency statements and settlement submissions are
secured for disclosure. In contrast to the disclosure of files in the possession of
the defendant, in Section 406E(1) StPO German law already allows access to files
in the possession of the competition authority and protects the files of leniency
applicants according to the ruling under Directive 2014/104/EU. Therefore, it
is not necessary to find a different solution or regulation to make it possible
to gain access to files in the possession of the national competition authority.
However, with reference to the principle of effectiveness it is recommended that
the reasons for a refusal in competition law cases are specified based on the
regulations in Directive 2014/104/EU. Even if it is not regulated, the wording of
Section 406e(1) StPO has to be read in relation to Directive 2014/104/EU, and it is
therefore necessary to uphold the decision of Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt II and
the refusal of access to leniency files. Under English law, the regulations that are
applicable for gaining access to files of the CMA and the CAT are generally the same
as those that apply to disclosure of files in the possession of the other parties; it is
only necessary to clarify the refusal grounds according to Directive 2014/104/EU
which are slightly different to files in the possession of the defendant.
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5. Conclusion
In summary, it can be said, firstly, that private enforcement of European competition
law is underdeveloped, but still necessary as access to individual justice.
With reference to a purely quantitative analysis, the number of cases of damage
claims is marginal in relation to the number of fine decisions by the Commission
and they are more in relation to the number of imposed undertakings. This is based
on the history of competition law in Europe. However, with reference to the basis of
European competition law in the antitrust law of the US, the strong position of the
European Commission (and the other national competition authorities) in public
enforcement is the key difference to US competition law which is largely based on
private enforcement because it lacks public enforcement authorities.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the European leniency programmes is a
reason for weak private competition law enforcement. The information gathering
of competition authorities within public enforcement proceedings is based on a
procedural and institutional inquisitorial system. The given rights of the European
Commission make its fine proceedings an effective information gathering system
and thus an effective way of detecting and proving an infringement of European
competition law, especially Art 101 TFEU. Moreover, the Commission has to rely
on members of cartels to apply for leniency and therefore to disclose a hidden
infringement, i.e. cartel. On the other hand, the leniency programme is efficient
because it gives psychological incentives to the members of the cartel to disclose the
infringement and to obtain fine immunity. This psychological phenomenon is based
on the so-called Prisoners Dilemma of the Game Theory. Therefore, an efficient
leniency programme has to offer effective protection to its whistle-blowers. However,
this protection policy is in conflict with an effective private enforcement because the
private plaintiffs have to provide evidence of an infringement.
That goes against the general burden of proof in civil damage claims. Under
German law, Sec 33(3) GWB – the core regulation about civil damage claims based
on an infringement of competition law – requires the proof of damages to be causally
based on the infringement and the culpability of the infringer besides an infringement
of Art 101 or 102 TFEU (or the equivalent regulation of Sec 1 or Secs 19-21 GWB).
In addition, English law requires a link between the infringement and the damage.
Although the requirement to provide a link between the infringement and the damage
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is a significant simplification for the claimant in competition law cases, it is still
necessary to bring evidence about a causal link between the infringement of Art 101
or 102 TFEU and the suffered damage. For the quantification of the damage, the
English lawgivers want to introduce a rebuttable presumption of loss based on a
presumption that a cartel had increased its prices by a fixed amount.
On the other hand, private enforcement and especially civil damage necessary
to achieve access to individual justice. Based on the basic definition of justice by
Aristotle and his distinction between universal and individual justice, as well as
corrective and distributive justice, it is necessary for a legal enforcement system to
achieve the aims of all forms of justice. It is therefore necessary for a legal system
to promote individual justice as well as ensure a system of effective enforcement of
individual rights of every victim guaranteed by law to promote universal justice.
Furthermore, universal justice and distributive justice are connected and can be
achieved by an effective punishment regime, i.e. public enforcement. Regarding
Aristotle’s moral definition of distributive justice, he describes how it is an equal
allocation of goods, and justice can be described as a good itself and an equal
allocation of justice is a way to achieve distributive justice. Therefore, the strict
distinction between universal and distributive justice as part of individual justice
as set out by Aristotle is diffuse or ambiguous. Therefore, public enforcement
is a complement to a (private) system of restitution in providing individual and
corrective justice. The primary goal of private law enforcement is compensation of
victims for damages caused by competition law infringements. In consequence, even
if private enforcement has an impact on deterrence and universal justice, public
enforcement is indispensable.
Secondly, because of the underdevelopment, it is necessary to implement a
general right of pre-action disclosure and access to files in the possession of the
competition authorities to improve the effectiveness of private enforcement of
European competition law.
Whereas the general burden of proof in adversarial procedural systems works
quite well and is a matter of fair proceeding, it is a reason for the weakness of
private enforcement in competition law cases because the relevant evidence for a
successful claim is in the possession of the defendant. As mentioned above, cartels
are a form of organised crime, and it is a common phenomenon that externals find
it difficult to gather evidence, especially for the infringement of the law itself and
the suffered harm. Furthermore, customers only have the documentation about their
contracts with their direct suppliers, and they usually do not know anything about
the internal cartel agreement yet this agreement is the main infringement of the
competition law. Therefore, it is necessary to find a mechanism to provide access to
that evidence for the plaintiff whilst not bypassing the principle of the adversarial
system.
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It would seem that German and English law found a way to handle the
information asymmetry in competition law cases regarding the burden of proof in
civil damage claims based on an infringement of Art 101 and 102 TFEU. Under
German law, Sec 287 ZPO allows the estimation of damages by the court. Moreover,
with reference to the information asymmetry of evidence in competition law cases,
the courts do not impose high requirements on the presentation of evidence as a basis
for the estimation. On the other hand, the ORWI decision of the Federal Court of
Justice of Germany leads to the conclusion that it would support the inapplicability
of the passing-on defence under German law. Whereas the first is compatible with the
Directive 2014/104/EU and also recognises the Communication and Practical Guide
of the European Commission on quantification of harm, the latter has to be amended
with reference to the adverse Art 13 of Directive 2014/104/EU which requires that
the Member States shall ensure that the passing-on defence is applicable. Under
English law, the claimant has to provide evidence for a causal link between the
infringement and the damage. For the quantification of the damage itself, the
English lawgivers want to introduce a rebuttable presumption of loss based on the
presumption that a cartel had increased its prices by a fixed amount. With reference
to the Communication on the quantification of harm by the European Commission,
that solution could help to improve private enforcement of European competition
law.
Furthermore, follow-on claims are an effective way of harmonising cooperation
between public and private enforcement of European competition law. The central
element of the effectiveness of follow-on claims and its advantage over stand-alone
cases is the binding effect of the administrative decisions of the competition
authorities and the cessation of the burden to prove that infringement. Although, if
the facts of the cases are congruent, the national civil court is bound by the factual
as well as legal evaluation of the case, it is not automatically an infringement of the
binding effect if a national court dismisses a civil damage claim even if the European
Commission or a national competition authority proved an infringement of Art 101
or 102 TFEU. This is because the infringement of competition law is only one part
of a civil damage claim and the binding effect is limited to that infringement.
Beside this, prior to Directive 2014/104/EU there was no regulation about the
binding effect of infringement decisions of national competition authorities of the
Member States. With reference to the ruling in Directive 2014/104/EU, this question
has to be distinguished in decisions of the competition authority in the same Member
State in which the civil proceeding is placed and national competition authorities of
other Member States. Art 9(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU rules that of infringement
decisions of the national competition authorities in the same Member State in
which the civil proceeding is placed have an irrefutable binding effect. On the other
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hand, decisions of foreign national competition authorities only work as prima facie
evidence in a civil proceeding as per Art 9(2) Directive 2014/104/EU.
To allow an effective claim and to provide evidence for the facts that are not part
of the binding effect, European law emphasises on access rights for the claimant to
files in the possession of the competition authority and the defendant. Therefore,
Directive 2014/104/EU obliges the Member States to implement regulations about
access to files in the possession of the national competition authority as well as in the
possession of the defendant. Thus, national courts are, on the one hand, entitled to
order the disclosure of files in the possession of the national competition authority on
a case-by-case basis and apply a balancing test according to Directive 2014/104/EU.
On the other hand, this recent EU law requires the implementation of a disclosure
proceeding based on the principles of plausibility and proportionality. This requires
that facts sufficient to support the plausibility of the claim be made reasonably
available, that it is possible to pinpoint or narrow the evidence and that a court
considers the application of disclosure as proportionate to the expense of the obliged
party. Furthermore, Art 5(4) of Directive 2014/104/EU rules that files are disclosable
even if they contain confidential information and the national civil court has the duty
to protect the legal interests of the involved or third parties, e.g. by blacking parts
of the files not relevant for the case.
Under English law, the emphasis of providing information is pre-action disclosure
of files in the possession of the defendant. The standard regulation about disclosure
under English law applies in civil damage claims based on an infringement of
competition law in the High Court and covers the disclosure proceeding of files
on which a party (usually the claimant) relies and that have an adverse effect on the
case. On the other hand, the CAT also has the power to order a disclosure but that
is regulated in its own procedural law. On the other hand, the regulations that are
applicable in order to gain access to the files of the CMA and the CAT are generally
the same as are applicable for disclosure of files in the possession of the other parties.
In opposition to this, German law puts the emphasis on access to files
in the possession of the competition authorities. Under German law, the
wording of Section 406e(1) StPO allows an application under the scope of
Directive 2014/104/EU. Therefore, it is not necessary to find a different solution
or regulation on the possibility of gaining access to files in the possession of
the national competition authority. However, with reference to the principle
of effectiveness, it would be recommended to specify the reasons for a refusal
in competition law cases based on the regulations in Directive 2014/104/EU.
On the other hand, the requirement to transpose the European ruling in
Directive 2014/104/EU is made more difficulty because there is no possibility
of pre-trial disclosure de lege lata. Therefore, it is necessary to implement the ruling
of Art 5 Directive 2014/104/EU in the national competition regulation in the GWB.
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Regarding the existing regulations of pre-trial disclosure in copyright law (Sec 101a
UrhG), trademark law (Sec 19 MarkenG), patent law (Sec 140b PatG) and property
law (Sec 809 BGB), it is necessary to provide a detailed regulation about pre-trial
disclosure for civil damage claims based on an infringement of European competition
law. Therefore, the German lawgiver should produce a regulation like Section 89B
GWB under the chapter Civil Claims of the title Proceedings where it rules a
pre-trial disclosure regulation according to Directive 2014/104/EU.
In summary, it can be stated that the effectiveness of private enforcement of
European competition law is based on effective access to pre-trial information and
the possibility to use files in the possession of the defendant or the competition
authority to establish a case. Regarding this, European law stresses the necessity to
improve the possibility for claimants to gain access to relevant files.
Finally, it is necessary to protect the documents provided by the leniency regimes
to uphold the effectiveness of public enforcement and to streamline the overall
effectiveness of enforcement of European competition law.
This is necessary because both forms of enforcement are necessary and have
different aims. The primary goal of private law enforcement is the compensation of
victims for damages caused by competition law infringements. The main outcome for
private claims for damages is to establish corrective justice. Therefore, even if private
enforcement has an impact on deterrence and universal justice, public enforcement is
indispensable. On the other hand, it suffices to look to the workload of competition
authorities to see that public enforcement can only be concentrated on the most
damaging infractions of competition law. With regard to the deterrent effect, it is
just a minor weakness but, with reference to justice, it leads to a major problem.
That enforcement gap or gap of justice can only be bridged through a combined law
enforcement with a strong private part avoiding the intervention-oriented approach
of public competition law enforcement.
Regarding the effectiveness of public enforcement, an effective leniency regime
is the key point of information gathering for the competition authorities. Although
the Commission has the right to investigate a breach of Art 101 or 102 TFEU, in
practice it is quite difficult to recognise a breach of competition law and to find
evidence for it. With reference to the proceedings of the European Commission
from September 2006 to June 2014, approximately every fine proceeding is based
on a leniency application. Transferring the situation from the so-called Prisoners
Dilemma of Game Theory to a competition law scenario, the decision making of
the members of a cartel is affected by the possibility of immunity or the reduction
of fines if they confess and cooperate with the competition authorities to help to
uncover and collect evidence of the breach of competition law. In a competition
law context, it is therefore always preferable for a member of a cartel to co-operate
with the competition authorities and to apply for a leniency programme. Besides
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the investigation effect, leniency regimes have a deterrent effect too. If a member of
cartel cannot be sure that the other members of the cartel are not cooperating with
the competition authorities, they are less likely to join a cartel.
Therefore, it is necessary to protect leniency documents provided by members
of the cartel to ensure the effectiveness of the leniency program. With reference to
the landmark decision of the ECJ in Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt, English and
German courts have accepted the need to protect whistle-blowers. Due to this, the
courts have to take a decision on a case-by-case basis to protect the legally protected
interests of the leniency applicants. However, the ruling of European law under
Directive 2014/104/EU states that the Member States have to provide a national
regulation about disclosure of files in the possession of the national competition
authority. Here, the courts have to decide on a case-by-case basis and apply a
balancing test. The Member States have to ensure that leniency statements and
settlement submissions are secured for disclosure. In contrast to the disclosure of files
in the possession of the defendant, in Section 406E(1) StPO German law already
allows access to files in the possession of the competition authority and protects the
files of leniency applicants according to the ruling under Directive 2014/104/EU.
Therefore, it is not necessary to find a different solution or regulation to make
it possible to gain access to files in the possession of the national competition
authority. However, with reference to the principle of effectiveness it is recommended
that the reasons for a refusal in competition law cases are specified based on the
regulations in Directive 2014/104/EU. Even if it is not regulated, the wording of
Section 406e(1) StPO has to be read in relation to Directive 2014/104/EU, and
it is therefore necessary to refuse access to leniency files. Under English law, the
regulations that are applicable for gaining access to files of the CMA and the CAT
are generally the same as those that apply to disclosure of files in the possession
of the other parties; it is only necessary to clarify the refusal grounds according to
Directive 2014/104/EU which are slightly different to files in the possession of the
defendant.
156
Bibliography
——, ‘Principles for Leniency Programmes’ Directors’ General of European
Competition Authorities meeting in Dublin on 3 and 4 September 2001 <http:
//www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/2001-09-04ecaleniencyprinci
ples.pdf> accessed 01/03/2016
——, <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.
pdf> accessed 01/03/2016
Agylaeus H, The Civil law, including the Twelve tables: the Institutes of Gaius, the
Rules of Ulpian, the Opinions of Paulus, the Enactments of Justinian, and the
Constitutions of Leo, vol 2 (SP Scott tr, The Central Trust Company 1932)
Albors-Llorens A, ‘Courage v Crehan: judicial activism or consistent approach?’
(2002) 61 CLJ 1
Alpmann J, ‘§ 280 BGB’ in M Junker, RM Beckmann and H Ru¨ßmann (eds), juris
Praxiskommentar BGB, vol 2 (7th edn, juris 2014)
Anderson DG, ‘Damages for Breach of Competition Rules’ in M Andenas and
F Jacobs (eds), European Community Law in the English Courts (OUP 1998)
Aresu A, ‘Optimal contract reformation as a new approach to private antitrust
damages in cartel cases’ (2010) 35 ELRev 349
Aristotle, Politics (H Rackham tr, Harvard University Press 1944)
——, Nicomachean Ethics (JAK Thomson tr, Penguin 1955)
——, Eudemian Ethics (H Rackham tr, Harvard University Press 1961)
Atiyah PS, ‘Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations’ in PS Atiyah (ed),
Essays on Contract (OUP 1990)
——, ‘Fuller and the Theory of Contract’ in PS Atiyah (ed), Essays on Contract
(OUP 1990)
Audretsch DB, Baumol W and Burke AE, ‘Competition Policy in Dynamic Markets’
(2001) 19 IntJIndOrgan 613
Babirad RM, ‘The Commission’s proposal for a Directive on damages for
anti-competitive infringements: an increase in evidentiary accessibility,
disclosure and legal certainty for private litigants’ [2013] GCLR 155
157
Bacher K, ‘§ 287 Schadensermittlung; Ho¨he der Forderung’ in V Vorwerk and
C Wolf (eds), Beck'scher Online-Kommentar ZPO (16th edn, CH Beck 2015)
Barnett RE, ‘Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice’ (1977) 87 Ethics 279
——, ‘The Justice of Restitution’ (1980) 25 AmJJuris 117
Barthelmeß S and Rudolf L-P, ‘VO 1/2003, Art. 18’ in U Loewenheim, KM Meessen
and A Riesenkampff (eds), Kartellrecht (2nd edn, CH Beck 2009)
Basedow J, ‘Die Aufgabe der Verzugszinsen in Recht und Wirtschaft. Bemerkungen
zu § 288 BGB und § 352 HGB’ (1979) 143 ZHR 317
Bebr G, ‘The European Coal and Steel Community: A Political and Legal
Innovation’ (1953) 63 YaleLRev 1
Bechtold R, ‘Grundlegende Umgestaltung des Kartellrechts: Zum Referentenentwurf
der 7. GWB-Novelle’ [2004] DB 235
——, ‘Zum Ermessen der Kommission in Bußgeldverfahren’ [2009] WuW 1115
Becker GS, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76
JPolEcon 169
Becker R, ‘VO (EG) 1/2003 Artikel 15 Zusammenarbeit mit Gerichten der
Mitgliedstaaten’ in H von der Groeben, J Schwarze and A Hatje (eds),
Europa¨isches Unionsrecht (7th edn, CH Beck 2015)
Beckhaus GM, Die Bewa¨ltigung von Informationsdefiziten bei der Sachverhaltsauf-
kla¨rung – Die Enforcement-Richtlinie als Ausgangspunkt fu¨r die Einfu¨hrung
einer allgemeinen Informationsleistungspflicht in das deutsche Zivilrecht (Mohr
Siebeck 2010)
Bekker EI, Die Aktionen des Ro¨mischen Privatrechts, vol 1 (Vahlen 1871)
Beninca J, ‘Schadensersatzanspru¨che von Kunden eines Kartells?’ [2004] WuW 604
Beno¨hr H-P, ‘Die Entscheidung des BGB fu¨r das Verschuldensprinzip’ (1978) 46
TvR 1
——, ‘Die Redaktion der Paragraphen 823 und 826 BGB’ in R Zimmermann (ed),
Rechtsgeschichte und Privatrechtsdogmatik (CF Mu¨ller 1999)
Berrisch GM and Burianski M, ‘Kartellrechtliche Schadensersatzanspru¨che
nach der 7. GWB-Novelle. Eine Einscha¨tzung der Zukunft privater
Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung mittels Schadensersatzklagen in Deutschland’
[2005] WuW 878
Bezzenberger T, ‘Das Verbot des Zinseszinses’ (2002) 32 WM 1617
Bien F, ‘Wozu brauchen wir die Richtlinie u¨ber private Kartellschadensersatzklagen
noch?’ [2013] NZKart 481
Bien G, ‘Gerechtigkeit bei Aristoteles’ in O Ho¨ffe (ed), Aristoteles, Nikomachische
Ethik (2nd edn, Akademie Verlag 2006)
158
Birks P, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: an Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26
UWAustlLRev 1
Blanke H-J, ‘EU-GRCharta Art. 48 – Unschuldsvermutung und Verteidigungsrechte’
in Calliess C and Ruffert M (eds), (4th edn, CH Beck 2011)
Blatter M, Emons W and Sticher S, Optimal leniency programs when firms have
cumulative and asymmetric evidence, Discussion Paper No 10106 (CEPR 2014)
Bo¨ge U and Ost K, ‘Up and Running, or Is it? Priavte Enforcement – The Stituation
in Germany and Policy Perspectives’ (2006) 27 ECLR 197
Bo¨hmer E, ‘Anwendung von § 829 BGB bei außerdeliktischen Schadensersatzfa¨llen’
[1967] NJW 865
Bornkamm J, ‘Die Masterfoods-Entscheidung des EuGH: Bindung der Zivilgerichte
an Kommissionsentscheidungen. Lehren fu¨r das neue Kartellverfahren?’
[2003] ZWeR 75
——, ‘§ 33 GWB – Unterlassungsanspruch, Schadensersatzpflicht’ in E Langen and
H-J Bunte (eds), Kartellrecht, vol 1 (12th edn, Lucherhand 2014)
Bourjade S, ‘The role of private litigation in antitrust enforcement’ (2010) 3
GCLR 118
Brealey M and Green N, Competition Litigation, UK Practice and Procedure
(OUP 2010)
Brinker I, ‘Overview of Damage Actions in EU – An Private Enforcement of
Competition Laws’ [2003] IBL 171
Brokx LMM, ‘A patchwork of leniency programmes’ (2001) 22 ECLR 35
Bru¨ggemeier G, ‘Gesellschaftliche Schadensverteilung und Deliktsrecht’ (1982) 182
AcP 385
——, Deliktsrecht – ein Hand- und Lehrbuch (Nomos 1986)
——, ‘Judizielle Schutzpolitik de lega lata – Zur Rekonstruktion des
BGB-Deliktsrechts’ [1986] JZ 969
——, Haftungsrecht: Struktur, Prinzipien, Schutzbereich (Springer 2006)
Buccirossia P and Spagnolo G, Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions,
Discussion Paper No 5442 (CEPR 2006)
——, ‘Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers’ in V Ghosal and J Stennek (eds),
The Political Economy of Antitrust (Elsevier 2007)
Bulst FW, ‘Internationale Zusta¨ndigkeit, anwendbares Recht und Schadensbe-
rechnung im Kartelldeliktsrecht’ [2004] EWS 403
——, ‘Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung durch die Marktgegenseite: deutsche
Gerichte auf Kollisionskurs zum EuGH’ [2004] NJW 2201
159
——, Schadensersatzanspru¨che der Marktgegenseite im Kartellrecht – zur
Schadensabwa¨lzung nach deutschem, europa¨ischem und US-amerikanischem
Recht (Nomos 2006)
Bundeskartellamt, Erfolgreiche Kartellverfolgung: Nutzen fu¨r Wirtschaft und
Verbraucher (Bonn 2011)
Burrichter J and Hennig TT, ‘VO 1/2003 Art. 18. Auskunftsverlangen’ in
U Immenga and E-J Mestma¨cker (eds), Wettbewerbsrecht, vol 1 (5th edn,
CH Beck 2012)
Burrows A, Understanding the Law of Obligations: Essays on Contract, Tort and
Restitution (Hart Pub 1998)
Busse M and Leopold A, ‘Entscheidungen u¨ber Verpflichtungszusagen nach Art. 9
VO (EG) Nr. 1/2003’ [2005] WuW 146
Cahn A, ‘Zwingendes EG-Recht und Verfahrensautonomie der Mitgliedstaaten’
[1998] ZEuP 974
Canaris C-W, ‘Schutzgesetze – Verkehrspflichten – Schutzpflichten’ in C-W Canaris
and U Diederichsen (eds), Festschrift fu¨r Karl Larenz zum 80 Geburtstag am
23 April 1983 (CH Beck 1983)
Cane P, The anatomy of tort law (Hart Pub 1997)
——, ‘The Anatomy of Private Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25
OJLS 203
Canenbley C and Steinvorth T, ‘Kartellbußgeldverfahren, Kronzeugenregelungen
und Schadensersatz – Liegt die Lo¨sung des Konflikts »de lege ferenda«
in einem einheitlichen Verfahren?’ in FIW (ed), Wettbewerbspolitik und
Kartellrecht in der Marktwirtschaft – Festschrift 50 Jahre FIW: 1960 bis 2010
(Heymanns 2010)
Chapman B, ‘Ethical Issues in the Law of Tort’ in MD Bayles and B Chapman (eds),
Justice, Rights, and Tort Law (Reidel 1983)
Chappatte P and Walter P, ‘European Union’ in CA Varney (ed), The Cartels and
Leniency Review (2nd edn, Law Business Research 2014)
Chirit¸a˘ AD, ‘A Legal Historical Review of the EU Competition Rules’ (2014) 63
ICQL 2
Cicero MT, De Officiis (W Miller tr, Harvard University Press 1931)
Clark E, Hughes M and Wirth D, ‘Study on the conditions of claims for damages in
case of infringement of EC competition rules’ (2004) <http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/economic_clean_en.pdf>
accessed 01/03/2016
Coing H, Die obersten Grundsa¨tze des Rechts: ein Versuch zur Neugru¨ndung des
Naturrechts (Schneider 1947)
160
D'Sa RM, European Community Law and Civil Remedies in England and Wales
(Sweet & Maxwell 1994)
Dalheimer D, ‘Art. 3 Verha¨ltnis zwischen den Artikeln 81 und 82 des Vertrags
und dem einzelstaatlichen Wettbewerbsrecht’ in E Grabitz, M Hilf and
M Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europa¨ischen Union (40th edn, CH Beck
2009)
——, ‘Art. 15 Zusammenarbeit mit Gerichten der Mitgliedstaaten’ in E Grabitz,
M Hilf and M Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europa¨ischen Union (40th edn,
CH Beck 2009)
——, ‘Art. 16 Einheitliche Anwendung des gemeinschaftlichen Wettbewerbsrechts’
in E Grabitz, M Hilf and M Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europa¨ischen
Union (40th edn, CH Beck 2009)
Damrau J, ‘ZPO § 383 Zeugnisverweigerung aus perso¨nlichen Gru¨nden’
in T Rauscher and W Kru¨ger (eds), Mu¨nchener Kommentar zur
Zivilprozessordnung mit Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, vol 2
(4th edn, CH Beck 2013)
Dannecker G and Biermann J, ‘VO 1/2003, Art. 23, Geldbußen’ in U Immenga and
E-J Mestma¨cker (eds), Wettbewerbsrecht, vol 2 (5th edn, CH Beck 2012)
Daube D, Studies in Biblical Law (CUP 1947)
de Bracton H, Bracton on the laws and customs of England (De Legibus
et Consuetudinibus Angliae) (GE Woodbine and SE Thorne trs, Harvard
University Press 1968-1977)
de Bronett G-K, ‘VO 1/2003, Vor Art. 17’ in H Schro¨ter et al (eds), Europa¨isches
Wettbewerbsrecht (2nd edn, Nomos 2014)
de Burca G and Scott J, ‘Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’
in G de Burca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US
(Hart Pub 2006)
de Cruz P, Comparative Law in a Changing World (3rd edn, Routledge
Cavendish 2007)
de Glanvill R, The treatise on the laws and customs of the realm of England,
commonly called Glanvill (Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni
Angliae) (GDG Hall tr, Clarendon Press 1993)
De Smijter E and Sinclair A (eds), The Enforcement System under Regulation 1/2003
(3rd edn, OUP 2014)
De Stefano G, ‘Access of damage claimants to evidence arising out of EU cartel
investigations: a fast evolving scenario’ [2012] 5(3) GCLR 95
Deakin S, Johnston A and Markesinis B, Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law (7th edn,
OUP 2012)
Deards E, ‘”Curiouser and Curiouser”? The Development of Member State Liability
in the Court of Justice’ (1997) 3 EPL 117
161
Deringer A, Rapport fait au nom de la commission du marche´ interieur
ayant pour objet la consultation demande´e a` l’Assemble´e parlementaire
europe´ene par le Conseil da la Communaute´ e´conomique europe´ene sur un
premier re`glement d’application des articles 85 et 86 du traite´ de la CEE
(Document 104/1960-1961, 1961)
Deringer A and Tessin C, ‘Das erste Kartellgesetz des Gemeinsamen Marktes’
[1962] NJW 989
Deutsch E, ‘Entwicklung und Entwicklungsfunktion der Deliktstatbesta¨nde. Ein
Beitrag zur Abgrenzung der rechtsetzenden von der rechtsprechenden Gewalt
im Zivilrecht’ [1963] JZ 385
——, Haftungsrecht (Heymann 1976)
——, Allgemeines Haftungsrecht (2nd edn, Heymanns 1996)
Dieckmann H, ‘§ 46 – Geldbußen und Zwangsgelder’ in G Wiedemann (ed),
Handbuch des Kartellrechts (1st edn, CH Beck 1999)
Diemer C, ‘The Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust
Rules’ (2006) 27 ECLR 309
Do¨ring O, Feuerbachs Straftheorie und ihr Verha¨ltnis zur Kantischen Philosophie
(Reuther & Reichard 1907)
Drake S, ‘Scope of Courage and the principle of ”individual liability” for
damages – further development of the principle of effective judicial protection
by the Court of Justice’ (2006) 31 ELRev 841
Dreher M, ‘Kartellrechtliche Kronzeugenprogramme und Gesellschaftsrecht’
[2009] ZWeR 397
Du¨ck H, Eufinger A and Schultes M, ‘Das Spannungsverha¨ltnis zwischen
kartellrechtlicher Kronzeugenregelung und Akteneinsichtsanspruch nach
§ 406e StPO’ [2012] EuZW 418
Dunleavy N, Competition Law: A Practitioner's Guide (Bloomsbury Professional 2010)
Dworschak S and Maritzen L, ‘Einsicht – der erste Schritt zur Besserung? Zur
Akteneinsicht in Kronzeugendokumente nach dem Donau Chemie-Urteil des
EuGH’ [2013] WuW 839
Eckhardt KA, Lex Salica: 100 Titel-Text (Bo¨hlaus 1953)
Edmond C, ‘From whom the whistle blows’ Legal Week (London, 22 September 2011)
Edward D and Lane R, European Union Law (Edward Elgar 2014)
Edwards CD, Control of Cartels and Monopolies: An International Comparison
(Oceana Pub 1967)
Eger T and Weise P, ‘Some limits to the private enforcement of antitrust law: a
grumbler's view on harm and damages in hardcore price cartel cases’ (2010) 3
GCLR 152
162
Eilmansberger T, Die Bedeutung der Art 85 und 86 EG-V fu¨r das o¨sterreichische
Zivilrecht (Verlag der O¨sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1998)
——, ‘Schadenersatz wegen Kartellverstoßes – Zum EuGH-Urteil Courage/Crehan’
[2002] ecolex 28
Emmerich V, ‘§ 33 GWB, Unterlassungsanspruch, Schadensersatzpflicht’ in
U Immenga and E-J Mestma¨cker (eds), Wettbewerbsrecht, vol 2 (5th edn,
CH Beck 2014)
Engliˇs K, ‘Hans Kelsens Lehre von der Gerechtigkeit: ein Beitrag zur Theorie der
Gesellschaftsordnungen’ (1961) 47 ARSP 301
Epicurus, Principal doctrines (GRG Mure tr, Infomotions 1996)
Erhard L, Prosperity through competition (ET Roberts and JB Wood trs, FA Praeger
1958)
Ernst W, ‘§ 280 BGB’ in FJ Sa¨cker and R Rixecker (eds), Mu¨nchener Kommentar
zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol 2 (6th edn, CH Beck 2012)
European Commission, XIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1983 (Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 1984)
——, XXII nd Report on Competition Policy, 1992 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 1993)
——, XXXI st Report on Competition Policy, 2001 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2002)
——, XXXIV th Report on Competition Policy, 2004, vol. 1 (Brussels/Luxembourg,
2005)
——, XXXV th Report on Competition Policy, 2005 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2006)
——, XXXVI th Report on Competition Policy, 2006 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2007)
——, XXXVII th Report on Competition Policy, 2007 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2008)
——, XXXVIII th Report on Competition Policy, 2008 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2009)
——, ‘Antitrust: European Competition Network publishes report on leniency
convergence’ MEMO/09/456 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
MEMO-09-456_en.pdf> accessed 01/03/2016
——, XXXIX th Report on Competition Policy, 2009 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2010)
——, XXXX th Report on Competition Policy, 2010 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2011)
——, XXXXI st Report on Competition Policy, 2011 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2012)
——, XXXXII nd Report on Competition Policy, 2012 (Brussels/Luxembourg, 2013)
——, Antitrust: Commission welcomes Council adoption of Directive on antitrust
damages actions (2014)
163
Feddersen CT, ‘Art 23 VO(EG) 1/2003’ in E Grabitz, M Hilf and
M Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europa¨ischen Union (30th edn,
CH Beck 2009)
Feenstra R, ‘Das Deliktsrecht bei Grotius’ in R Feenstra and R Zimmermann (eds),
Das ro¨misch-holla¨ndische Recht (Duncker & Humblot 1992)
Fiedler L, ‘Der aktuelle Richtlinienvorschlag der Kommission – der große Wurf fu¨r
den kartellrechtlichen Schadensersatz?’ [2013] BB 2179
Fingleton J, ‘De-monopolising Ireland’ in C-D Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds),
European competition law annual 2003: What is an abuse of a dominant
position? (Hart Pub 2006)
Fleming JG, Fleming's The law of torts (10th edn, Thomson Reuters 2011)
Foster C, Wynn T and Ainley N, Disclosure and Confidentiality: A Practitioner’s
Guide (1st edn, Pearson 1996)
Foster N, EU Law (4th edn, OUP 2014)
Francis BPB, ‘Subsidiarity and Antitrust: The Enforcement of European
Competition Law in the National Courts of Member States’ (1995) 27 Law &
PolIntBus 247
Frese MJ, Sanctions in EU Competition Law (Hart Pub 2014)
Fried C, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligations (Harvard
University Press 1981)
Frier BW, A casebook on the Roman law of delict (Scholars Press 1989)
Friedmann W and Verloren P, ‘International Cartels and Combines’ in
W Friedmann (ed), Anti-Trust Laws: A Comparative Symposium (Stevens 1956)
Fuller LL, ‘Consideration and Form’ (1941) 41 ColLRev 799
Fuller LL and Perdue WR, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages’ (1936) 46
YaleLJ 52
Gaitanides C, ‘Art 220 EGV [Aufgabe]’ in H von der Groeben und J Schwarze,
Kommentar zum Vertrag u¨ber die Europa¨ische Union und zur Gru¨ndung der
Europa¨ischen Gemeinschaft (6th edn, 2003)
Gardner J, ‘What is tort law for? Part 1: the place of corrective justice’ (2011) 30
Law Philos 1
Geffcken H, Lex Salica zum akademischen Gebrauche (Veit&Comp 1898)
Genzmer E, ‘Talion im klassischen und nachklassischen Recht?: Erwa¨gungen u¨ber
Ursprung und Grundgedanken des Edikts Quod quisque juris in alterum
statuerit, ut ipse eodem jure utatur’ (1942) 62 ZSS 122
Gerber DJ, Law and Competition in Twentieth-Century Europe: Protecting
Prometheus (OUP 2001)
164
Giglio F, The foundations of restitution for wrongs (Hart Pub 2007)
Ginsburg DH, ‘Comparing Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and Europe’
(2005) 1 JCL&E 427
Gomez L and Harrision F, ‘Global Cartels Handbook’ in SJ Mobley and
R Denton (eds), Global Cartels Handbook (OUP 2011)
Goodwin F, The XII tables (Stevens 1886)
Gordley J, ‘Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition’ in P Benson (ed), The
Theory of Contract Law (OUP 2001)
Goyder J and Albors-Llorens A, Goyder's EC Competition Law (5th edn, OUP 2009)
Grainger I, Fealy M and Spencer M, The Civil Procedure Rules in Action (2nd edn,
Cavendish 2000)
Greger R, ‘Ein Beitrag des Prozessrechts zur Versachlichung der fiktiven
Reparaturkostenabrechnung’ [2002] NJW 1477
Griffin JM, ‘An inside view at a cartel at work: Common characteristics of
international cartels’ in A Sundberg (ed), Fighting cartels – why and how?
(Swedish Competition Authority 2001)
Gropp W, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (Springer 2005)
Grundmann S, ‘§ 246 Gesetzlicher Zinssatz’ in FJ Sa¨cker and R Rixecker (eds),
Mu¨nchener Kommentar zum BGB, vol 2 (6th edn, CH Beck 2012)
——, ‘§ 247 Basiszinssatz’ in FJ Sa¨cker and R Rixecker (eds), Mu¨nchener
Kommentar zum BGB, vol 2 (6th edn, CH Beck 2012)
——, ‘§ 248 Zinseszinsen’ in FJ Sa¨cker and R Rixecker (eds), Mu¨nchener
Kommentar zum BGB, vol 2 (6th edn, CH Beck 2012)
——, ‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ in FJ Sa¨cker and R Rixecker (eds),
Mu¨nchener Kommentar zum BGB, vol 2 (6th edn, CH Beck 2012)
Gru¨neberg C, ‘§ 248 Zinseszinsen’ in O Palandt (ed), Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch
(74th edn, CH Beck 2015)
——, ‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ in O Palandt (ed), Bu¨rgerliches
Gesetzbuch (74th edn, CH Beck 2015)
Gussone P and Maritzen L, ‘Anmerkung zur Entscheidung des EuGH vom
6.6.2013 (C-536/11, EWS 2013, 288) – Zum Akteneinsichtsrecht Dritter im
Kartellverfahren’ [2013] EWS 292
Gu¨terbock K, Bracton and his relation to the Roman law: a contribution to the
history of the Roman law in the middle ages (JB Lippincott 1866)
Habermas J, Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law
and democracy (W Rehg tr, Polity 1996)
165
Hammond SD, ‘Dettecting and deterring cartel activity through an effective leniency
program’ (International Workshop on Cartels, Brighton, 21st/22nd November
2000) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/9928.htm>
accessed 01/03/2016
——, ‘Cornerstones of an effective leniency program’ (ICN Workshop on Leniency
Programs, Sydney, Australia, 22nd/23rd November 2004) <http://www.
justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/206611.htm> accessed 01/03/2016
Hardie WFR, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1980)
Harding C, European Community Investigations and Sanctions, The Supranational
Control of Business Delinquency (Leicester University Press 1993)
Harding C and Joshua J, Regulating Cartels in Europe (OUP 2010)
Harding C and Sherlock A, European Community Law: Text and Materials
(Longman 1995)
Hasse JC, Die culpa des ro¨mischen Rechts: Eine civilistische Abhandlung
(Marcus 1838)
Hausmaninger H and Selb W, Ro¨misches Privatrecht (9th edn, Bo¨hlau 2001)
Havu K, ‘Horizontal Liability for Damages in EU Law – the Changing Relationship
of EU and National Law’ (2012) 18 ELJ 407
Hazelhorst M, ‘Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law – Why Punitive
Damages Are a Step Too Far’ (2010) 18 ERPL 757
Hegel GWF, Hegel's Philosophy of right (SW Dyde tr, George Bell and Sons 1896)
Hempel R, ‘Privater Rechtsschutz im deutschen Kartellrecht nach der
7. GWB-Novelle’ [2004] WuW 362
——, ‘Anmerkung zur Entscheidung des EuGH vom 06.06.2013 (C 536/11;
EuZW 2013, 586) – Zur Frage des Akteneinsichtsrechts durch Schadenersatz-
kla¨ger im kartellrechtlichen Verfahren’ [2013] EuZW 589
Hennig TT, Settlements im Europa¨ischen Kartellverfahren – Eine rechtsvergleichende
Untersuchung konsensualer Verfahrensbeendigungsmechanismen unter
besonderer Beru¨cksichtigung der Verpflichtungszusageentscheidung (Nomos 2010)
Herdegen M, Vo¨lkerrecht (13th edn, CH Beck 2014)
Heuston RFV and Buckley RA, Salmond and Heuston on the law of torts (21st edn,
Sweet & Maxwell 1996)
Hetzel P, ‘Die Vielzahl kartellrechtlicher Kronzeugenregelungen als Hindernis fu¨r die
Effektivita¨t der europa¨ischen Kartellbeka¨mpfung’ [2005] EuR 735
Hiljemark L, ‘Enforcement of EC Competition Law in National Courts. The
Perspective of Judicial Protection’ (1997) 17 YEL 83
Hirsbrunner S, ‘VO 1/2003, Art. 18’ in R Bechtold, W Bosch and I Brinker (eds),
EU-Kartellrecht (3rd edn, CH Beck 2014)
166
Hirsch G, ‘Anwendung der Kartellverfahrensordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 durch
nationale Gerichte’ [2003] ZWeR 233
Hodges CJS, ‘European competition enforcement policy: integrating restitution and
behaviour control: an integrated enforcement policy, involving public and private
enforcement with ADR’ (2011) 34 WComp 383
Ho¨ffe O, ‘Kant's Principle of Justice as Categorical Imperative of Law’ in
Y Yovel (ed), Kant’s Practical Philosophy Reconsidered (Springer 1989)
Honsell H, ‘Einleitung zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch’ in H Roth (ed), J von
Staudingers Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einfu¨hrungsgesetz
und Nebengesetzen, vol 1 (Sellier/de Gruyter 2013)
Hoskins M, ‘Garden Cottage revisited: the availability of damages in the national
courts for breaches of the EEC competition rules’ (1992) 13 ECLR 257
Hossenfelder S and Lutz M, ‘Die neue Durchfu¨hrungsverordnung zu den Artikeln 81
und 82 EG-Vertrag’ [2003] WuW 118
Hunter JD and Hornsby S, ‘New incentives for ”whistle-blowing”: will the
E.C. Commission's notice bear fruit?’ (1997) 18 ECLR 38
Hu¨schelrath K, ‘How Are Cartels Detected? The Increasing Use of Proactive
Methods to Establish Antitrust Infringements’ (2010) 1 JECL&P 522
Jacobs FG, ‘Civil Enforcement of EEC Antitrust Law’ in MLR Association (ed),
The art of governance: Festschrift zu Ehren von Eric Stein (Nomos 1987)
Jacobs FG and Deisenhofer T, ‘Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private
Enforcement of EC Competition Rules: A Community Perspective’ in
C-D Ehlermann and I Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2001:
Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (Hart Pub 2003)
Jaeger W, ‘Art. 81 EG’ in U Loewenheim, KM Meessen and A Riesenkampff (eds),
Kartellrecht (2nd edn, CH Beck 2005)
Jansen N, Die Struktur des Haftungsrechts – Geschichte, Theorie und Dogmatik
außervertraglicher Anspru¨che auf Schadensersatz (Mohr Siebeck 2003)
Jephcott M, ‘The European Commission's New Leniency Notice – Whistling the
right tune’ (2002) 23 ECLR 378
Johnson J, An Idealist Justification of Punishment – Kant, Hegel and the problem
of punishment (VDM 2008)
Jones A and Sufrin B, EU Competition Law – Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn,
OUP 2014)
Jones AHM, The Criminal Courts of the Roman Republic and Principate
(Blackwell 1972)
Jones CA, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA
(OUP 1999)
167
Justinian, Justinian's Institutes (P Birks, G McLeod and K Paul trs,
Duckworth 1987)
Kant I, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of
Jurisprudence as the Science of Right (W Hastie tr, Clark 1887)
——, On the old saw: that may be right in theory but it won't work in practice
(EB Ashton tr, University of Pennsylvania Press 1974)
——, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (3rd edn, JW Ellington tr,
Hackett 1993)
Kapp T, ‘Grundsatz der Einzelabwa¨gung sticht Gesetzgebungskompetenz aus’
[2013] BB 1556
Kaser M, ‘David Daube, Studies in Biblical Law, Cambridge, University Press, 1947’
(1948) 66 ZSS 617
——, Das Ro¨mische Privatrecht (2nd edn, CH Beck 1971)
Kaser M and Knu¨tel R, Ro¨misches Privatrecht (19th edn, CH Beck 2008)
Katzenmeier C, ‘Vorbemerkung zu §§ 823 ff’ in B Dauner-Lieb and W Langen (eds),
BGB, Schuldrecht (2nd edn, Nomos 2012)
Kaufman BE, ‘Chicago and the development of twentieth-century labor economics’,
in RB Emmett (ed), The Elgar Companion to the Chicago School of Economics
(Edward Elgar 2010)
Kelsen H, Reine Rechtslehre: Einleitung in die Rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik
(1st edn, Deuticke 1934)
——, What is justice?: justice, law, and politics in the mirror of science (University
of California Press 1957)
——, Pure Theory of Law (M Knight tr, 2nd Revised and Enlarged edn, University
of California Press 1967)
Keren-Paz T, Torts, egalitarianism, and distributive justice (Ashgate 2007)
Kerse CS, EC Antitrust Procedure (4th edn, 1998)
Kersting K, ‘Kronzeugenregelung und Akteneinsicht Dritter im Kartellverfahren’
[2013] JZ 737
Kindler P, Gesetzliche Zinsanspru¨che im Zivil- und Handelsrecht – Pla¨doyer fu¨r
einen kreditmarktorientierten Fa¨lligkeitszins (Mohr 1996)
Klawiter DC, ‘Corporate Leniency in the Age of International Cartels: The American
Experience’ (2000) 14 Antitrust 13
Klein E, Statusvertra¨ge im Vo¨lkerrecht. Rechtsfragen territorialer Sonderregime
(Springer 1980)
168
Kloub J, ‘White Paper on Damage Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust
Rules – Plea for a More Holistic Approach to Antitrust Enforcement’ (2009) 5
ECJ 515
Klusmann M, ‘Internationale Kartelle und das Europa¨ische Leniency-Programm
aus Sicht der Verteidigung – Kritik nach fu¨nf Jahren Anwendungspraxis’
[2001] WuW 820
Ko¨hler H, ‘Kartellverbot und Schadensersatz’ [2004] GRUR 99
——, ‘EU-Kartellgeldbußen gegen Mutter- und Tochtergesellschaft: Gesamtschuld-
nerische Haftung und Ausgleich im Innenverha¨ltnis’ [2011] WRP 277
Komninos AP, ‘New Prospects for Private Enforcement of Competition Law:
Courage v. Crehan and the Community Right in Damages’ (2002) 39
CMLRev 447
——, ‘Public and private antitrust enforcement in Europe: complement? Overlap?’
(2006) 3 CompLRev 5
——, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of
EC Competition Law by National Courts (Hart Pub 2008)
Konrad S, ‘Der Schutz der Vertrauensspha¨re zwischen Rechtsanwalt und Mandant
im Zivilprozess’ [2004] NJW 710
Ko¨tz H, ‘Haftung fu¨r besondere Gefahr’ (1970) 170 AcP 1
——, ‘Ziele des Haftungsrechts’ in JF Baur (ed), Festschrift fu¨r Ernst Steindorff
zum 70 Geburtstag am 13 Ma¨rz 1990 (de Gruyter 1990)
Kraayvanger J and Hilgard MC, ‘Urkundenvorlegung im Zivilprozess. Anna¨herung
an das amerikanische ”discovery”-Verfahren?’ [2003] NJ 572
Kredel N and Kiani S, ‘Germany’ in SJ Mobley and R Denton (eds), Global Cartels
Handbook (OUP 2011)
Kremer C, ‘Liability for Breach of European Community Law – An Analysis of the
New Remedy in the Light of English and German Law’ (2003) 22 YEL 203
Kru¨ger H-W, O¨ffentliche und private Durchsetzung des Kartellverbots gema¨ß
Art. 81 EG – eine rechtso¨konomische Analyse (Dt Univ-Verl 2007)
Kru¨ger P, ‘Ueber dare actionem und actionem competere in der justinianischen
Compilation’ (1895) 16 ZSS 1
Kubicek TL, Adversarial Justice: America's Court System on Trial (Algora
Pub 2006)
Kunkel W, Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung des ro¨mischen Kriminalverfahrens in
vorsullanischer Zeit (Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1962)
Lande RH, ‘Introduction: Benefits of private enforcement’ in AA Foer and
RMStutz (eds), Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the United States:
A Handbook (Edward Elgar 2012)
169
Lande RH and Davis JP, ‘The Extraordinary Deterrence of Private Antitrust
Enforcement: A Reply to Werden, Hammond, and Barnett’ (2012) 58 Antitrust
Law Bulletin 174
Landes WM and Posner RA, ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’ (1975) 4 JLS 1
Lane R, EC Competition Law (Longman 2000)
Lange H, Schadensersatz und Privatstrafe in der mittelalterlichen Rechtstheorie
(Bo¨hlau 1955)
Larenz K, Allgemeiner Teil des deutschen Bu¨rgerlichen Rechts (7th edn,
CH Beck 1989)
Larenz K and Canaris C-W, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, (CH Beck 1994)
Leucht B and Marquis M, ‘American Influences on EEC Competition Law: Two
Paths, How Much Dependence?’ in KK Patel and H Schweitzer (eds), The
Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (OUP 2013)
Lettl T, ‘Der Schadensersatzanspruch gema¨ß § 823 Abs. 2 BGB i.V. mit Art. 81
Abs. 1 EG’ (2003) 167 ZHR 473
Lewis C, Remedies and the Enforcement of European Community Law (Sweet &
Maxwell 1996)
Liebs D, ‘Damnum, damnare und damnas: Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte einiger
lateinischer Rechtswo¨rter’ (1968) 85 ZSS 173
——, Die Klagenkonkurrenz im ro¨mischen Recht (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1972)
——, Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichwo¨rter (7th edn, CH Beck 2007)
Lord Steyn J, ‘Perspectives of corrective and distributive justice in tort law’ (2002) 37
Irish Jurist 1
Lorenz M, An Introduction to EU Competition Law (CUP 2013)
Lorenz S, ‘§ 276 BGB’ in C Bamberger and H Roth (eds), Beck'scher
Online-Kommentar BGB (34th edn, 2015)
——, ‘§ 280 BGB’ in C Bamberger and H Roth (eds), Beck'scher Online-Kommentar
BGB (34th edn, CH Beck 2015)
Lu¨bbig T, ‘Die zivilprozessuale Durchsetzung etwaiger Schadensanspru¨che durch die
Abnehmer eines kartellbefangenen Produktes’ [2004] WRP 1254
——, ‘Gleichzeitiger Verstoß gegen nationales und europa¨isches Wettbewerbsrecht
durch Kartell – Aktivlegitimation jedes Gescha¨digten’ [2006] EuZW 529
Lutz M, ‘Schwerpunkte der 7 GWB-Novelle’ [2005] WuW 718
MacGregor A and Boyle D, ‘Private antitrust litigation in the EU: levelling the
playing field’ (2014) 20 IntTLR 30
170
Maher I, ‘Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: Evolving Formalism’
in de G Burca and P Craig (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 1999)
——, ‘Regulation and modes of Governance in EC Competition Law: What’s new
in Enforcement?’ (2008) 31 FordhamIntlLJ 1713
——, ‘Competition Policy’ in E Jones, A Menon and S Weatherill (eds), The Oxford
Handbook of the European Union (OUP 2012)
Maitland-Walker J, ‘Editorial: A step closer to a definitive ruling on a right in
damages for breach of the EC competition rules’ (1992) 13 ECLR 1
Manzini P, ‘European Antitrust in Search of the Perfect Fine’ (2008) 31 WComp 3
Martorana M, ‘Pareto Efficiency’ (2007) 11 Region Focus 8
Ma¨sch G, ‘Private Anspru¨che bei Versto¨ßen gegen das europa¨ische Kartellverbot –
”Courage” und die Folgen’ [2003] EuR 825
Mattei U, ‘Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal
Systems’ (1997) 45 AJCL 5
McAfee RP, Mialon HM and Mialon SH, ‘Private v. public antitrust enforcement:
A strategic analysis’ (2008) 92 JPublicEcon 1863
Meder S, Schuld, Zufall, Risiko – Untersuchungen struktureller Probleme
privatrechtlicher Zurechnung (Klostermann 1993)
Mederer W, ‘Richtlinienvorschlag u¨ber Schadensersatzklagen im Bereich des
Wettbewerbsrechts’ [2013] EuZW 847
Medicus D, ‘Vorschla¨ge zur U¨berarbeitung des Schuldrechts – Das allgemeine Recht
der Leistungssto¨rungen’ [1992] NJW 2384
Medicus D and Lorenz S, Schuldrecht I: Allgemeiner Teil; ein Studienbuch (20th edn,
CH Beck 2012)
Medinger JD, ‘Antitrust Leniency Programs: A Call for Increased Harmonization as
Proliferating Programs Undermine Deterrence’ (2003) 52 EmoryLJ 1439
Meibom W and Zinsmeister U, ‘Verbesserung des Europa¨ischen Wettbewerbsver-
fahrens’ in Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 1991/92, Verwaltungs- und
Rechtsprechungspraxis, Referate des 20 FIW-Seminars 1992 und der
11 Bru¨sseler Informationstagung 1992, FIW-Schriftenreihe Heft 153 (FIW 1993)
Meier K and Wehlau A, ‘Die zivilrechtliche Haftung fu¨r Datenlo¨schung, Datenverlust
und Datenzersto¨rung’ [1998] NJW 1585
Mestma¨cker E-J, ‘The EC Commission’s Modernization of Competition Policy: A
Challenge to the Community’s Constitutional Order’ (2000) 1 EBOR 401
Meyer-Ladewig J, Europa¨ische Menschenrechtskonvention (3rd edn, Nomos 2011)
Micklitz H-W, ‘Anmerkung zu EuGH, Urt. v. 20.9.2001 – Rs C-453/99
(Courage Ltd.)’ [2001] EWiR 1141
171
Miege C, ‘Modernisation and Enforcement Pluralism – The Role of Private
Enforcement of Competition Law in the EU and the German Attempts in the
7th Amendment of the GWB’ (Conference Organised by the Amsterdam Center
for Law and Economics on Remedies and Sacntions in Competition Policy,
Amsterdam, 17-18 Feb 2005)
Miersch G, ‘Vorbemerkung Art. 17’ in E Grabitz and M Hilf (eds), Das Recht der
Europa¨ischen Union (40th edn, CH Beck 2009)
Miller FD, Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics (OUP 1995)
Milutinovic´ V, The 'right to damages' under EU competition law: from Courage
v. Crehan to the White Paper and beyond (Kluwer 2010)
Mohr J, ‘Normativer Schadensbegriff und Berechnung des Schadensersatzes’
(2010) 32 JURA 645
Mommsen T, Ro¨misches Strafrecht (Duncker & Humblot 1899)
Montag F and Rosenfeld A, ‘A solution to the problems? Regulation 1/2003 and the
Modernization of competition procedure’ [2003] ZWeR 107
Moore S and Lewis C, ‘Duties, Directives and damages in European Community
law’ [1993] PL 151
Mo¨schel W, ‘Beho¨rdliche oder privatrechtliche Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts?’
[2007] WuW 483
——, ‘Should private enforcement of competition law be strengthened?’ (2013) 6
GCLR 1
Murphy F, ‘EU Commission proposes new measures re private actions for damages
and collective actions’ (2014) 35(5) ECLR 223
Murray G, ‘European Union’ in SJ Mobley and R Denton (eds), Global Cartels
Handbook (OUP 2011)
Nagel S, Schweizerisches Kartellprivatrecht im internationalen Vergleich (Dike 2007)
Nash JF, ‘Equilibrium points in n-person games’ (1950) 36 ProcNatAcadSci 48
——, ‘Non-Cooperative Games’ (1950) 54 AnnMath 286
Nazzini R, ‘The objective of private remedies in EU competition law’ (2011) 4
GCLR 131
Nebbia P, ‘Damages actions for the infringement of EC competition law:
compensation or deterrence?’ (2008) 33 ELRev 23
Nebbia P and Szyszczak E, ‘White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the
EC Antitrust Rules’ (2009) 20 EBLR 635
Neumayr F, Ku¨hnert H and Schaumburger V, ‘The Gordian knot of access to file:
legislation will have to resolve it’ (2014) 7 GCLR 185
172
Notaro N, ‘Case C-188/95, Fantask A/S and Others v. Industriministeriet
(Erhvervsministeriet), Judgment of 2 December 1997, [1997] ECR I-6783’
(1998) 35 CMLRev 1385
Nowak C, Konkurrentenschutz in der EG – Interdependenz des gemeinschaftlichen
und mitgliedstaatlichen Rechtsschutzes von Konkurrenten (Nomos 1997)
——, ‘Anmerkung zu EuGH, Urteil vom 20.9.2001 – Rs. C-453/99 Courage Ltd/
Bernard Crehan und Bernard Crehan/Courage Ltd u.a.’ [2001] EuZW 715
——, ‘Art 23 VO(EG) 1/2003’ in U Loewenheim, KM Meessen and A Riesen-
kampff (eds), Kartellrecht (2nd edn, CH Beck 2009)
Oberheim R, ‘ZPO-Reform Update 1: Grundzu¨ge’ [2002] JA 408
Odudu O and Edelman J, ‘Compensatory damages for breach of Article 81’ (2002) 27
ELRev 327
OECD, Fighting Hard Core Cartels: Harm, Effective Sanctions and Leniency
Programmes (OECD 2002)
Oetker H, ‘§ 249 BGB – Art und Umfang des Schadensersatzes’ in FJ Sa¨cker and
R Rixecker (eds), Mu¨nchener Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol 2
(6th edn, CH Beck 2012)
Oftinger K and Stark EW, Schweizerisches Haftpflichtrecht (5th edn,
Schulthess 1995)
Ortiz Blanco L, EU Competition Procedure (3rd edn, OUP 2013)
Ost K, ‘Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung – gesetzgeberische Entwicklungen in
Deutschland und Europa –’ in P Behrens, E Braun and C Nowak (eds),
Europa¨isches Wettbewerbsrecht nach der Reform: Forum Wissenschaft und
Praxis zum Internationalen Wirtschaftsrecht (Nomos 2006)
Palzer C, ‘Unvereinbarkeit der o¨sterreichischen Regelung zur Akteneinsicht
Kartellgescha¨digter mit EU-Recht‘ [2013] NZKart 324
Panizza E, ‘Ausgewa¨hlte Probleme der Bonusregelung des Bundeskartellamts vom
07.03.2006’ [2008] ZWeR 58
Parisi F, Liability for negligence and judicial discretion (2nd edn, University of
California at Berkeley 1992)
Paulweber M, ‘The End of a Success Story? The European Commission's White
Paper on the Modernisation of the European Competition Law; A Comparative
Study about the Role of the Notification of Restrictive Practices within the
European Competition and the American Antitrust Law’ (2000) 23 WComp 3
Peters F, ‘Der Zinssatz des § 288 I 1 BGB’ [1980] ZRP 90
Peyer S, ‘Myths and Untold Stories – Private Antitrust Enforcement in Germany’
(Working Paper No. 10-12, Centre for Competition Policy 2010)
173
——, ‘Die private Durchsetzung von kartellrechtlichen Anspru¨chen – Status Quo in
England und Wales’ [2012] EuZW 617
Pfeiffer G, Strafprozessordnung, Kommentar (5th edn, CH Beck 2005)
Pika W, Ex causa furtiva condicere im klassischen ro¨mischen Recht (Duncker &
Humblot 1988)
Plato, Republic (Shorey P tr, Harvard University Press 1935)
——, Laws (Bury RG tr, Harvard University Press 1967)
Polinsky AM, ‘Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines’ (1980) 9 JLS 105
Polinsky AM and Che Y-K, ‘Decoupling liability: optimal incentives for care and
litigation’ (1991) 22 RJE 562
Potter N, ‘Kant on Punishment’ in TE Hill (ed), The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s
Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell 2009)
Pru¨tting H, ‘§ 287 Schadensermittlung; Ho¨he der Forderung’ in T Rauscher and
W Kru¨ger (eds), Mu¨nchener Kommentar zur ZPO, vol 1 (4th edn, CH Beck 2013)
Ptak R, ‘Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the Ordoliberal Foundations oft
he Social Market Economy’ in P Mirowski and D Plehwe (eds), The Road
From Mont Pelerin: The Making of The Neoliberal Thought Collective (Harvard
University Press 2009)
Ramı´rez Pe´rez SM, ‘The Evolution of the Law on Articles 85 and 86 EEC
[Articles 101 and 102 TFEU]’ in KK Patel and H Schweitzer (eds), The Historical
Foundations of EU Competition Law (OUP 2013)
Rauscher T, ‘Einleitung’ in T Rauscher and W Kru¨ger (eds), Mu¨nchener Kommentar
zur ZPO, vol 1 (4th edn, CH Beck 2013)
Rehbinder E, ‘§ 33 GWB, Unterlassungsanspruch, Schadensersatzpflicht’ in
U Loewenheim, KM Meessen and A Riesenkampff (eds), Kartellrecht
(2nd edn, 2009)
Reich N, ‘Rechtfertigung der Festbetragsregelung durch GKV-Spitzenverba¨nde nach
Art. 86 EG?’ [2000] EuZW 653
——, ‘The ‘Courage’ Doctrine: Encouraging or Discouraging Compensation for
Antitrust Injuries?’ (2005) 42 CMLRev 35
Reichold K, ‘§ 142 Anordnung der Urkundenvorlegung’ in H Thomas and H Putzo,
Zivilprozessordnung, Kommentar (36th edn, CH Beck 2015)
Reifner U, ‘Das Zinseszinsverbot im Verbraucherkredit’ [1992] NJW 337
Reynolds MJ and Anderson DG, ‘Immunity and leniency in EU cartel cases: current
issues’ (2006) 27 ECLR 82
Ripstein A, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard
University Press 2009)
174
Ritchie DG, ‘Aristotle’s Subdivision of Particular Justice’ (1894) 8 CR 185
Ritter J-S, ‘Private Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts – Vorschla¨ge des Weißbuchs der
Europa¨ischen Kommission’ [2008] WuW 762
Ritter KL, ‘Art. 16. Einheitliche Anwendung des gemeinschaftsrechtlichen
Wettbewerbsrechts’ in U Immenga and E-J Mestma¨cker, Wettbewerbsrecht,
vol 1 (5th edn, CH Beck 2012)
Ritter L and Braun WD, European competition law: a practitioner's guide (3rd edn,
Kluwer 2004)
Roach K and Trebilock MJ, ‘Private Enforcement of Competition Laws’ (1996) 34
Osgoode Hall LJ 461
Robert JV, Routledge philosophy guidebook to Aristotle and the Politics
(Routledge 2009)
Rodger BJ, ‘The Interface Between Competition Law and Private Law – Article 81,
Illegality and Unjustified Enrichment’ (2002) 6 EdinLR 217
——, ‘Private Enforcement of Competition Law, the Hidden Story: Competition
Litigation Settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000-2005’ (2008) 29 ECLR 96
Rodger BJ and MacCulloch A, ‘Community Competition Law Enforcement,
Deregulation and Re-regulation: The Commission, National Authorities and
Private Enforcement’ (1998) 4 ColumJEurL 579
Ro¨hling A, ‘Die Zukunft des Kartellverbots in Deutschland nach In-Kraft-Treten
der neuen EU-Verfahrensrechtsordnung’ [2003] GRUR 1019
Roll A, ‘Die Ho¨he der Verzugszinsen’ [1973] DRiZ 339
Rosochowicz PH, ‘Deterrence and the relationship between public and
private enforcement of competition law’ Amsterdam Center for Law &
Economics, Competition & Regulation Meeting 2005, Working Papers <http
://acle.uva.nl/binaries/content/assets/subsites/amsterdam-center-
for-law--economics/cr-meetings/2005/working-papers-2005/hahn-roso
chowicz.pdf?1345929891801> accessed 01/03/2016
Roth W-H, ‘Private Enforcement of European Competition Law – Recommendations
Flowing from the German Experience’ in J Basedow (ed), Private Enforcement
of EC Competition Law (Kluwer 2007)
Ru¨hl G, ‘Die Begrenzung des § 142 ZPO durch das Anwaltsprivileg’ [2012] ZZP 25
Saenger I, ‘Grundfragen und aktuelle Probleme des Beweisrechts aus deutscher Sicht’
(2008) 121 ZZP 139
——, Zivilprozessordnung (6th edn, Nomos 2015)
Saidov AK, Comparative Law (Wildy 2003)
175
Salkever S, ‘Reading Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics as a Single
Course of Lectures: Rhetoric, Politics, and Philosophy’ in S Salkever (ed), The
Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Political Thought (CUP 2009)
Sanders M and others, ‘Disclosure of leniency materials in follow-on damages actions:
striking ”the right balance” between the interests of leniency applicants and
private claimants?’ (2013) 34 ECLR 174
Scanlon TM, ‘Promises and Contracts’ in P Benson (ed), The Theory of Contract
Law (CUP 2001)
Scha¨fer C, ‘Gerechtigkeit’ in C Scha¨fer (ed), Platon-Lexikon (Wiss Buchges 2007)
Scha¨fer H-B and Ott C, Lehrbuch der o¨konomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts (5th ed,
Springer 2012)
Scha¨fer K, ‘Unerlaubte Handlungen §§ 823-835’ in G Beitzke et al (eds), J von
Staudingers Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einfu¨hrungsgesetz
und Nebengesetzen, vol 5/II (Schuldverha¨ltnisse §§ 823-835) (10th/11th edn,
J Schweitzer Verlag 1975)
Scharaw B, ‘Commission proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages and
recommendation on principles for collective redress – the road towards ”private
antitrust enforcement” in the European Union?’ (2014) 35 ECLR 352
Schaub S, ‘§ 248 BGB Zinseszinsen’ in HP Westermann (ed), Erman Bu¨rgerliches
Gesetzbuch (14th edn, Otto Schmidt 2014)
Scheuch, S ‘§ 383 Zeugnisverweigerung aus perso¨nlichen Gru¨nden’ in V Vorwerk and
C Wolf, Beck’scher Online-Kommentar ZPO (19th edn CH Beck 2015)
Schiemann G, ‘BGB § 254 Mitverschulden’ in M Martinek (ed), Staudinger,
Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch, vol 2 (Sellier/de Gruyter 2005)
——, ‘Vorbemerkung’ in HP Westermann (ed), Erman Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch
(14th edn, Otto Schmidt 2014)
Schinkel MP, ‘Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe’ (2007) 30 WComp 539
Schmidt J, Schadensersatz und Strafe: Zur Rechtfertigung des Inhaltes von
Schadensersatz aus Verschuldenshaftung (H Lang 1973)
Schmidt K, ‘Das ”Zinseszinsverbot”. Sinnwandel, Geltungsanspruch und
Geltungsgrenzen’ [1982] JZ 829
——, ‘Umdenken im Kartellverfahrensrecht! Gedanken zur Europa¨ischen VO
Nr. 1/2003’ [2003] BB 1237
——, ‘Anhang 2: Privatrechtliche Durchsetzung – Materielles Recht’ in U Immenga
and E-J Mestma¨cker (eds), Wettbewerbsrecht, vol 1 (5th edn, CH Beck 2012)
Schmidt SK, ‘European Commission’ in E Jones, A Menon and S Weatherill (eds),
The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (OUP 2012)
176
Schroeder F-C, ‘Die Fahrla¨ssigkeit als Erkennbarkeit der Tatbestandsverwirklichung’
(1989) 17 JZ 776
Schubert C, ‘§ 249 Art und Umfang des Schadensersatzes’ in C Bamberger and
H Roth (eds), Beck'scher Online-Kommentar BGB (34th edn, CH Beck 2011)
Schulze R, ‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ in R Schulze (ed), Bu¨rgerliches
Gesetzbuch (8th edn, CH Beck 2014)
Schu¨tt M, ‘Individualrechtsschutz nach der 7. GWB-Novelle. Anmerkung zum
Regierungsentwurf vom 12.08.2004’ [2004] WuW 1124
Schwarze R, ‘§ 280 BGB’ in M Lo¨wisch (ed), J von Staudingers Kommentar zum
Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol §§ 255-304 (rev edn, Sellier/de Gruyter 2014)
Schweitzer H, ‘Die Richtlinie zur privaten Durchsetzung von Schadensersatzan-
spru¨chen aus Wettbewerbsversto¨ßen’, Speech on International Forum on EU
Competition Law (Brussels, April 2014) <https://www.studienvereinigung-
kartellrecht.de/downloads/forum-kartellrecht/2014_prof-dr-heike-
schweitzer.pdf> accessed 01/03/2016
Segal I and Whinston M, ‘Public vs private enforcement of antitrust law: a survey’
(2007) 28 ECLR 306
Sell C, Die actio de rupitiis sarciendis der XII Tafeln und ihre Aufhebung durch die
Lex Aquilia (Marcus 1877)
Seitz C, ‘Grundsa¨tze der ordnungsgema¨ßen Verwaltung und der Gleichbehandlung –
Sanktionsreduzierung wegen Nichtbeachtung der im Gemeinschaftsrecht
geltenden Verfahrensgarantien durch die Europa¨ische Kommission’ [2008]
EuZW 525
——, ‘Public over Private Enforcement of Competition Law?’ [2012] GRUR-RR 137
Shavell SM, ‘The social versus the private incentive to bring suit in a costly legal
system’ (1982) 11 JLS 333
——, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Belknap Press 2004)
Shaw J, ‘Decentralization and law enforcement in EC competition law’ (1995) 15
LS 128
Shiffrin S, ‘The Divergence of Contracts and Promises’ (2007) 120 HarvLRev 708
Siems M, Comparative Law (CUP 2014)
Simpson AWB, Leading Cases in the Common Law (Clarendon Press 1996)
Smith A, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
(Strahan & Cadell 1776)
Smith H, ‘The Francovich case: state liability and the individual's right to damages’
(1992) 13 ECLR 129
177
Snyder F, ‘The Effective of European Law: Institutions, processes, Tools and
Techniques’ in T Daintith (ed), Implementing EC Law in the United Kingdom:
Structures for Indirect Rule (Chancery Law Pub 1995)
Solte´sz U, ‘Bußgeldreduzierung bei Zusammenarbeit mit der Kommission in
Kartellsachen – ”Kronzeugenmitteilung”’ [2000] EWS 240
Spagnolo G, Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes, Discussion Paper
No 4840 (CEPR 2004)
Spindler G, ‘§ 823 BGB – Schadensersatzpflicht’ in HG Bamberger and H Roth (eds),
Beck'scher Online-Kommentar BGB (34th edn, CH Beck 2013)
St Aquinas T, Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics (R McInerny and
CI Litzinger trs, Dumb Ox Books 1993)
Stadler A, ‘§ 276 Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ in R Stu¨rner (ed), Jauernig,
Kommentar zum BGB (14th edn, CH Beck 2014)
——, ‘ZPO § 142 Anordnung der Urkundenvorlegung’ in H-J Musielak and W Voit,
Zivilprozessordnung, Kommentar (12th edn, Vahlen 2015)
Stakheyeva H, ‘Removing obstacles to a more effective private enforcement of
competition law’ (2012) 33 ECLR 398
Stein P, ‘Continental Influences on English Legal thought, 1600-1900’ in P Stein (ed),
The Character and Influence of the Roman Civil Law (Hambledon 1988)
Steuer S, ‘Justizreform – von außen betrachtet’ [2000] WM 1889
Stillfried G and Stockenhuber P, ‘Schadensersatz bei Verstoß gegen das Kartellverbot
des Art. 85 EG-V’ [1995] WBl 345
Stockenhuber P, ‘Art 81 EGV / Art 101 AEUV’ in E Grabitz, M Hilf and
M Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europa¨ischen Union, vol 1 (53rd edn,
CH Beck 2010)
Stoll H, ‘Fleming: The Law of Torts, 3. Aufl.’ (1966) 166 AcP 380
Stu¨rner R, ‘Duties of Disclosure and Burden of Proof in the Private Enforcement
of European Competition Law’ in J Basedow (ed), Private Enforcement of
EC Competition Law (Kluwer 2007)
Sura M, ‘Art. 23 VO(EG) 1/2003’ in E Langen and H-J Bunte (eds), Kartellrecht,
vol 2 (14th edn, Luchterhand 2014)
Taylor PM, EC and UK Competition Law and Compliance (Sweet & Maxwell 1999)
Tickle G and Tyler C, ‘Community Competition Law, Recovering Damages in the
English Courts’ in J Lonbay and A Biondi (eds), Remedies for Breach of EC Law
(Wiley 1997)
Tomuschat C, Neuhold H and Kropholler J, Vo¨lkerrechtlicher Vertrag und
Drittstaaten (CF Mu¨ller 1988)
178
Topel J, ‘§ 50 Zivilrechtliche Sanktionen’ in G Wiedemann (ed), Kartellrecht
(2nd edn, CH Beck 2008)
Tucker AW, ‘The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler’ (1983) 14 Two-YearCollMathJ
228
Tuhr A, Zur Scha¨tzung des Schadens in der lex Aquilia: Rudolf von Jhering zur
Feier seines fu¨nfzigja¨hrigen Doctorjubila¨ums am VI. August MDCCCXCII (Law
Faculty of the University of Basel 1892)
Vallerani M, Medieval Public Justice (SR Blanshei tr, CUoA Press 2012)
van Caenegem RC, The birth of the English common law (2nd edn, CUP 1988)
van Weert W and Maier M, ‘European Union’ in J Buhart (ed), Leniency Regimes:
Jurisdictional comparisons (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012)
Vandenborre I and Goetz T, ‘EU Competition Law Procedural Issues’ (2013) 4(6)
JECL&P 506-13
Vandenborre I et al, ‘Actions for antitrust damages in the European Union:
evaluating the Commission's Directive proposal’ (2014) 7 GCLR 1
Vaughan D, ‘EC Competition Law in National Proceedings’ in G Slynn and
SA Pappas (eds), Procedural Aspects of EC Competition Law (EIPA 1995)
Veljanovski CG, Economic Principles of Law (CUP 2007)
Verstrynge J-F, ‘Current Antitrust Policy Issues in the EEC: Some Reflections on
the Second Generation of Competition Policy’ in BE Hawk (ed), Antitrust and
Trade Policies in International Trade (Matthew Bender 1985)
Virgo G, ‘The Effect of Illegality on Claims for Restitution in English Law’ in
WJ Swadling (ed), The Limits of Restitutionary Claims – A Comparative
Analysis (United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law 1997)
Vo¨lkl A, Die Verfolgung von Ko¨rperverletzungen: Studien zum Verha¨ltnis von
To¨tungsverbrechen und Injuriendelikt (Bo¨hlau 1984)
Vollrath C, ‘Das Maßnahmepaket der Kommission zum wettbewerbsrechtlichen
Schadenersatzrecht’ [2013] NZKart 434
von Danwitz T, Verwaltungsrechtliches System und europa¨ische Integration (Mohr
Siebeck 1996)
——, ‘Die Eigenverantwortung der Mitgliedsstaaten fu¨r die Durchfu¨hrung von
Gemeinschaftsrecht’ [1998] DVBl 421
von Feuerbach PJA, Lehrbuch des gemeinen, in Deutschland geltenden peinlichen
Rechts (Heyer 1801)
von Jhering R, Das Schuldmoment im ro¨mischen Privatrecht (Bru¨hl 1867)
von Liszt F, ‘Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht, Marburger Universita¨tsprogramm
1882’ (1883) 3 ZStW 1
179
——, Strafrechtliche Aufsa¨tze und Vortra¨ge (de Gruyter 1970)
von Maydell B, Geldschuld und Geldwert – Die Bedeutung von A¨nderungen d.
Geldwertes fu¨r d. Geldschulden (CH Beck 1974)
von Mayr R, Die condictio des ro¨mischen Privatrechts (Duncker & Humblot 1900)
Waelbroeck D, Slater D and Even-Shoshan G, ‘Study on the conditions of claims
for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules (Ashurst Study)’
(EC Commission Open Procedure, 2004)<http://ec.europa.eu/competition
/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf> accessed
01/03/2016
Wagner G, ‘Haftung und Versicherung als Instrumente der Techniksteuerung’
[1999] VersR 1441
——, ‘Pra¨vention und Verhaltenssteuerung durch Privatrecht – Anmaßung oder
legitime Aufgabe?’ (2006) 206 AcP 352
——, ‘Unerlaubte Handlungen §§ 823-838’ in M Habersack (ed), Mu¨nchener
Kommentar zum Bu¨rgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol 5 (§§ 705-853) (6th edn,
CH Beck 2013)
Wagner G, ‘Urkundenedition durch Prozeßparteien – Auskunftspflicht und
Weigerungsrechte’ [2007] JZ 706
Wainwright R, ‘The Relationship between the national judge and the European
Commission in applying articles 81 and 82 of the EC treaty’ (2005) 5(1)
ERA Forum 84
Weatherill S, ‘Public Interest Litigation in EC Competition Law’ in H-W Micklitz
and N Reich (eds), Public Interest Litigation Before European Courts
(Nomos 1996)
——, Cases and Materials on EU Law (11th edn, OUP 2014)
Weber M, Max Weber on law in economy and society (Simon & Schuster 1954)
Weidenbach G and Saller M, ‘Das Weißbuch der Europa¨ischen Kommission zu
kartellrechtlichen Schadensersatzklagen’ (2008) 20 BB 1020
Weidt CF, ‘The Directive on actions for antitrust damages after passing the
European Parliament’ (2014) 35(9) ECLR 438
Weinrib E, The Idea of Private Law (rev edn, OUP 2012)
Weishaar S, Cartels, competition and public procurement: law and economic
approaches to bid rigging (Edward Elgar 2013)
Weitbrecht A, ‘Die Kronzeugenmitteilung in EG-Kartellsachen’ [1997] EuZW 555
Wesseling R, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law (Hart Pub 2000)
Westermann HP, ‘§ 276 BGB Verantwortlichkeit des Schuldners’ in HP Wester-
mann (ed), Erman Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch (14th edn, Otto Schmidt 2014)
180
——, ‘§ 280 BGB’ in HP Westermann (ed), Erman Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch
(14th edn, Otto Schmidt 2014)
Weyer H, ‘Gemeinschaftsrechtliches Verbot und nationale Zivilrechtsfolgen’ (1999) 7
ZEuP 424
——, ‘Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Vergaben fu¨r das nationale Zivilverfahren’
[2000] EuR 145
——, ‘Anmerkung zu EuGH, Urteil vom 20.9.2001 – C-453/99 Courage/Crehan-
Courage Ltd ./. Bernard Crehan und Bernard Crehan ./. Courage Ltd u.a.’
[2002] GRUR Int 54
——, ‘Zivilrechtsfolgen, Art 81 EG’ in H Glassen et al (eds), Frankfurter Kommentar
zum Kartellrecht (80th edn, Otto Schmidt 2000 ff.)
Williamson OE, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets,
Relational Contracting (Macmillan 1985)
Wils WPJ, ‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?’
(2003) 26 WComp 473
——, ‘The relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions
for Damages’ (2009) 32 WComp 3
Winterstein A, ‘A community right in damages for breach of EC competition rules?’
(1995) 16 ECLR 49
——, ‘Art. 81 – Fallgruppen Marktabsprachen’ in H Schro¨ter, T Jakob and
W Mederer (eds), Europa¨isches Wettbewerbsrecht (1st edn, 2003)
Wirtz M, Mo¨ller S and Eden E, ‘Germany’ in J Buhart (ed), Leniency Regimes:
Jurisdictional comparisons (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012)
Wisking S and Dietzel K, ‘United Kingdom’ in J Buhart (ed), Leniency Regimes:
Jurisdictional comparisons (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012)
Wißmann T, ‘Decentralised Enforcement of EC Competition Law and the New
Polify on Cartels: The Commission White Paper of 28th of April 1999’ (2000) 23
WComp 123
Wood A, ‘The disclosure of leniency related materials supplied during competition
enforcement proceedings: battle lines drawn by the ECJ’ (2013) 18(1) CovLJ 112
Wolf D, ‘European Political Integration, Comparative Law and Private Enforcement
of Competition Law’ in T Einhorn (ed), Spontaneous Order, Organization and
the Law, Roads to a European Civil Society, Liber Amicorum Ernst-Joachim
Mestma¨cker (Asser 2003)
Wo¨stmann H, ‘ZPO § 142 Anordnung der Urkundenvorlegung’ in I Saenger,
Zivilprozessordnung, Handkommentar (6th edn, Nomos 2015)
——, ‘ZPO § 144 Augenschein; Sachversta¨ndige’ in I Saenger, Zivilprozessordnung,
Handkommentar (6th edn, Nomos 2015)
181
Young CM, ‘Aristotle’s Justice’ in R Kraut (ed), Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell 2007)
Zabeck A, ‘StPO § 406e [Akteneinsicht]’ in R Hannich, Karlsruher Kommentar zur
Strafprozessordnung (7th edn, CH Beck 2013)
Zekoll J and Bolt J, ‘Die Pflicht zur Vorlage von Urkunden im Zivilprozeß – Ameri-
kanische Verha¨ltnisse in Deutschland?’ [2002] NJW 3129
Ziegenbein U, Die Unterscheidung von Real und Personal Actions im Common Law
(Duncker & Humblot 1971)
Zimmer DJ and Logemann H, ‘Unterliegen ”Altfa¨lle” der verscha¨rften
Schadensersatzhaftung nach § 33 GWB? Die versteckte Ru¨ckwirkung im
Kartellprivatrecht’ [2006] WuW 982
Zimmermann R, Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition
(Clarendon Press 1996)
Zuber A, Die EG-Kommission als amicus curiae – Die Zusammenarbeit der
Kommission und der Zivilgerichte der Mitgliedstaaten bei der Anwendung der
Wettbewerbsregeln des EG-Vertrages (Heymann 2001)
——, ‘VO 1/2003/EG Art. 16 Einheitliche Anwendung des gemeinschaftlichen
Wettbewerbsrechts’ in U Loewenheim, KM Meessen and A Riesenkampff,
Kartellrecht (2nd edn, CH Beck 2009)
Zweigert K and Ko¨tz H, Einfu¨hrung in die Rechtsvergleichung (3rd edn, Mohr
Siebeck 1996)
182
List of cases
A. European cases
I. European Court of Justice
1. Case 11-70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorrats-
stelle fu¨r Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125
2. Case 3-73 Hessische Mehlindustrie Karl Scho¨ttler KG v Einfuhr- und Vorrats-
stelle fu¨r Getreide und Futtermittel [1973] ECR 745
3. Case 4-73 J Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the
European Communities [1974] ECR 491
4. Case 127-73 Belgische Radio en Televisie and socie´te´ belge des auteurs,
compositeurs et e´diteurs v SV SABAM and NV Fonior [1974] ECR 313
5. Case 155-73 Giuseppe Sacchi [1974] ECR 409
6. Case 4-73 DEPE-J Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of
the European Communities [1977] ECR 1
7. Case 33-76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschafts-
kammer fu¨r das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989
8. Case 61-79 Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Denkavit italiana Srl
[1980] ECR 1205
9. Case 136-79 National Panasonic (UK) Limited v Commission of the European
Communities [1980] ECR 2033
10. Case 319-82 Socie´te´ de Vente de Ciments et Be´tons de l’Est SA v Kerpen &
Kerpen GmbH und Co KG [1983] ECR 4173
11. Joined cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG v Commission of the European
Communities [1989] ECR 2859
12. Case 374-87 Orkem v Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR
3283
13. Case C-2/88 Imm J. J. Zwartveld and Others [1990] ECR I-3365
14. Case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bra¨u AG [1991] I-935
15. Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tile´orassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia
Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and
Nicolaos Avdellas and others [1991] ECR I-2925
16. Joined case C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and
others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357
17. Joined cases C-87/90, 88/90 and 89/90 A Verholen and others v Sociale
Verzekeringsbank Amsterdam [1991] ECR I-3757
18. Case C-67/91 Direccio´n General de Defensa de la Competencia v Asociacio´n
Espan˜ola de Banca Privada and others [1992] ECR I-4785
183
19. Case C-271/91 M Helen Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire
Area Health Authority [1993] ECR I-4367
20. Case C-128/92 HJ Banks & Co Ltd v British Coal Corporation [1994] ECR
I-1209
21. Case C-188/92 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Bundesrepublik
Deutschland [1994] ECR I-833
22. Case C-250/92 Gøttrup-Klim e.a. Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs
Grovvareselskab AmbA [1994] ECR I-5641
23. Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Peˆcheur SA v Bundesrepublik
Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte:
Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ECR I-1029
24. Joined cases C-319/93, 40/94 and 224/94 Dijkstra v Friesland (Frico Domo)
Coo¨peratie BA [1995] ECR I-4471
25. Joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes
Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten
[1995] ECR I-4705
26. C-180/95 Nils Draehmpaehl v Urania Immobilienservice OHG [1997] ECR
I-2195
27. Case C-242/95 GT-Link A/S v De Danske Statsbaner (DSB) [1997] ECR
I-4449
28. Case C-282/95 P Gue´rin automobiles v Commission of the European
Communities [1997] ECR I-1503
29. Case C-2/97 Societa` italiana petroli SpA (IP) v Borsana Srl [1998] ECR I-8597
30. Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369
31. Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan
v Courage Ltd and Others [2001] ECR I-6297
32. Case C-94/00 Roquette Fre`res SA v Directeur ge´ne´ral de la concurrence, de la
consommation et de la re´pression des fraudes, and Commission of the European
Communities [2002] ECR I-9011
33. Joined cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and
C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri A/S (C-189/02 P), Isoplus Fernwa¨rmetechnik
Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH and Others (C-202/02 P), KE KELIT
Kunststoffwerk GmbH (C-205/02 P), LR af 1998 A/S (C-206/02 P),
Brugg Rohrsysteme GmbH (C-207/02 P), LR af 1998 (Deutschland) GmbH
(C-208/02 P) and ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd (C-213/02 P) v Commission
of the European Communities [2005] ECR I-5425
34. Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico
Assicurazioni SpA (C-295/04), Antonio Cannito v Fondiaria Sai SpA
(C-296/04) and Nicolo` Tricarico (C-297/04) and Pasqualina Murgolo
(C-298/04) v Assitalia SpA [2006] ECR I-6619
35. Case C-301/04 P Commission of the European Communities v SGL Carbon AG
[2006] I-5915
36. Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and
Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union
and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-6351
37. Case C-139/07 P European Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau
GmbH [2010] ECR I-5885
38. Joined cases C-322/07 P, C-327/07 P and C-338/07 P Papierfabrik August
Koehler AG (C-322/07 P), Bollore´ SA (C-327/07 P) and Distribuidora
184
Vizca´ına de Papeles SL (C-338/07 P) v Commission of the European
Communities [2009] ECR I-7191
39. Case C-506/08 P Kingdom of Sweden v European Commission and MyTravel
Group plc [2011] ECR I-6237
40. Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161
41. Case C-404/10 P Commission v E´ditions Jacob [2012] 5 CMLR 8 (ECJ)
42. Case C-477/10 P European Commission v Agrofert Holding a.s. [2012] 5
CMLR 9 (ECJ)
43. Case C-571/10 Servet Kamberaj v Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia
autonoma di Bolzano (IPES) and Others [2012] 2 CMLR 43 (ECJ)
44. Case C-617/10 A˚klagaren v Hans A˚kerberg Fransson [2013] 2 CMLR 46
45. Case C-280/11 Council of the European Union v Access Info Europe [2014] 2
CMLR 6 (ECJ)
46. Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbeho¨rde v Donau Chemie AG and Others
[2013] 5 CMLR 19 (ECJ)
47. Case C-365/12 P European Commission v EnBW Energie Baden-Wu¨rttem-
berg AG [2014] 4 CMLR 30 (ECJ)
48. Case C-127/13 P Guido Strack v European Commission [2015] 1 WLR 2649
(ECJ)
49. Case C-612/13 P ClientEarth v European Commission [2015] NVwZ 1273
II. European General Court
1. Case T-7/89 SA Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission of the European
Communities Case [1992] 4 CMLR 84 (CFI)
2. Case T-13/89 Imperial Chemical Industries plc v Commission of the European
Communities [1992] ECR II-1021
3. Case T-138/89 Nederlandse Bankiersvereniging and Nederlandse Vereniging
van Banken v Commission of the European Communities [1992] ECR II-2181
4. Case T-23/90 Automobiles Peugeot SA and Peugeot SA v Commission of the
European Communities [1991] ECR II-653
5. Case T-24/90 Automec Srl v Commission of the European Communities [1992]
ECR II-2223
6. Case T-44/90 La Cinq SA v Commission of the European Communities [1992]
ECR II-1
7. Case T-347/94 Mayr-Melnhof Kartongesellschaft mbH v Commission of the
European Communities [1998] ECR II-1751
8. Joined Cases T-305, 306, 307, 313, 316, 318, 325, 328, 329, 335/94 Limburgse
Vinyl Maatschappij NV, et al v Commission of the European Communities
[1999] ECR II-931
9. Case T-353/94 Postbank v Commission [1996] ECR II-921
10. Joined cases T-45/98 and T-47/98 Krupp Thyssen Stainless GmbH and Acciai
speciali Terni SpA v Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR
II-3757
11. Case T-48/98 Compan˜ia espan˜ola para la fabricacio´n inoxidables, SA
(Acerinox) v Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR II-3859
12. Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission of the European
Communities [2003] ECR II-4653
185
13. Case T-31/99 ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd v Commission of the European
Communities [2002] ECR II-1881
14. T-224/00 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Archer Daniels Midland
Ingredients Ltd v Commission of the European Communities Case [2003] ECR
II-2597
15. Joined cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and
T-252/01 Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd and Others v Commission of the European
Communities [2004] ECR II-1181
16. Case T-44/00 Mannesmannro¨hren-Werke AG v Commission of the European
Communities [2004] ECR II-2223
17. Joined cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 JFE Engineering Corp,
formerly NKK Corp, Nippon Steel Corp, JFE Steel Corp and Sumitomo Metal
Industries Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [2004] ECR II-2501
18. Case T-38/02 Groupe Danone v Commission of the European Communities
[2005] ECR II-4407
19. Case T-48/02 Brouwerij Haacht NV v Commission of the European
Communities [2005] ECR II-5259
20. Case T-322/01 Roquette Fre`res SA v Commission of the European
Communities [2006] ECR II-3137
21. Case T-59/02 Archer Daniels Midland Co. v Commission of the European
Communities [2006]ECR II-3627
22. Joined cases T-259/02 to T-264/02 and T-271/02 Raiffeisen Zentralbank
O¨sterreich AG and Others v Commission of the European Communities [2006]
ECR II-5169
23. Case T-2/03 Verein fu¨r Konsumenteninformation v Commission [2005] ECR
II-1121
24. Joined cases T-391/03 and T-70/04 Yves Franchet and Daniel Byk v
Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR II-2023
25. Case T-30/05 William Prym GmbH & Co KG and Prym Consumer GmbH &
Co KG v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-107
26. Joined cases T-109/02, T-118/02, T-122/02, T-125/02, T-126/02, T-128/02,
T-129/02, T-132/02 and T-136/02 Bollore´ SA and Others v Commission of
the European Communities [2007] ECR II-947
27. Joined cases T-391/03 and T-70/04 Yves Franchet and Daniel Byk v
Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR II-2023
28. Case T-410/03 Hoechst GmbH v Commission of the European Communities
[2008] ECR II-881
29. Case T-36/04 Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) v
Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-3201
30. Joined cases T-101/05 and T-111/05 BASF AG and UCB SA v Commission
of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-4949
31. Case T-237/05 E´ditions Odile Jacob SAS v Commission [2010] ECR II-2245
32. Case T-181/10 Reagens SpA v European Commission [2014] 4 CMLR 28
(EGC)
33. Case T-534/11 Schenker AG v European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2014:854
186
III. European Commission
1. Bandengroothandel Frieschebrug BV/NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie
Michelin (Case IV29491) Commission Decision number 81/969/EEC [1981]
OJ L353/3
2. National Panasonic (Case IV/30070) Commission Decision number
82/853/EEC [1982] OJ L354/28
3. Agreements and concerted practices in the flat-glass sector in the Benelux
countries (Case IV/30988) Commission Decision number 84/388/EEC [1984]
OJ L212/13
4. Polistil/Arbois (Case IV/30658) Commission Decision number 84/282/EEC
[1984] OJ L136/9
5. Zinc producer group (Case IV/30350) Commission Decision number
84/405/EEC [1984] OJ L220/27
6. Sperry New Holland (Case IV/30839) Commission Decision number
85/617/EEC [1985] OJ L376/21
7. Wood pulp (Case IV/29725) Commission Decision number 85/202/EEC [1985]
OJ L85/1
8. British Dental Trade Association (Case IV/31593) Commission Decision
number 88/477/EEC [1988] OJ L233/15
9. Viho/Toshiba (Case IV/32879) Commission Decision number 91/532/EEC
[1991] OJ L287/39
10. French-West African shipowners’ committees (Case IV/32450) Commission
Decision number 92/262/EEC [1992] OJ L134/1
11. Viho/Parker Pen (Case IV/32725) Commission Decision number 92/426/EEC
[1992] OJ L233/27
12. Luxembourg Brewers (Case COMP/37800/F3) Commission Decision number
2002/759/EC [2001] OJ L253/21
13. Graphite electrodes (Case COMP/E-1/36490) Commission Decision number
2002/271/EC [2002] OJ L100/1
14. Vitamins (Case COMP/E-1/37512) Commission Decision number 2003/2/EC
[2003] OJ L6/1
15. Methionine (Case C37519) Commission Decision number 2003/674/EC [2003]
OJ L255/1
16. Methylglukamin (Case COMP/E-2/37978) Commission Decision number
2004/104/EC [2004] OJ L38/18
17. Flood flavour enhancers (Case COMP/C37671) Commission Decision number
2004/206/EC [2004] OJ L75/1
18. Carbonless paper (Case COMP/E-1/36212) Commission Decision number
2004/337/EC [2004] OJ L115/1
19. Electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products (Case C38359)
Commission Decision number 2004/420/EC [2004] OJ L125/45
20. Coca-Cola (Case COMP/A.39.116/B2) Commission Decision number
2005/670/EG [2005] OJ L253/21
21. Copper Plumbing tubes (Case C38069) Commission Decision number
2006/485/EC [2006] OJ L192/21
22. Gas Insulated Switchgear (Case COMP/38.899) Commission Decision number
C(2006) 6762 final [2008] OJ C5/7
187
B. English cases
I. House of Lords / Supreme Court
1. Bell v Lever Bros [1932] UKHL 2; [1932] AC 161
2. Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562
3. X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 AC 633
4. McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59
5. Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52; [2004] 1 AC
309; [2003] 3 WLR 1091; [2003] 4 All ER 987
II. Court of Appeal
1. Compagnie Financie`re du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Company (1882) 11
QBD 55
2. Rondel v Worsley [1967] 1 QB 443; [1966] 3 WLR 950; [1966] 3 All ER 657;
(1966) 110 SJ 810
3. Island Records Ltd v Corkindale [1978] Ch 122
4. Brophy v Dunphys Chartered Surveyors [1998] All ER (D) 85; [1998] EG 37
(CS); (1998) 95(16) LSG 23; (1998) 142 SJLB 109, CA (Civ Div)
5. Courage Ltd v Crehan (No.2) [1999] UKCLR 407
6. Norwich Union Life Insurance Co Ltd v Quershi; Aldrich v Norwich Union
Life Insurance Co Ltd [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 707; [1999] CLC 1963, CA
(Civ Div)
7. Black v Sumitomo [2001] EWCA Civ 1819, [2002] 1 WLR 1562
8. SES Contracting Ltd and ors v UK Coal plc and ors [2007] EWCA Civ 791
III. High Court
1. Clarion Ltd v National Provident Institution [2000] 2 All ER 265; [2000] 1
WLR 1888 (Ch)
2. Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub Company [2003] EWHC 1510 (Ch)
3. Hutchison 3G UK Ltd v O2 (UK) Ltd [2008] EWHC 55 (Comm), [2008]
UKCLR 83
4. National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd and others [2012]
EWHC 869 (Ch)
IV. Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) and
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT)
1. Aberdeen Journals v DGFT [2003] CAT 14
2. Umbro Holdings ltd v OFT [2003] CAT 26, [2004] Comp AR 217
3. Umbro Holdings Ltd v OFT [2004] CAT 3
4. Argos and Littlewoods v OFT [2004] CAT 5
5. Claymore Dairies v OFT [2003] CAT 12
6. Claymore Dairies v OFT [2004] CAT 16
7. Cityhook v OFT [2006] CAT 32
8. Albion Water v OFWAT [2008] CAT 3
9. Durkan Holdings v Office of Fair Trading [2010] CAT 12
188
C. German cases
I. Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht)
1. BVerfGE 64, 133
2. BVerfGE 107, 395
3. BVerfGE 115, 205
4. BVerfG NJW 2007, 204
II. Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof)
1. BGH NJW 1982, 1150
2. BGHZ 91, 243
3. BGH NJW 1987, 909
4. BGH NJW 1988, 3016
5. BGH WM 1995, 341
6. BGH GRUR 2003, 356 – Pra¨zisionsmessgera¨te
7. BGH NJW 2007, 155
8. BGH NJW 2007, 2989
9. BGH NJW-RR 2007, 1393
10. BGH GRUR 2009, 603 – Versicherungsuntervertreter
11. BGH WM 2010, 1448
12. BGH WM 2014, 1379
III. Higher Regional Courts, Regional Courts and District Courts
(Oberlandes-, Landes- und Amtsgerichte)
1. OLG Stuttgart NJW 2007, 2989
2. LG Mannheim, GRUR 2004, 182 – Vitaminkartell
3. LG Mainz, NJW-RR 2004, 478
4. AG Bonn, GRUR-RR 2012, 178 – Pfleiderer
5. AG Bonn, NJW 2012, 937 – Pfleiderer II
D. Other international cases
I. European Court of Human Rights
1. Ruiz-Mateos v Spain [1993] 16 EHRR 505
2. Goktepe v Belgium (Application No 50372/99) (ECtHR)
3. Volkmer and Petersen v Germany [2002] NJW 3087 (ECtHR)
4. Pravednaya v Russia (Application No 69529/01) (ECtHR)
5. Nikitin v Russia [2005] 41 EHRR 10
6. John v Germany [2007] 45 EHRR SE4
7. Colak v Germany [2009] 49 EHRR 45
8. Herma v Germany [2010] NJW 3207 (ECtHR)
9. Cooperative Produzentenorganisatie v Netherlands [2010] NJOZ 1914 (ECtHR)
189
II. US courts
1. Associated Industries of New York State, Inc v Ickes 134 F 2d 694 (2d Cir
1943)
2. Hanover Shoe v United Shoe Machinery Corp [1968] 392 US 481
3. Illinois Brick Co v Illinois [1977] 431 US 720
4. Pfizer, Inc v Government of India [1978] 434 US 308
5. American Society of Mechanical Engineers Inc v Hydrolevel Corp [1982] 456
US 556
190
